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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis is centred on issues which are assuming rising impact for investors: the management 
of business’ decline and resulting situations of financial distress. Although, according to life-
cycle theory, decline and crisis in individual firms or entire industrial sectors are considered 
physiological phenomena in modern economic systems, their occurrence inevitably impacts the 
regularity of operating activities, the relationships between business and external stakeholders 
and, if the situation is not timely overcome, it may threaten the independence or the survival of 
the organization. 
It follows that business decline and financial distress are carefully studied by Financial 
Economics and Managerial Sciences, moreover they tend to be regulated by legal systems 
because in these situations the decision-makers have the incentive to adopt opportunistic and 
inefficient choices, likely to damage the environment where the firm lives in. In fact, the 
inevitable presence of asymmetrical information between internal and external stakeholders in 
a distressed firm creates a situation of tension about the distribution of the required sacrifices 
to sort out the situation of decline and distress. The tension among parties open the room for 
delays in recognition of causes and real dimensions of the business’ decline by management 
and controlling shareholders, which is likely to result in intervention with limited scope and 
low effectiveness; on the other hand, external stakeholders fear excessive impairment of their 
right and the interruption of regular relationships with the distressed firm. Consequently, many 
clients and employees abandon the distressed firm, while suppliers ask for immediate payment 
and creditors try to enforce their contractual right. In this messy situation, the declining business 
is likely to lose the possibility to focus on its core activities and to safeguard the residual value 
of key assets and resources, leading to further disruption of value and need of transformations 
which usually involve management team and shareholding structure. 
The thesis is aimed at presenting the available pathways to deal with situations of business 
decline and crisis, underlying their aspects at the light of the need to ensure the efficiency of 
economic system: it means that businesses with residual intrinsic value should continue, while 
businesses without significant value should be liquidated. Different restructuring procedures 
presents positive and negative aspects, and their choice shall be made under the light of the 
actual situation of the distressed business, to avoid extra costs and inefficient solutions which 
damage the overall set of stakeholders. 
With respect to this work, Chapters 1 and 2 are aimed to properly describe, with the help of 
scientific and managerial literature, the situation of decline and crisis and the ideal pathway for 
the return to growth. As introduction, Chapter 1 describes the features of business decline and 
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the so-called turnaround process from a managerial point of view. Chapter 2 is focused on the 
presentation of the set of legal instruments available to sort out situations of corporate crisis 
and financial distress. It is developed starting from the need to consistently rule the managerial 
behaviour in financial distress, then by presenting the set of institutions provided by legal 
systems to reorganize or liquidate a distressed business, with a focus on the distinction between 
out-of-court reorganizations and judicially-controlled proceedings. The aim of Chapter 2 is to 
describe the dynamic of the negotiations between the distressed firm and its stakeholders, which 
are influenced by the choice of a judicial or non-judicial composition procedure, so it tries to 
present a profile of costs and benefits of both type of procedures, to suggest the choice of the 
way which best fits for the corporate situation. 
Then, Chapter 3 provides the description of the role of debt from a financial and managerial 
point of view: while in normal periods it is a useful tool to ensure wise managerial choices and 
maximize overall value creation through the fiscal shield of interest expenses; as suggested by  
Damodaran (2008, page 363), “debt is a double-edged sword [and] declining firms often are 
exposed to the wrong side”, since in decline and crisis unsustainable debt burden accelerates 
disruption of value and created difficulties in making decision in the best interest of internal 
and external stakeholders. Also, the chapter briefly describes specialized active investors who 
deal with debt to create value: Private Equity Investors, aimed at sustaining growth and 
efficiency of target businesses, and Distressed Investors, who tries to turnaround distressed firm 
through massive acquisition of distressed debt claims. 
Finally, Chapter 4 and 5 are focused on the application of the tools to a complex case study 
about the restructuring of Seat Pagine Gialle: the business faced a sudden decline of its core 
products which, combined with very high debt burden arising from a leveraged acquisition 
undertaken by Private Equity investors in 2003. After a period of stability, at the end of 2008 
the business was uncapable to repay debt and it entered a long restructuring procedure from 
2009 to 2015, characterized by multiple out-of-court attempts and a final judicial procedure of 
Composition with creditors. While Chapter 4 describes the origins of Seat Pagine Gialle crisis, 
the historical steps of restructuring and its result with the help of official financial statements 
and legal documentation, Chapter 5 analyses the controversial aspects of the managerial choices 
putting the attention on the performance of its shares in the Stock Exchange and on the opinions 
issued by equity analysts. Despite its complexity, the case study seems to exemplify the critical 
aspects of negotiation among involved stakeholders, the negative effects of improper 
restructuring interventions, together with the potentiality of legal instruments in sorting out 
from situations of high financial distress.  
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CHAPTER 1: VALUE CREATION, DECLINE AND TURNAROUND 
 
1.1. FIRM AND VALUE CREATION 
It is widely known by managerial science that the firm is a combination of tangible, intangible 
and human resources, aimed at growing and creating value over time by satisfying the needs of 
clients under the constraints of effectiveness and efficiency. The firm is not a closed and 
unchangeable system, but it has some similarity with a living being. A firm is continuously in 
contact with stakeholders, such as shareholders, competitors, suppliers and public institutions, 
entertaining many complex relationships with its complex environment. 
More specifically, Falini (2011) suggests that the firm is an open set of organized resources 
where each component takes a specific role within an overall coordination ensuring the 
achievement of the common aim of the business. The vitality of the business depends on 
continual exchange of resources with the external environment, which usually has a significant 
influence on its evolution. This set of resources is valuable since the presence of coordination 
determines the creation of an overall value higher than the sum of values of separate 
components. Ultimately, to preserve its vitality, the firm is continuously asked to identify and 
improve its sources of value and defend them from inevitable deterioration due to competition 
and changes in technology and in the environment where the firm operates. 
According to Koller et al. (2015), value is the difference between the cash inflows and the cost 
of the investment sustained to achieve those inflows, adjusted for the time value of money and 
the risk that the future net cash flows do not occur. There are two relevant variables that 
determine the conversion of revenues into cash flows: Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) and 
growth rate of operating income. More specifically, the precondition for value creation is the 
fact that the ROIC is higher than the cost of Invested Capital, then, if this condition holds, the 
growth rate amplifies the magnitude of value creation. 
Return on Invested Capital drivers are specified in the following formula: 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶 = (1 − 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒) ∗
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
 
Ultimately, Return on Invested Capital depends on the industry structure and on the strategy 
pursued by the firm. Michael Porter, in his famous five forces model, suggests that the 
performance of an industry depends on the combined effect of these factors: the threat of new 
entrants, the availability of substitutive products, the degree of rivalry among competitors, the 
bargaining power of suppliers and customers. The ability of a certain business model to pursue 
a strategy that mitigates the intensity of these forces, guarantees to the firm implementing the 
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business model a competitive advantage that ultimately leads to higher profitability. In fact, the 
strategy allows the firm either to charge a price premium or to reduce the unitary cost and the 
need of invested capital. The higher profitability is measured by a higher level of Return on 
Invested Capital with respect to the firms in the same industry. 
More specifically, the competitive advantage belongs not to the whole firm but to each business 
unit within a certain firm, which is a specific product or service that is sold through a peculiar 
marketing mix. The most relevant sources of competitive advantage which allow the firms to 
charge a sustainable price premium while contrasting the effects of the Porter’s five forces, can 
be summarized as follows: 
- Innovative goods and services; 
- Higher quality perceived by the consumer; 
- Powerful brands; 
- Lock-in of customers due to high effort needed for the substitution of the supplier; 
- Barriers to entry of new players due to legal, technical or natural constraints; 
- Limitation of production capacity in the whole industry. 
On the other hand, competitive advantage allows the firm to produce and sell a good or service 
at a lower cost or unitary invested capital with respect to competitors. Some factors that affect 
cost and capital (so the dimension of efficiency) are: 
- Innovative business models that build up new relationships in the supply chain and 
distribution channels; 
- Access to unique and valuable natural resources; 
- Economies of scale; 
- Scalability of a product or process. (Koller et al., 2015, page 99) 
The sustainability of a competitive advantage is a relevant issue, because, in a market economy, 
the combined effect of competition, access to innovation and obsolescence reduces the ROIC 
over time by setting it equal to the cost of capital and this phenomenon stops the creation of 
new economic value. Therefore, to retain a sustainable competitive advantage, as suggested by 
Favotto et al. (2012), the firm should own and control a couple of resources with these following 
specific peculiarities. The resources shall be scarce, difficult to replicate and difficult to 
substitute, in the sense that their replication and substitution are characterized by high costs, 
long time needed and high uncertainty on results, and these factors discourage potential 
investments by competitors, since they would trigger high risk of economic losses. 
For example, an innovation which may be easily replicated by competitors, such as self-check-
in machines in the airport, does not grant a sustainable competitive advantage to the first airline 
company implementing it. In fact, other airlines, having access to the requested technology, 
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easily imitate the first-mover, so the benefit in the form of lower personnel cost, is progressively 
deteriorated by the dynamic of competition and, at the end of the day, it is shifted from the 
airline to the final customer (Koller et al., 2015). 
Another feature that a resource should possess to ensure a sustainable competitive advantage, 
is the imperfect mobility, in the sense that these valuable assets are difficult to exchange in the 
market because they are very complex and entrenched with the business where they have been 
originated. Finally, the firm owning the resources must have the capabilities to exploit them and 
to extract the connected benefits, otherwise the resource naturally loses its value. (Favotto et 
al., 2012) 
 
1.2. CYCLICALITY OF BUSINESSES 
Notwithstanding their effort to defend competitive advantage from deterioration by preserving 
the existing resources and by investing into growth and development of new valuable business 
opportunities, all firms and their industries experience a cyclicality: according to Gao & Alas 
(2010), who refer Allen’s study, firms are considered to have a life-cycle which can be divided 
in a couple of stages. In Allen’s opinion, the firm’s life is divided into five stages: “Pre-Start-
up, Start-up, Growth, Maturity and Rebirth or Decline”, but it is specified that “the Pre-Start-
up stage is when the enterprise’s concept is formulated, the enterprise does not indeed exist 
until the “Start-up” stage” (Gao & Alas, 2010, page 12). Each stage can be identified through 
the study of a couple of variables: age, size, focus, diversity and complexity. 
It follows that, over time, firms modify some of their key aspects, such as consistency of assets 
and resources, number of employees, revenues or financial indicators, and, by measuring the 
level of some reference variables, it is possible to classify a firm in its stage of life-cycle. During 
each step of the cycle, the final aim of value creation must be declined by directors and 
managers into different focuses. In the Start-up phase the firm is focused on survival and 
awareness, through identification of target market, attraction of customer and attention about 
financial resources. Then, in the Growth phase, the aim is to expand and to rapidly increase 
sales and market share. In the Maturity Phase, sales become stable and the firm focuses on 
profits and margins, which are threatened by increasing competition and innovation. (PAIB 
2006) 
From a practical point of view, it is possible to measure the level of revenues and earnings and 
to see that, in normal conditions, they follow a predictable pathway: they rise during the Start-
up and Growth phases, they reach their maximum in the Maturity phase and they fall in the last 
stage. The behaviour of these economic variables can be represented in Figure 1.1 and then 
explained in Table 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1 – Dynamics of Revenues and Earnings during business life-cycle 
Source: Damodaran (2010), page 8 
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Entirely from 
Existing Assets 
Table 1.1 – Main features of businesses during their life-cycle 
Personal Elaboration from Damodaran (2010), page 8 
 
Table 1.1 shows also the main difficulties a financial practitioner faces to determinate the 
economic value of a business: in the first stages of the lifecycle the firm has no history and high 
uncertainty, so its risk profile is very high, and its value is mainly based on future growth. When 
the firm and its industry mature, it becomes easier to forecast future perspective, to find out 
comparable firms and the weight of value created from future growth becomes smaller with 
respect to value arising from current business operations. In the last step, the decline, growth 
rate of revenues becomes negative, threatening the marginality and consequently the 
sustainability of the business. The main peculiarity of this stage is that “the firm does not 
increase the value of its economic capital, [which is destroyed and] the gravity of the decline is 
measured by the entity of this disruption in a certain time interval” (Giacosa & Mazzoleni 2012, 
page 15). 
The business life-cycle model suggests also that in the long run the decline of a business, is “a 
normal phenomenon and sometimes recurring in the enterprise life cycle, caused by 
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deterioration of its vitality”. (Giacosa & Mazzoleni 2012, page 18) It follows that firms are 
asked to appropriately predict and defer the entry into decline by appropriately facing the 
external pressures coming from the environment: they “must learn to live with the risk of 
decline and crisis” (P. Evans in Guatri 1995, page 59). 
When the decline occurs, the firm should immediately recognize it and accurately manage this 
event by exiting as soon as possible from stale Business Units and by finding new sources of 
value, to avoid the collapse of the firm and to transform the decline in a “rebirth”, which is the 
renewal of the business and the restart of the process of value creation for all stakeholders. 
 
1.3. DECLINE AND CRISIS 
A business’ decline is likely to be defined as a complex and progressive process characterized 
by a permanent reduction of effectiveness and efficiency of its operating dimensions: the 
business experiences a reduction in demand of good and services, together with increase of 
costs which reflects in reduction of operating marginality and cash flow generation, and they 
lead to the recognition of losses in the profit and loss statements. According to Giacosa & 
Mazzoleni (2012), a business experiences a decline whether operating margins and earnings, 
although they are still positive, they are shrinking over time and the reduction is expected to 
persist in future periods. It follows that we cannot talk about decline if reduction of earnings is 
caused by exceptional events and it is expected to quickly recover in the following years. Then, 
the only presence of extraordinary, transitory or purely cyclical losses shall not be classified 
into indications of decline. 
At the light of complexity of decline, many academics affirm that this phase in the business’ 
life-cycle should be divided into two main steps, which eventually, whether any recovery is not 
possible, lead to a final phase characterized by the definitive cessation of the firm’s operating 
activities. According to Guatri (1995), the two steps of a business’ decline are called decline 
and crisis, while the business dissolution is the disarray. Buttignon (2008), calls the steps, 
respectively, potential crisis, reversible crisis and irreversible crisis. Furthermore, Guatri 
divides the decline in two sub-phases, the incubation and the maturation. Analogously, the 
phase of reversible crisis may be staged into financial tension and insolvency. 
Although the distinction between decline and crisis is not straightforward, and difficult to be 
practically disentangled, Sirleo (2009) provides an interesting definition of these steps. He 
suggests that decline is a physiological phase of business life-cycle, characterized by alternance 
of periods of decline and return to growth through restructuring interventions with limited 
external impact; while crisis is a deterioration of decline which appears irreversible, unless 
radical interventions involving external stakeholders are taken. Moreover, Giacosa & 
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Mazzoleni (2012) state that in some cases the decline is so rapid that the business immediately 
enters in a situation of crisis, being asked to take radical intervention for its survival. 
According to a quantitative point of view, as suggested by Buttignon (2008), to distinguish 
different phases of decline, management should put its attention on present value of future cash 
flows that are expected to be generated by the firm. This value is known as going concern value, 
to underline the fact that it refers to the flow of revenues and operating margins coming from 
the continual conduct of core operating activities of the business. The going-concern value shall 
be compared with cumulated nominal value of outstanding debt (both financial and non-
financial) and with estimated amount of proceeds from liquidation of all firm’s assets, net of 
costs of disposal. When going-concern value is declining over time, but it remains higher then 
nominal value of debt, the business is facing a potential crisis; whether going-concern value 
falls below the cumulated amount of debt, the firm faces a situation of reversible crisis, which 
is likely to be solved through extraordinary measures. On the contrary, when going-concern 
value is lower than liquidation value, the firm faces a situation of irreversible crisis. In this case, 
the firm as a coordinated set of operating assets and resources is not valuable anymore: residual 
value of proceeds from separate disposal of assets owned by the firm, less the costs of 
termination of the activities, is higher than expected value of future cash flows. Figure 1.2 
shows the relationship between going-concern value, debt and liquidation value in a distressed 
firm. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 – Dynamics of Values in decline and crisis 
Source: Buttignon (2008), Page 256 
Despite this approach based on going-concern value is consistent with the final aim of a 
business, since “the Theory of Value Creation assumes as fundamental aim of a firm the increase 
of value of economic capital [and] this represents the condition to ensure the survival of the 
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firm in the long run” (Falini 2011, page 8), the estimation of requested financial variables is not 
straightforward since it depends on many variables and on the personal valuation of the 
appraiser, so it is important to define these stages also from a managerial point of view.  
According to Guatri (1995), the entry of a firm into the first stage of decline is usually gradual 
and progressive, but in some cases the trouble is fast and unexpected. A potential crisis can be 
discovered by its very first indications which have been called decadence and disequilibria: 
decadence mainly refers to quantitative symptoms of decline, while disequilibria are connected 
to quantitative indicators of decline.  
Disequilibria and decadence are referred to inefficiencies in the internal management of the 
firm, which may or may not be influenced by the dynamics of macroeconomic factors or 
industry-related phenomena. While indications of decadence are constituted by qualitative and 
descriptive phenomena, such as resignation of key human resources, loss of productivity or 
conflicts with suppliers and employees, disequilibria refer to deterioration of measurable ratios, 
taken from financial analysis, and computed from the most recent accounting data and financial 
statements. 
During maturation of decline, cash flows reduce over time and profit and loss statements close 
with losses, which start to erode the book value of shareholders ‘equity. If the reduction is not 
transitory, the value of capital for debt and equity investors starts to be negatively affected, via 
expectations of lower cash flows and higher volatility in in revenues and marginality.  
In the following step, the financial tension, the decline becomes a real but still reversible crisis, 
because the economic losses have a negative impact on the availability of cash. The firm is not 
able to match inflows and outflows of cash, and some payments are missed. Therefore, the firm 
starts to lose its creditability and trust among stakeholders, while its enterprise value continues 
to fall. This phase is very relevant because inevitably the state of distress become 
knowledgeable by the external stakeholders and their reaction may deteriorate the situation.  
In the last phase, the firm in crisis has run out available financial resources, becoming unable 
to face any payment due and it must take radical interventions to come up with the crisis. The 
interventions affect first the management and the corporate investors, and then the other 
stakeholders who are asked to make very strong sacrifices. This is the phase of insolvency, 
which, as it will be explained and defined in Chapter 2, is very relevant also from a legal 
perspective, and it requires deep interventions that involve both capital structure and top 
management team. In this situation, the corporate stakeholders inevitable sustain sacrifices and 
losses because of erosion of cash flows and assets value. 
The already described steps of decline are summarized in Figure 1.3, where the yellow boxes 
represent the state of decline or potential crisis and the blue boxes represent the state of crisis. 
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Figure 1.3 – Phases and Evidences of decline and crisis 
Personal elaboration from Guatri (1995) – Page 112 
 
1.3.1. Common features of decline 
To summarize the main common characteristics showed by firms experiencing a phase of 
decline, Damodaran (2010) provides a list of features which are very likely to be found in 
businesses experiencing situations of decline and crisis: 
- Stagnant or declining revenues, especially whether macroeconomic and industry 
situation is good or growing: this aspect directly refers to the above-presented definition 
of decline; 
- Shrinking or negative margins: this phenomenon signals that the firm is losing 
contractual power towards suppliers and it is reducing selling prices to sustain reduction 
in revenues; it reflects to the second leg of definition of decline; 
- Asset divestitures: some assets owned by declining firms lose their going-concern value, 
so they are likely to become more valuable inside different businesses, divestitures are 
also driven by the need of collecting liquidity to satisfy expiring obligations; 
- Extraordinary dividends and stock repurchases: if the declining firm has limited room 
for growth and debt burden is sustainable, the combined effect of asset divestures and 
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existing operations may generate large amounts of cash which are devoted to 
shareholders; 
- Downside of financial leverage: declining cash flow and limited growth opportunity 
determine the unsustainability of existing debt, since the hypothesis at the basis of the 
amortization plan of debts are not actual anymore. Therefore, the business faces 
difficulties in honouring payment of interests and in refinancing expiring debt. 
 
1.4. METHODS FOR RECOGNITION OF DECLINE AND CRISIS 
As suggested by Falini (2011), a situation of decline is manifested by the presence of economic 
losses and, in its deeper phases, also by the so-called financial tension, which is the temporary 
impossibility to meet the payments due on time. When the decline is not timely recognized by 
the managerial team, the only adoption of short-sighted measures to overcome losses and 
financial tension, such as the over-utilization of available revolving credit line, produces its 
effects in the very short run, threatening the whole equilibrium of the firm in a longer time 
horizon. In fact, when the dimension of the decline is not perceived yet by management, the 
decision-maker adopts these measures hoping that the financial tension is transitory, but in 
absence of a consistent action plan, the problems are bound to reappear with bigger dimensions. 
It follows that, to avoid the possibility that situations of decline and crisis are not tackled on 
time, determining further deterioration of the business’ perspective and eventual entry in 
irreversible crises, it is important that the management team continuously monitors the most 
critical external variables and it adopts all available tool for timely recognition of decline. 
Many scholars, such as Guatri (1995), Sirleo (2009) and Fedele & Antonucci (2015), 
distinguish the methodologies for recognition of decline and crisis into three categories: 
- Methods based on intuition 
- Methods based on financial analysis 
- Methods based on models 
 
In details, methods based on intuition are not based on formal procedures: the management 
team identifies the dynamics of most critical strategic and operating indicators of decline, 
according to personal experience and the business features, to judge the entry into a situation 
of decline. The indicators of decline selected by management may be qualitative, being closer 
to what Guatri called symptoms of decadence, or quantitative, revealing the presence of 
disequilibria. In every case, the number of possible indicators is almost infinite, to properly 
consider key factors and performance indicators which are specifically significant for a single 
firm. 
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With respect to financial analysis, it is the traditional methodology suggested by managerial 
science to assess indications of decadence and, especially, disequilibria typical of situations of 
decline. The manager is asked to compute the proper ratios based on data taken from financial 
statements and to compare them with both the historical dynamics inside the firm and with 
comparable firms. Unfortunately, it does not exist a table with universal benchmarks, so this 
methodology too is influenced by the personal interpretation of the analyst, together with issues 
related on reliability of input data. The main ratios are designed to investigate the business 
dimensions of profitability, level of liquidity and sustainability of the financial structure. 
 
Reduction of profitability indicators, resulting from the reduction of demand and prices, result 
in a perspective lower generation of free cash flows which may result in a liquidity shortage. In 
fact, low availability of liquidity, measured through the Current Ratio (Current Assets / Current 
Liability), or more reliably through the Quick Ratio or Acid Test, which focuses only on assets 
eligible to be rapidly converted into cash, even if not accompanied by low profitability, requires 
the adoption of emergency solution to ensure the continuity of payments and to avoid further 
troubles on operations. Finally, the analysis of the financial structure, conducted though static 
ratios such as Debt / Equity or Debt / Assets and sustainability ratios such as Interest Coverage 
and EBITDA / Debt, allows to predict the capability of the firm to correctly repay its outstanding 
liabilities, in medium-long term horizon. If the financial structure shows disequilibria, the 
management team should plan and undertake the proper actions to timely reduce the debt 
burden and to avoid the entry into situations of insolvency. 
 
Finally, methodologies based on models are aimed at overcoming the subjectivity of the 
financial statement analysis through statistic tools which try to combine financial ratios in a 
linear model which predicts the presence of situations of decline and distress and eventually its 
gravity. As an example, the model developed by Ohlson (1980), is a logistic model which 
linearly combines a set of nine financial ratios and binary variables in a numeric indicator (the 
O-score), as the input for the assessment of the business’ probability of default. Details of the 
model are presented in Figure 1.4. 
 
23 
 
 
Figure 1.4 – Ohlson model for estimation of Probability of Default 
Source: Ohlson (1980) 
 
1.5. CAUSES OF DECLINE AND CRISIS 
After the top management team has acknowledged the actual presence of decline or crisis, the 
following step for a successful exit from the situation is the deep and sincere analysis of the 
causes which triggered that situation. Only the recognition of causes of decline permits an 
adequate comprehension of problems faced by the business, aimed at the adoption of a 
consistent plan of required interventions for operational and financial restructuring. 
In the analysis of the causes of decline and crisis, academic literature distinguishes the 
subjective approach and the objective approach. According to subjective approach, the 
corporate crisis has been originated by incorrect behaviour of individuals operating with the 
business; it follows that, theoretically, the substitution of the individual responsible for bad 
choices with a new and more competent individual, is likely to ensure the resolution of decline 
and crisis. The responsibility for bad choices is usually found in key decision-makers: directors, 
top management and controlling shareholders, but in some situation key employees and even 
external stakeholders, such as banks, suppliers and trade unions who oppose the transformation 
of the business. (Giacosa & Mazzoleni, 2012 and Sirleo, 2009)  
Under the objective approach, the crisis is caused by forces and events connected to the 
variability of the external environment, which is highly dynamic and turbulent. It follows that 
management team is continuously asked to control the most critical external variables which 
are likely to negatively affect the business’ key success factors and sources of competitive 
advantage, triggering a situation of decline and distress. According to this approach, the 
variability of external environment, at macroeconomic, sectorial or individual level, may 
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determine the following types of crises: 
- Inefficiency crisis, when production and commercialization of goods and services are 
less efficient than competitors, determining unfavourable incidence of operating costs; 
- Overcapacity crisis, when the demand of goods and services reduces, and the firm is not 
able to reduce its fixed cost in conformance to the new level of production; 
- Decadence crisis, characterized by reduction of the spread between unitary revenues 
and marginal costs, impeding the coverage of fixed costs and non-operating expenses 
- Crisis determined by lack of planning: the absence of clear targets and objectives to be 
reached by the organization and low investments in innovation produce low 
commitment of individuals 
- Financial disequilibria: an imbalanced financial structure reduced profitability since it 
determines higher cost of capital with respect to comparable firms and unsustainable 
financial expenses in case of economic downturn and reduction of revenues. (Guatri, 
1995) 
 
Moving to the actual factors that give origin to a situation of decline or crisis, we refer to the 
study of Falini (2011), who classifies the multiple causes of crises into five macro-variables: 
1. Corporate governance issues 
2. Strategy management and planning 
3. Operations 
4. Macroeconomics and extraordinary factors 
5. Industry-related causes. 
 
Variables 1, 2 and 3 correspond to the causes of decline which refer to the subjective approach, 
since they belong to decisions and attitudes of people inside the firm, while the fourth and the 
fifth factor depend on the external environment and they are very difficult to be controlled and 
influenced by the firm. 
In details, issues related to corporate governance refer to shareholders decisions and managerial 
choices, including the accountability of the entrepreneur and the top management. A situation 
of decline is originated by these issues when shareholders and directors are not adequate to face 
the complexity of the firm or they do not systematically act in the best interest of the firm. The 
corporate governance structure may be inconsistent with respect to the external environment, 
and it is likely causes the rise of moral hazard, which transfers wealth and benefit from the firm 
to the managers. In some cases, the firm may be damaged by the owner’s decision of selling 
out its controlling stake, showing substantial indifference for the future perspectives of the firm, 
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or by the passage of the firm from the founder into the hands of his children and relatives. 
The second variable, strategic planning issues, is connected to long-term view and to the effects 
of past choices, including decisions related to capital structure and to investments for growth 
and development. In fact, excessive access to debt financing exposes the organization to the 
risk of unfavorable evolution of exogenous variables, such as interest rates, threatening its 
future perspectives. Mergers, acquisitions and extraordinary operations are also potential causes 
of decline and crisis: weak strategic planning that misestimates the dimension of revenues and 
cost synergies and bad integration between acquirer and target affect the capacity of value 
creation. 
With respect to Operations, the presence of higher operating costs then competitors and the 
inefficiency of internal processes are signals of weakness since they determine lower 
marginality and cash flows generation. The firm with higher costs (either fixed or variable) is 
more sensitive to external shocks and its profits are more likely to quickly become negative. 
The inefficiencies may be caused by lack of economies of scale, excessive diversification of 
business segments, inefficiency of internal processes and longer time needed to manufacture 
and deliver the product or service to final customers with respect to competitors. 
Moving to the external dimensions of the causes of decline, the fourth group is related to the 
economic cycle and extraordinary events such as natural disasters or terroristic attacks. These 
factors impact a huge number of firms belonging to the many different industries, because they 
negatively affect the consumers’ trust and their propensity to spend money. Macroeconomic 
risks affect also the volatility of commodity prices and foreign currencies, becoming likely to 
unpredictably affect the marginality of businesses.  
Finally, with respect to Industry dimension, the decline can be driven by shifts in product life 
cycle, causing reductions in demand and need for consolidation of production capacity, or by 
technological disruptions that makes existing products obsolete and not complying with the 
customers’ needs and willing. The reduction of legal and technical barriers in a sector (for 
example the expiry of patents and licences) and the entry of new competitors may cause an 
intense price war and damage incumbent firms which are not capable to quickly modify their 
cost structure. 
 
1.6. TURNAROUND PLANNING 
To exit from a situation of decline and crisis, managers are asked to implement what is 
internationally known as turnaround, a process characterized by radical changes, implemented 
in a situation of pressure due to the context of corporate crisis. These changes usually involve 
the key elements of a firm, such as its identity and culture. In turnaround, efforts and inevitable 
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sacrifices borne by involved stakeholders are coordinated to achieve the common aim to 
overcome the decline situation and to return at economic and financial equilibrium on long-
term view. During this attempt, controlling shareholders and incumbent directors usually leaves 
their position to new people who possess specific competencies and who encounter the favour 
of corporate creditors. (Guatri 1995). 
Turnaround may start during the situation of decline or crisis, always reminding that the 
effectiveness of the process is higher when it starts in the earlier stages of decline. Whether the 
firm is in crisis, low trust and bad image negatively influence the process, requiring bigger and 
bigger efforts to return to value creation. The ideal impact of turnaround on value is presented 
in Figure 1.5. 
 
Figure 1.5 – Ideal impact of turnaround on Value 
Source: Giacosa & Mazzoleni (2012) - Page 150 
 
Despite the turnaround process of a firm in decline and crisis is unique and uncertain in its 
outcome, because each distressed firm presents specific asset base, valuable resources and 
causes of decline, Guatri (1995) asserts that this process follows a logical pathway that may be 
articulated in these phases: 
1. Recognition of decline and adoption of the new leadership 
2. Analysis of the situation and valuation of the available initiatives 
3. Negotiations with stakeholders 
4. Normalization of the business 
5. Restart of value creation. 
When the management recognizes that the firm is in an actual situation of decline, the first 
action to be done is the substitution of part or all the managers: in fact, the acknowledgement 
of the downturn is an implicit admission of managerial errors. The substitution of incumbent 
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managers with external people constitutes an injection of credibility towards the involved 
stakeholders. The external managers, in fact, have a more objective view of the crisis and they 
can externalize all the possible risks and uncertainties, than they may take the decision with 
lower emotional bias and personal involvement. 
To augment the probability of success of the turnaround all the components of the new 
management team should be assigned a clear role and the key decision should not be delegated 
along the managerial structure, but they should preferably be taken by a recognized 
“transformational leader” with the aim “to mobilize the organization to accept and work toward 
achieving the new vision, and to institutionalize the changes” (Tichy & Ulrich 1984, page 59). 
This leader must create, develop and communicate a new vision, and he is also asked to renew 
“the political and cultural system” of the troubled organization, by changing the feeling of 
human resources form losers to winners. 
It is important that the turnaround process is planned in a formalized document, which resumes 
the causes of the decline, includes a photograph of the actual economic and financial situation 
expressed through accounting data, then it lists the interventions to be implemented to overcome 
the situation, the sacrifices requested to stakeholders and the projected financial statements that 
follow the adoption of extraordinary measures. The document should include an initial financial 
statement, which assumes the role of a reference framework for the valuation of the future result 
that will be achieved. This financial statement should include devaluation of useless past 
investments to be as more conservative as possible and to ensure the maximum level of 
transparency towards the stakeholders of the distressed firm.  
Then, the core part of the document is the action plan, which should be logical and consistent, 
and it should show the importance and the effectiveness of proposed interventions for the 
resolution of the crisis, by convincing the reader that it is reasonable and achievable. When the 
turnaround starts from a complex situation of crisis, and the continuation of business is 
threatened by the absence of financial resources, the action plan may be composed by three 
different moments: the emergency plan, the stabilization plan and the development plan.  The 
first is focused on the survival of the distressed firm, by immediately ensuring a positive cash 
flow. It is characterized by a situation of hurry and urgency and it is usually based on requests 
of bridge loans, speed divestitures and cost cuttings; its time horizon goes from two weeks to 
three months. This emergency plan is a few pages’ documents, that it is integrated in the 
stabilization plan, which will be focused on the two following years and it is bound to re-
establish the equilibrium on revenues and costs. The third plan is based on a three or four years’ 
time horizon and on the creation of new value. (Giacosa & Mazzoleni, 2012) 
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1.7. STRATEGIC DECISIONS AND TURNAROUND IMPLEMENTATION 
After the phase of negotiation with stakeholder and their consent, the managers have the 
possibility to implement the plan for the stabilization of the corporate situation, with the final 
objective to return to an acceptable level of economic profit (id est above the cost of capital).  
In this phase the strategic decisions are taken at a business units level: for each segment of 
operation, the turnaround plan shall explicit if it is bound to be liquidated, divested or 
restructured. 
This choice is subordinated to the objective to refocus the firm its core business, so areas where 
the firm has accumulated distinctive competencies and experience are deemed to be 
restructured, while accessory segments should be liquidated or sold to new owners able to create 
new values through operational and financial synergies. On the other hand, the decision is 
conditioned by financial constraints and the market constraints: the former may drive the 
decision of divesting an important business area because of urgent need for liquidity, while the 
latter may lead to the keeping of a secondary business unit due to a market downturn that makes 
impossible to close the dismissal at a fair price. As supported by Benson (2010), liquidation is 
the last resort option, applicable when the business unit is disarrayed and not capable to create 
substantial value through operating activities; furthermore, as it will be seen in Chapter 2, when 
assets are very specific for the business, it is difficult to create value through liquidation and 
the restructuring alternative becomes more valuable. 
It is important to specify that if the firm is composed by a single business unit, as suggested by 
Buttignon (2014), the decision to restructure the business ensures the continuation of going 
concern together with the conservation of the control of equity in the hands of the incumbent 
shareholders. Whether the controlling shareholders does not possess the competencies and 
resources to ensure the return to a sustainable value creation, the divestment may articulate in 
the shift of the control of the business to stronger and more competent shareholders, or in the 
acquisition by another firm to create value through revenues and cost synergies: in the latter 
way the business loses its independence, keeping its operating activities as a branch of a bigger 
firm. 
According to Guatri (1995), the interventions for revamping the operating activities are usually 
based on a mix of four alternatives: restructuring, reconversion, rescaling and reorganization. 
By restructuring, the firm improves the efficiency of transformation processes and reduces the 
cost incidence while keeping the same mix of products and markets. Through reconversion, the 
firm gradually moves from the current marketing mix, which is bound to be abandoned, to a 
new combination of innovative and more valuable products. Then, through rescaling, the scale 
of production activity is reduced, and many employees are laid-off to overcome a situation of 
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overcapacity, typical when the crisis involves the entire industry because of the declining life-
cycle of the output product. Finally, we talk about reorganization when the interventions are 
related to organizational aspects such as redefinition of functions, communications flows and 
production methods, together with the adoption of a new governance structure that allows the 
clearness of decisional processes and the supervision of the involved stakeholders. 
During implementation of the turnaround plan, the organization passes a situation of instability 
due to disruption of routines and the reduction of employees. Therefore, the recovery of trust 
and collaboration with external and internal stakeholders, assumes a critical importance for the 
success of turnaround and the return to a new equilibrium on business operations. When the 
most critical phase of the crisis is passed, and the lack of liquidity is resolved, the firm needs to 
focus on investments in promotion and advertising of new and existing products to recover lost 
market shares, together with product innovation and development of equipment and human 
resources. These investments shall be careful and conservative to avoid the risk of bad 
investment which could cause another situation of crisis. When the situation of decline is 
passed, the firm has become more solid than in the past and it may implement a more ambitious 
strategy refocused on creation of value in the medium and long term. The consent obtained by 
external stakeholders to important investments, such as the acquisition of another firm is the 
signal that the crisis is passed, and the trust has been completely recovered. (Guatri, 1995) 
Despite the managerial efforts for planning, negotiation and implementation of turnaround, its 
success is threatened by factors outside the managerial control. The empirical evidence suggests 
that a firm exiting from a turnaround needs to restart the process because the plan was not 
sufficient to sort out the crisis and to solve the financial troubles. In fact, Gilson et al. (1990) 
examined a sample of 169 attempts of restructurings in U.S. in the 1980s, where in 89 cases the 
first restructuring was unsuccessful, and firms needed to access to bankruptcy procedures to 
sort out the crisis. A similar study by Giacosa and Mazzoleni (2012), about Italian businesses 
which entered financial crisis in 2009-2010 states that, on 98 considered plans, 58 of them were 
being renegotiated because their objectives were not achieved. With respect to Italy, this high 
rate of unsuccess may be caused to the low commitment of the management, who sees the 
document as a formality to renegotiate liabilities and cut excess cost, rather than an occasion to 
shift the business strategy and revitalize the core resources and competencies. In fact, the 
authors assert that in formulation of the plan, management team does not put the necessary 
attention on the revenues side, since they rely on a generic recovery of the macroeconomic 
downturn. More specifically, these weak financial plans usually assume a conservative growth 
rate in the first two years, and a sudden acceleration of the growth in the following years, which 
is not supported by adequate strategy and implementation.
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CHAPTER 2 – LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO SORT OUT FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
 
2.1. NEED OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN SITUATIONS OF INSOLVENCY 
A firm that stays in a situation of financial tension or insolvency, defined according to Chapter 
1, is facing a delicate situation from a legal point of view. This paragraph provides the legal 
definition of the state of insolvency, since this state opens the room for the application of legal 
rules about bankruptcy. According to Italian Bankruptcy Code (art. 5) “the state of insolvency 
appears through the default or other facts that show the debtor’s inability to regularly satisfy its 
obligations”. The default means the failure to perform contractual or legal obligations, typically 
the payment of a monetary amount within a certain expiry date, but also the delivery of a good, 
the performance of a service or the compliance with covenants, which are commitments towards 
lenders involving financial and cash flow management. 
It follows that insolvency is the situation where the firm has already defaulted on a relevant 
obligation (under Italian law: valuable more than 30.000 Euro) or, at present, it is not able to 
pay the expiring debts on a regular basis, considering the anomalies in the means of payment 
or in obtaining the necessary amount of cash. Insolvency requires that the events of defaults 
must be proven and reasonably caused by the situation of distress, or that the firm stays in 
dangerous situations, classified by the law among “the other facts”, where the entrepreneur has 
abandoned the firm, the assets have been carried away or the business premises are suddenly 
closed. (Cian 2014) 
The presence of default or its threat jeopardizes the survival of the business and it may cause a 
situation of trouble among creditors, since they may activate the instruments for the 
enforcement of their right provided by the Civil Law. It follows that creditors, under the 
supervision of the Court, have the power to expropriate the firm's assets (real estate, equipment, 
inventory), to sell them in a public auction and to retain the proceeds from disposal until its 
credit is fully satisfied. This system does not fit for the insolvency of a typical firm for two main 
reasons. First, the firm is a dynamic system, where, on a day by day basis, goods are bought 
from suppliers, then flow through a production process and finally they are delivered and 
disposed to clients. In this sense, the expropriation of a production facility, a piece of office 
equipment or a substantial portion of goods on inventory may block the entire corporate 
activity; in this way the proceeding creditor is satisfied while the other stakeholders that obtain 
benefit from their contributions to the conduct of business are damaged. 
Secondly, if we consider that the insolvent firm owes a substantial monetary amount to a set of 
different creditors, the situation becomes dramatic since ordinary enforcement law is based on 
first come, first served principle: the creditors who start the enforcement procedure later bear 
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the risk that the available assets have been exhausted by the claimholders who had taken the 
enforcement action on a timely basis. It must also be considered that the law fixes the par 
condicio creditorum (Absolute Priority Rule – APR) principle, which states that more creditors 
with the same grade of priority, when they enforce their claim, have the right to share the 
proceeds from execution proportionally to the amount of their claim. 
To complete the general framework, an important issue must be specified. Exceptions of the 
principle of parity and equal treatment of creditors are granted by priority rights whose source 
is defined by the law. If the creditor owns a preference right over its claim, proceeds from the 
enforcement of the credit are first retained by the preferred creditor until the claim is fully 
satisfied. After the satisfaction of the preferred creditor, residual proceeds are devoted to non-
preferred creditors. Typically, preference rights are negotiated between creditor and debtor 
according to the mandatory legal provisions and they are constituted by pledges on assets and 
mortgages on real estate, that give a preference right limited on proceeds from the encumbered 
asset. 
It follows that, when a firm negotiates debt financings, the lender poses a special attention on 
obtaining a set of preference rights and guarantees that ensure the satisfaction of its claim in 
case of default. Moreover, preference rights negotiated between lenders and borrower shall be 
combined with preference rights directly originated by the law (for example about wages to 
employees, taxes, professional fees) thus establishing a hierarchy of preference rights on the 
firm’s real and financial assets. 
About debt financing, the highest level of priority is given to senior secured debt (where secured 
means guaranteed by real guarantees such as special privileges, mortgages and pledges), then 
unsecured debt has a lower level of priority, while junior or subordinated debt has the right to 
be reimbursed after all the debt claims. At the lowest level we find equity claims, which are the 
residual claims, and in a situation of insolvency, they receive a payoff equal to zero, or even 
negative in the case the firm is not granted the legal benefit of limited liability. 
Therefore, under ordinary legal system, the only threat of a business' insolvency, causes the run 
of debtholders and suppliers to ask for new guarantees and to consolidate their position as soon 
as possible: suppliers ask to be paid on cash and they may refuse the delivery of raw materials, 
short term loans are revoked, guarantees are activated, and enforcement actions are taken. All 
these initiatives erode the amount of assets available for the continuity of the ordinary business 
activity and for the satisfaction of claimholders who do not promptly take legal actions versus 
the distressed firm. 
Considering also that the activation of multiple enforcement procedures leads to the 
multiplication of legal and procedural costs, while increasing the uncertainty on the outcome, 
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this messy situation opens the room for the need of an exceptional legal system regulating 
bankruptcies and corporate reorganizations, to sort out the overall problems of a distressed firm 
in an efficient, timely and equal way. 
According to Buttignon (2008), corporate reorganization legal frameworks shall be declined 
into dimension of efficiency, timeliness and equality of the resolution of the situation of 
corporate crisis. Efficiency dimension refers to the principle that potential contribution to value 
creation of a resource is maximum weather the resource is devoted to its optimal use and it stays 
in combination with other valuable assets. So, an efficient reorganization framework should 
direct the decisions about the future utilization of corporate resources and assets (restructuring, 
transfer or liquidation) at the only aim to maximize the value created for all the stakeholders. 
Timeliness assumes a key importance in the field of corporate restructuring, since a long 
situation of uncertainty deteriorates more and more deeply the image and reputation of the firm 
toward all internal and external stakeholders, reducing over time the value of intangible assets 
and resource, and therefore the Enterprise Value. In this sense “the principle of timeliness 
represents a declination of the efficiency dimension in a dynamic sense” (Buttignon 2008, page 
246). 
Then, the equality principle is related to the fair distribution of the restructuring costs and the 
sacrifices requested to stakeholders of the distressed firm. Given the fact that total value of 
assets is lower than the value of outstanding claims, the loss should be split among shareholder 
according to an equality principle. 
Practically, principle of par condicio creditorum and strict priority rules, while they ensure fair 
distribution of losses, they do not guarantee full efficiency and timeliness, since they pose the 
incentive for opportunistic behaviour and further disruption of value. As it will be seen in 
Chapter 3, controlling shareholders, through directors appointed by them, own an informational 
advantage about the situation of distress and they also have a specific know-how for the 
diagnosis and resolution of the crisis: in this sense they are the best candidates to ensure best 
utilization of assets and the maximization of value. Unfortunately, according to the status of 
residual owners, they cannot enjoy the value created by their effort on restructuring until all 
debtholders have been completely satisfied, so they have the incentive to abandon the control 
of the firm. It follows that it exists a trade-off between efficiency and equality: whether the 
crisis is at early stage, it is reasonable to give incentives to the directors and shareholders in 
charge to quickly implement the restructuring. In this way the equality is violated, since 
shareholders receive some benefits, but maximization of overall Enterprise Value is ensured. 
As counterbalance, all the valuations about the equality and the reasonableness of a certain 
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restructuring plan with respect to the creditors’ interest should be reserved to creditors 
themselves, who have the right to receive transparent information on a timely basis. 
Bankruptcy and corporate restructuring law, trying to reconcile the needs of efficiency, 
timeliness and equality, creates an exceptional regime, where the principle of first come, first 
served on the enforcement of claims leaves its space to collective and negotiated procedures. 
The system is usually completed by provisions that limit the power and the freedom of directors 
and top managers in a troubled firm, by including obligation of information and external 
supervision by the public authority. The limitation of power, enforced through criminal 
consequences in case of breach, is aimed at avoiding opportunistic behaviour that damages the 
corporate creditors. 
Insolvency law is an institutional variable that is strictly related to various elements such as 
juridical tradition, attitude toward entrepreneurship, relationships among firms and capital 
markets, political considerations; the interaction of these forces creates characteristic practices 
for each country. For example, in the United States, the Bankruptcy Reform Act, in force since 
1978, is based on two pillars: Chapter 7 and Chapter 11. While Chapter 7 refers to the 
compulsory cessation of the going concern of the business and the following liquidation of the 
corporate assets, Chapter 11 is the framework for the restructuring in continuity of the insolvent 
firm. These two pillars are related, since under a restructuring procedure, whether the agreement 
among parties is impossible to be reached, the restructuring plan is not feasible, or a situation 
of irreversible crisis is ascertained, the Chapter 11 is converted into a Chapter 7 procedure. The 
main features of the latter procedure are that the collection of outstanding claims toward the 
insolvent firm is stopped, the control of the overall firm is taken by a receivership whose activity 
is to sell out in a competitive auction all the assets of a firm, on aggregated or individual base, 
while resolving all the pending disputes. At the end of the liquidation, legal and administrative 
costs of receivership are paid, then net proceeds are distributed to claimholders according to a 
strict priority rule: a creditor belonging to a lower preference level cannot be paid unless the 
creditors of all the upper preference levels are fully paid; according to par condicio creditorum, 
the claimholders with the same preference right must be paid with same percentage on the 
nominal amount of credit. (Berk & DeMarzo 2011, page 545) 
 
2.2.  ORIGINS OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATION LAW 
This paragraph focuses on the origins of corporate restructuring provision, which in multiple 
jurisdictions constitutes a feature of the insolvency legal framework aimed at increasing the 
economic efficiency in dealing with situations of decline and crisis. Baird and Rasmussen 
(2003) analysed the historical situation of most relevant distressed firms in the United States 
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that led to the birth of an organic discipline for corporate restructuring. Nowadays these 
provisions are included, with modifications, into the actual Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Reform Act. Recently, Chapter 11 has become a point of reference for countries, such as United 
Kingdom and continental Europe, which historically focused their legislative corpus on the 
liquidation of the distressed firm and they have recently felt the need to regulate restructuring 
procedures. 
It may be anticipated that “Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code […] favours the 
reorganization and rehabilitation of all financially troubled companies that are deemed to be 
worth more as going concerns than liquidated in a piecemeal form, [while other countries] use 
bankruptcy for a different purpose: to liquidate insolvent businesses for the benefit of creditors, 
or to safeguard [...] the rights of workers and other non-financial stakeholders” (Gilson 2012, 
pages 25-26). For this reason, outside the U.S., the word “bankruptcy” is used as a synonymous 
of “business liquidation”. 
At the same time, in German and Japanese experience, public institutions in the field of 
corporate reorganization play a marginal role because corporate governance practices and 
dynamics between the firm and its stakeholders have produced long term-oriented relationships 
among stakeholders sustained by the reciprocal trust and transparency. In Germany, the firms 
strongly collaborate with their so-called Haus Bank, a bank with is the point of reference for 
every type of financial need. The relationship between bank and business is characterized by 
low level of asymmetrical information about the current and future perspectives of the business, 
determining the fact that, in case of corporate crisis, the Haus Bank is available to provide long 
term loans. Eventually, the bank converts the defaulted loans into equity, thus assuming the 
direct control of the distressed firm and then taking a key role in the restructuring. Similarly, in 
Japan, the commercial relationships between firms and bank are very stable and long-term 
oriented. Even, inside the bigger industrial groups, a banking division is included, which 
directly exchanges information with the directors of the interrelated companies and it provides 
a wide financial support. So, if a company of the group is distressed, the bank promotes the 
turnaround plan, by facilitating a wide consent among the involved stakeholders. Definitively, 
in the Japanese experience, the inclusion of a business into a big industrial group favours the 
contributions of the associated businesses entertaining commercial interrelationships for the 
resolution of a crisis, in compliance with the aim to preserve the value and the intangible 
resources for the overall group. (Guatri 1995) 
Restructuring law was born in U.S. in the nineteenth century, where many railways were built 
and then exercised by private corporations which presented an operating profit, but they could 
not repay the debt issued to cover the construction costs. More specifically, the construction or 
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acquisition of a portion of a railway line was financed by financial intermediaries through 
“multiple series of mortgage bonds secured by the portion of the line being built or acquired” 
(Bernstein 2007, page 9). Railways are assets with practically no market, so it was impossible 
to sell the line or a single stretch of it, to obtain the money needed to repay the bondholders. 
The components of a railway are also dedicated and specialized assets “put to their highest and 
best use”: it is impossible to move the single components to another use without destroying a 
large amount of value. Consequently, investment banks and lawyers created a form of 
receivership aimed at restructuring the distressed firm with these key features: “a stay of the 
collection activity of creditors, the infusion of operating funds, and negotiations among 
representatives of the various debtholders over a new capital structure”. (Baird & Rasmussen, 
2003, page 759) 
By contrary, at the same time in the England, the home of the first Industrial Revolution, many 
textile firms dominated the economy by employing many workers. Some textile mills were able 
to grow in scale and economic importance by acquiring other plants, while other factories were 
not successful and were shut down. In this industry, the capital required for the opening of a 
textile plant was relatively big, but it was affordable by a wealth individual investor of that time, 
without the need to access to capital market and to build complex financial structures. After the 
initial investment, the founder used the cash generated by the same business to sustain 
expansion and growth. Furthermore, the machinery was produced in a standardized way, it was 
available on the market and it could be adapted to the specific mill at a very low cost. 
Definitively, since the going concern value of textile plants did not depend neither on dedicated 
assets nor on qualified employees, and the amount of investment were relatively low, at that 
time in United Kingdom a set of provision on corporate restructuring was not developed, 
because it could not add efficiency to the economy. That is why U.K. insolvency law originally 
focused on liquidation rather than on going concern restructuring. 
Therefore, we may state that corporate restructuring discipline is aimed to ensure an efficient 
utilization of the distressed firm’s assets and it best fits for “large firms with specialized assets 
dedicated exclusively to them” (Baird & Rasmussen 2003, page 759), although, as already seen, 
during the Industrial Revolution they were not the typical firm in distress, but they were 
exceptional cases. Nowadays, the most relevant sources of a sustainable competitive advantage 
of firms rely on intangible assets, intellectual property and human resources. Firms with hard 
dedicated assets, such as power plants, coal mines or oil refineries, continue to exist, but they 
are declining in importance because of rising globalization and the commoditization of raw 
materials. The point is that, although some exceptions exist for very powerful intangible assets 
(for example a worldwide-known lifestyle brand or an innovative patent on technology), 
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intangible assets are exploited in the best way inside the unique mix of resources which 
contributed to its origination. It follows that intangible assets are very valuable from the 
originating firm's point of view, while outside of it they loss relevant part of potential for value 
creation, so they are bound to remain into its original organization to comply with the “best 
use” theorem. That is one of the reason why many countries, whose insolvency law was centred 
on liquidation, have recently amended their law to offer a reorganization option. 
The definition of efficiency into corporate restructuring does not mean that dedicated assets 
should be rescued by sacrificing the interests of claimholders in every case: whether the highly 
specialized asset is not able to create a valuable stream of revenues, the institutional system 
should not permit the keeping of the assets into the going concern, but it must force its dismissal. 
Baird & Rasmussen (2012) provide two examples on this point: the customized set of 
warehousing and logistics facilities for Webvan, a company with the ambitious business to sell 
grocery products through on-line websites, and the telecommunication satellites for Iridium, a 
telephone company that wanted to provide international calls for mobile phones. These 
businesses did not encounter the favour of customers, so the companies did not recoup its costs 
and they fell into bankruptcy. The continuation in usage of these assets by the two distressed 
companies would have only destroyed value, therefore it should not be permitted by an efficient 
restructuring institutional system. In fact, it occurred that warehousing facilities of Webvan 
were dismantled and liquidated to recover its low residual value, while, about Iridium satellites, 
their costly periodic maintenance were stopped, and they naturally burned into the atmosphere. 
The conclusion it that, while “many assets work equally well in one firm as another, [in some 
cases] assets that are tailored to a specific firm may not represent a source of value but the 
source of failure” (Baird & Rasmussen, 2002, page 768), because of their high cost and the lack 
of marketability, so the distressed firm should abandon them as soon as possible. 
At last, the need of regulation for corporate restructuring activities, is also driven by the 
difficulty in contracting allocation of control rights in eventual case of future distress, combined 
with the impossibility to take consistent decision without the pressure of the bankruptcy court. 
The point is that when the firm is in a positive situation, power stays in the hands of the 
shareholders who delegate power to directors and managers, but “when things are going poorly, 
control rights can shift to parties not traditionally viewed as inside the firm” (Ibidem, page 779). 
In fact, in case of insolvency, “creditors acquire control rights and may have the power to shut 
the firm down. It is the fear of improper exercise of such power that lies at the heart of 
reorganization law” (Op. Cit., page 779). So, in the case the investment agreements allocate 
control rights in the hands of someone who could take advantage from choices that do not 
increase the overall Enterprise Value by exploiting the uncertainty on the firm’s future 
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perspective and the informational asymmetry, the need for corporate restructuring institutional 
framework takes origins. 
To make an example, a controlling owner of a distressed firm, exposed with his wealth, who is 
granted the benefit of taking the first move in the restructuring process, may delay the 
recognition of the crisis by stating the situation will improve physiologically, thus continuing 
to destroy value for the other stakeholders. In the worst case, having nothing to lose, he may 
undertake fraudulent decision that lead to sharp reduction of cash flows and value. By contrary, 
a hypothetical secured creditor who is given a decision power over the distressed firm would 
reasonably decide a sale of its collaterals that ensures a quick and full recovery of its claims, 
although the more efficient choice is to wait for higher selling price that had benefited also other 
creditors. 
Law of corporate reorganization is therefore aimed at giving the control power in the hand of 
the people who are in the position to exercise it in a qualified and efficient way, by reconciling 
the “mismatch between incentives of the individual investors that possess control rights and 
what is in the best interest of the firm as a whole”. (Op. Cit., page 781) 
 
2.3. MAIN FEATURES OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATION LAW 
After explaining the factors that driven the birth of corporate reorganization law, in this 
paragraph we describe its essential provision. The paragraph takes as model the Chapter 11, 
since, as previously seen, advanced financial markets in United States put the condition for the 
birth of institutions for reorganization. Legal provisions of Chapter 11 are exceptions to the 
ordinary principle of civil law and to the applicable framework in case of bankruptcy 
liquidation, which have been exported to many other countries in adapting their insolvency laws 
to the increasing needs for regulating the reorganization of distressed firm. 
The most relevant legal aspects of Chapter 11, and more generally of corporate reorganization 
laws, are: 
- Automatic stay provision; 
- Access to super priority financings or bridge financing; 
- Breach of executory contracts; 
- Exemption from judicial review of the agreements in case of subsequent corporate 
crisis; 
- Extension of the agreements to dissenting creditors. 
The automatic stay provision is a legal instrument that becomes immediately active when the 
filing for Chapter 11 is presented to bankruptcy court by a distressed firm. This provision blocks 
all the enforcement action eventually proposed by the creditors, allowing the firm to continue 
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the utilization its assets base during the whole restructuring procedure. By this way, the potential 
problem of the creditors’ run to the enforcement of their claims is sorted out, since the defaulted 
creditors are put in a position of parity, obviously keeping unchanged the preference rights fairly 
obtained before the opening the procedure. As counterbalance, creditors are granted the judicial 
supervision on the ordinary course of the business and the approval by the court for each action 
that may violate the principle of equal treatment of creditors, such as the utilization of pledged 
assets or preference payment of relevant suppliers. A provision related to the automatic stay is 
the stop in the computation and accumulation of interests on unsecured financial loans, thus 
allowing the distressed firm to achieve an immediate benefit on cash flow and economic result. 
(Gilson 2012) 
The provision on bridge financing, which under U.S. Chapter 11 is called Debtor-In-Possession 
financing, allows investors to give the distressed firm, and the firm to obtain, the so-called new 
finance or fresh cash, which constitutes an important source of “financial oxygen” to guarantee 
the continuation of the ordinary business activity in the emergency phase of the crisis. These 
new financings constitute a bridge loan since, when the agreement about the restructuring is 
reached, that source of finance is substituted by proceeds from dismissal of non-core assets, 
longer-term loans or infusion of new shareholders’ capital, according to the content of the 
turnaround plan. U.S. bankruptcy law gives to credits from Debtor-In-Possession financing a 
top priority right with respect to claims of all other creditors, so they shall be fully satisfied, 
and they rank before the debt pre-existing at the opening of Chapter 11 procedure. 
Another key provision is the possibility for the firm to demand the bankruptcy court resolution 
or breach of unfavourable executory agreements in force, despite their original expiration date. 
The legal clause is very useful for the renegotiation of leasing agreement and other long-term 
contracts whose original clauses have become unsustainable for the distressed firm and they 
have contributed to the causation of the insolvency. In fact, if the judge approves the resolution 
of the agreement, the counterparty has the right to receive an indemnification for damages 
whose priority level is equal to ordinary unsecured creditor. Therefore, since this provision 
allows the transfer of wealth from the contractual counterparty to the distressed firm, it favours 
the renegotiation of the original agreement with the aim to rebalance the reciprocal obligations 
and to obtain a mutual benefit. (Gilson 2012) 
With respect to the exemption of judicial review, a brief explanation is needed. Whether a firm 
stays in a situation of irreversible crisis and it is bound to be liquidated under the supervision 
of the bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy receiver reviews all the anomalous operations 
undertaken by the firm, such as preferential payments or assets disposal at very low price with 
respect to market value and he takes a clawback action. It means that anomalous business 
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operations which damaged the creditors’ interests, and especially par condicio creditorum are 
declared invalid, and the counterparty is forced to return all the considerations received by the 
distressed firm related to that transaction. The exemption under analysis applies to the insolvent 
firm which takes extraordinary operations and preferential payments previously included in a 
legalized reorganization procedure and then it is subsequently forced to liquidation. In this case, 
the bankruptcy court of the latter proceeding, does not review the measures undertaken by the 
firm in compliance to the former restructuring agreement, although they had caused an actual 
damage on creditors’ heads, and they would in principle had been subject to clawback actions. 
Finally, the extension of the effects of the restructuring agreement to the dissenting creditors is 
a common legal effect of reorganization procedures undertaken under the judicial control.  At 
the end of the procedure, in the case the level of consents over the restructuring plan has reached 
the majorities prescribed by the applicable law, the bankruptcy court formally approves the 
agreement which becomes binding for all the impaired creditors, independently of their actual 
vote in the public hearing. The creditors who did not vote are assumed to have approved the 
proposal, while the creditors who rejected the proposal have the only possibility to open a 
proceeding for challenging the plan. In the case a rejecting creditor proposes a challenge, the 
bankruptcy court assesses the fairness and the equitability of the restructuring plan by a formal 
estimation of going-concern value and liquidation value. Then the court ascertains whether “the 
market value of new securities distributed to each class under the plan at least equals what the 
class would receive in a liquidation” (Gilson et al. 1990, page 318), which is the most relevant 
limit imposed by the law in the formulation of the debt restructuring proposal and in the 
assignment of the new claims. Therefore, if the plan has been judged “fair and equitable”, the 
court rejects the opposition proposed by the dissenting creditor, who is therefore entitled to 
receive the impaired considerations according to the legalized restructuring plan: this is the so-
called cram down power. 
 
2.4. COST OF REORGANIZATION PROCEDURES 
All restructuring procedures involve time, professional effort and formal steps, inevitably 
producing the distraction of economic resources from the ordinary business conduct to the 
extraordinary reorganization. Restructuring costs belong to the costs of distress and they 
constitute relevant factors for any valuation about the efficiency of a certain reorganization 
strategy. Cost of distress are defined as “any economic losses that are attributable to the adverse 
impact of the restructuring on the investment decisions and the operations of the business”. 
(Gilson 2012, page 26). On this point, scholars have traditionally classified the costs of distress 
into two categories, direct costs and indirect costs. 
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The former category includes all the out-of-pocket expenses connected to the negotiation and 
the realization of the restructuring plan, such as legal fees, administrative expenses, professional 
fees for accounting and valuation experts, financial advisory fees, eventual cost of consultancies 
in the creditors’ interest sustained by the firm. 
The latter category is determined by the loss on trust and the adverse effects on commercial 
operations that are caused by the situation of distress and the following attempt to exit. 
According to Berk & DeMarzo (2011) and Gilson et al. (1990), some determinants of indirect 
costs of distress are: 
- Loss of customers, due to the uncertainty on the continuity of the business activities and 
the risk the firm will not perform the obligations on pending contracts; 
- Loss of suppliers, who fear their credit will not paid: legal rules on preferential payment 
of strategic suppliers under in-court restructuring may reduce the incidence of this cost; 
- Loss of employees: the situation of insolvency may cause the resignation of the key 
human resources; 
- Loss on trade receivables: some customers defer or miss the payment of receivables, on 
the assumption that the distressed firm does not have the resources to control the 
collection of credits; 
- Lower proceeds from divestitures: the firm cannot negotiate a fair value on the dismissal 
of non-core asset because of the public knowledge of the situation of crisis; 
- Inefficient investment: procedure management may undertake investment which 
destroy economic value and delay the liquidation of an inefficient business; 
- Adverse effect for creditors: a firm’s bankruptcy may contribute to the financial distress 
of the businesses with a relevant exposure toward those firm; 
- Value of the management’s time spent into dealing and negotiating the restructuring; 
- Missed investment opportunity that were not undertaken because of the situation of 
distress. 
Both categories of costs of distress have a negative impact on the Enterprise Value and they 
reduce the recovery of creditors’ claims, so a rational debt investor should subtract the expected 
value of the costs of distress when they compute the net present value, and therefore the initial 
investment, of a loan or bond financing. 
While journalists and scholars put their attention on the amount of direct cost of restructuring, 
the effect of indirect cost on enterprise value, is usually very relevant. The attention on direct 
costs is highlighted by the fact that, under judicial procedures, its amount shall be public, and 
each payment of professional and consultancy fees classified among this class must be  ly 
approved by the bankruptcy court. However, the empirical analysis of Gilson et al. (1990), has 
42 
 
stated that mean and median cost of restructuring the public traded debt through an exchange 
offer is very trivial. In fact, with respect to a sample of U.S. firms that were restructured in the 
1980s, the mean amount of direct cost of restructuring divided by the book value of asset had 
been close to 3 %. According to Gilson (2012), “direct costs are relatively small after adjusting 
for a company’s size” (page 26) and they are characterized economies of scale, since they have 
higher incidence on smaller firms. For example, the famous bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, 
sorted out through a Chapter 11 procedure, presented an amount of 1,6 billion dollars of direct 
costs, which corresponded to the 0.25 % of the assets and to 0.5 % of the amount of liabilities 
asked by creditors. 
With respect to indirect costs, although they are difficult to be precisely determined, the impact 
on Enterprise Value is more relevant, since their estimates “range from 10 % to 25 % of firms’ 
stock market before bankruptcy” (Ibidem). Furthermore, a study by Andrade & Kaplan (1998) 
focused on a sample of 36 firms whose distress was primarily caused by the presence of a high 
level of leverage, states “the changes in operating performance suggest that the net costs of 
financial distress are no greater than 10 percent to 20 percent of initial value” (page 1463). Also, 
the study, through the application of an EBITDA multiples model, estimates that the losses of 
value determined by financial distress have a median value of 22 %, if adjusted for the industry 
performance, and 25 %, if adjusted for market performance; at the same time average loss have 
been determined respectively equal to 19 % and 23 %. Considering that these values are likely 
to be overstated because the performance of some firms belonging to the sample was affected 
by adverse economic downturn, and other twenty of them experienced an exceptionally good 
industry-adjusted return after the exit from Chapter 11 procedure. Finally, since it is not possible 
to completely disentangle the contribution of high leverage from the effects of economic 
adverse shocks on the quantitative performance of the distressed firms, the above presented 
estimates should be interpreted as upper limits of the cost of financial distress. 
 
2.5. OUT-OF-COURT RESTRUCTURING 
Although in-court procedures of restructuring or liquidation seem to be the natural room for 
sorting out situations of financial distress while ensuring efficiency and equality of the 
procedure, directors and management have the alternative to proceed with a private 
restructuring. Under a private restructuring, also called workout on an informal basis, the court 
is not involved, so the directors' power is not officially supervised by an external authority and 
limited by special legal constraints. 
In order to choose the proper way of restructuring, directors and shareholders of a distressed 
firm should make a careful comparison of benefits and costs of both methods and then 
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implement the alternative which is expected to bring a favourable agreement with stakeholder 
while minimizing the direct and indirect costs of distress. 
The main feature of a private restructuring is that the overall process of reorganization, from 
the disclosure of distress to the approval of the agreement, is guided by the intentions of 
directors and the contractual power of the counterparties; by consequence the distressed firm's 
directors have the faculty to choose the most relevant stakeholders to be involved into the 
restructuring and conduct the negotiations with good level of confidentiality. Although the 
managing power is not constrained by insolvency law provisions, creditors may ask the 
appointment of external consultants and auditors as precondition to initiate and conduct the 
reorganization. Negotiations among stakeholders are centred both on “how the company should 
be valued, how much debt there should be, how the equity should be split” (Moyer et al. 2012, 
page 68) and on the extraordinary measures to restart the creation of new value, declined both 
on new sources of revenues and on reduction of outstanding costs. 
This type of restructuring is fully regulated by private agreements between the distressed firm 
and their creditors, which, in case of reciprocal consent, realize the refinancing of claims 
through modification of the original terms of the debt obligations. It follows that none of typical 
effects of the in-court restructuring procedure is automatic and they must be separately 
negotiated with the creditors. 
First, the automatic stay is not granted, therefore the firm is exposed to the risk that the creditors 
involved into the negotiations of the restructuring, after having assumed the information about 
the severity of the crisis, adopt an opportunistic behaviour by undertaking those enforcement 
actions that, as already seen, threaten the business continuity, the equal treatment of creditors 
and increase the incidence of procedural costs. Furthermore, liabilities toward claimholders 
excluded from negotiations must be fully paid according to original contractual expirations, and 
the same rule applies towards creditors who abandon the negotiation or does not agree with the 
final term sheet. To limit the adverse effect of the opportunism during the negotiations, since 
they may jeopardize the success of the reorganization and the continuity of the business, the 
distressed firm, when it acknowledges the situation of crisis, should ask creditors to provide a 
moratorium agreement to ensure a fair and ordered conduct of the negotiations. The moratorium 
temporarily stops the faculty to undertake enforcement actions on defaulted debt and on 
accumulated interests; then, in the case the private restructuring is successful, the frozen debt 
will be settled according to the final term sheet, which will be written and approved by the 
parties in compliance with the applicable law. 
Secondly, under private settlements of corporate crisis, in the case the distressed firm needs 
bridge financing, the situation is quite difficult to be sorted out. In fact, the firm can access to 
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new debt financing only without altering the position the existing creditors: therefore, either the 
bridge loan is negotiated to be more junior with respect to existing debt, or the senior creditors 
voluntary renounce to their priority rights. However, the former operation is costly for the 
distressed firm in terms of new financial expenses and it leads to high exposition to default risk 
by the lender, while the consent on the voluntary subordination of outstanding debt is likely to 
be rejected by the senior creditor. 
Then, with respect to parties who dissent on the negotiated outcome of the private restructuring, 
from a juridical point of view, the content the final term sheet is not applicable to them, so they 
retain the right to demand the payment of the outstanding obligations according to the original 
agreement.  It is important to underline that the possibility of full repayment of the obligation 
excluded from the impairment is allowed by the reduction of the debt burden due to the approval 
of the restructuring agreement, since under the adverse hypothesis that the restructuring was 
not undertaken, the firm would be forced to declare the bankruptcy. (Cian, 2014) 
Also, as it will be seen later, a framework constituted by private restructuring arrangements 
without automatic binding effect for rejecting counterparties opens the room for the holdout 
problem, which may affect the success of the overall procedure in a relevant way. 
Moving toward the technical aspects, the private restructuring requires the presence of qualified 
legal, accounting and business assistance: usually the intervention of a consultancy firm 
specialized in resolution of corporate crises coordinates the negotiation with stakeholders and 
it puts in place the necessary action for the achievement of consent and the formalization of the 
restructuring plan. Private restructurings are perceived to be less costly than judicial 
reorganizations, because the latter are strictly regulated by formal constraints, such as the need 
of opinions from independent professionals and the continual oversight by expert appointed by 
the court on the day-by-day management. These formalities affect the amount of direct cost of 
restructuring: according to Gilson et al. (1990), “when debt is restructured privately, legal costs 
are reduced because [extraordinary business] decisions can be made more quickly” (page 319); 
furthermore, the compensation scheme of bankruptcy practitioners gives them the incentive to 
prolong the time length of the procedure. 
By contrary, a relevant positive aspect of private restructuring procedures is the confidentiality 
of the process: the negotiation and the implementation of the restructuring may remain covered 
by secrecy, being acts of internal management. Through workouts, only the stakeholders 
directly impacted by the turnaround plan are precisely informed about the actual situation of 
the firm: this strategy is reasonable if the crisis is not severe and it is likely to be completely 
sorted out by the negotiated reorganization measures. In the case of maximum secrecy, some 
relevant stakeholders, not directly involved into the restructuring, completely ignore the 
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existence of a corporate crisis, thus preserving the relationship of trust and the corporate image. 
Confidentiality ensured by workouts avoid the diffusion of wrong information among 
stakeholders that would cause panic and sudden alterations of the normal core business activity, 
thus augmenting the severity of the crisis, or they would increase the complexity of the private 
settlement of crisis because of the need of including more counterparties. 
Recently, the innovation of the pre-packaged bankruptcy in the United States has changed the 
dichotomy in the choice between private and judicial restructuring. The institution matches the 
positive aspects of both procedure, while limiting the cost and the time required for the 
resolution of the crisis. It consists in a restructuring plan privately negotiated between the 
distressed firm and its stakeholders, with a formal solicitation for their votes. Then the firm files 
for Chapter 11 submitting the bankruptcy court the restructuring plan already approved by the 
creditors. In this way, the distressed firm “reduces the amount of time [spent] in bankruptcy 
court, lowering direct and indirect financial distress costs” (Gilson 2012, page 30). In this way, 
the application of the Chapter 11 majorities for the approval of the reorganization prevents the 
undesired consequences of holdout problem in the phase of negotiation, thus facilitating the 
approval of a fair and equitable restructuring measures. 
 
2.6. POSITION AND INCENTIVES OF STAKEHOLDERS 
After the presentation of the main features of in-court restructurings and workout procedures, 
some considerations about the choice of the best strategy for dealing with corporate crises shall 
be made. Although the decision-makers should focus their attention on the interest of the overall 
mass of stakeholders, by adopting the solution which is more likely to be successful in sorting 
out the distress while minimizing the incidence of related costs and the consequent loss of 
Enterprise Value, the actual selection of the restructuring strategy and the resulting outcome of 
negotiations are biased by personal incentives and by asymmetrical information. 
Unfortunately, it must be considered that each involved stakeholder takes its decision he is in 
charge to make by comparing the personal payoff of each available alternative considering as 
last resort option expected proceeds in case of liquidation, rather than the interests of the firm 
as a unitary system. 
Starting the analysis with the profile of the shareholders-owners of an insolvent firm, first of all 
they evaluate the situation of the firm within the perspectives of its industrial sector, then they 
either feel that “the very fact of insolvency means that [they] have lost their economic stake” 
(Bernstein 2007, page 8), or they may judge their option value attached to equity is still positive, 
because of volatility of current assets due to uncertainties in its value and the presence of good 
future investment opportunities. In the former scenario the old shareholders do not invest new 
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money in the company and they pass their power to creditors filing for an in-court procedure, 
while in the latter they attempt a voluntary restructuring aimed at receiving a certain number of 
shares in the reorganized business corresponding to their option value of equity. Furthermore, 
they are interested in private restructurings whether expected costs are lower than expenses for 
judicial procedures. In the adverse case the mass of stakeholders does not approve the plan, 
owners have the incentive to delay the restructuring and hope for a recovery of the economic 
condition, otherwise they file for Chapter 11 (Moyer et al., 2012). On this point, private 
restructurings are less likely to be successful since they affected by adverse selection problems: 
according to Gilson et al. (1990), “rational creditors are aware of the stockholders’ incentives 
to misstate the value of the firm”, so they prefer the immediate filing for an in-court procedure. 
With respect to distressed firm’s creditors, they have different schemes of incentive depending 
on the nature of their claim. Although they differ in intensity, all of them are encouraged to free 
ride the restructuring, thus determining the rise of holdout problem. In fact, a rational debtholder 
who is asked a voluntary impairment of its claim, compares the payoff of its available 
alternatives (accept or rejects): if he accepted, he would bear a loss equal to the impairment, 
otherwise, if he rejected, and under the hypothesis that all other debtholders accepted, he would 
be fully paid. It means that in case of individual rejection of the proposal, restructuring costs, 
in the specific dimension of the impairment of the defaulted claims, would be sustained only 
by the debtholders who accepted the proposal. The consequence of multiple rejections is that 
the level of consent over measures of debt renegotiations needed to overcome the situation of 
insolvency is not reached and the restructuring will inevitably fail. 
Therefore, distressed firm’s directors must anticipate the adverse impact of the holdout problem 
both in the choice of the restructuring process which is more likely to be successful, and in the 
formulation of the final proposals on debt restructuring, by including in the term sheet the 
proper incentives to favour the desired level of consent over the plan. 
According to Gilson et al. (1990), holdout problem constitutes a relevant threat for a positive 
outcome of debt restructurings under private proceedings, especially where debt claims are 
spread among many small investors, such as public traded bonds. In fact, for public traded 
bonds, any change in the core term of the indenture (the term sheet regulating the features of 
the bond loan) must be approved by every investor. Practically, the acceptance of the 
restructuring on a bond loan is asked through a formal exchange offer, where the firm proposes 
their investor to voluntary tender their old bonds and he is given new bonds with lower nominal 
or coupon value. To minimize the holdout problem, the success of the exchange offer is 
conditioned to a minimal quorum of acceptance by bondholders, computed on the nominal 
value of securities, and the rejections are penalized: “the new bonds are generally more senior, 
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and mature sooner, than the old bonds” (Gilson 2012, page 323). Furthermore, holdout problem 
is also relevant, and interest toward private reorganization is reduced, in case the firm owes a 
relevant amount of trade payables toward many different suppliers. In fact, commercial 
liabilities are originated by a wide and varied set of contractual relationships, thus making 
impossible to use the technique of the exchange offer to achieve the consent on the 
restructuring. From the suppliers’ point of view, their main interest, rather than the full recovery 
of their receivables, is the assurance on the continuity of the commercial relationship. 
Therefore, whether the distressed firm does not get liquidated and it involves the specific 
supplier in the future business activities at favourable conditions, its consent on restructuring is 
more likely to be obtained. (Bernstein, 2007) 
By converse, private restructuring is likely to succeed when most of debt is held by banks, since 
financial institutions are particularly willing to settle a private restructuring. The predominance 
of the bank debt in the financial structure of the distressed firm causes positive externalities for 
the other involved debtholders: financial companies have a strong incentive to monitor the 
management and the results of the business, thus reducing the level of information asymmetry 
and the connected adverse selection effect. 
Summing up, the intensity of the holdout problem may explain the fact that probability of 
success of a private restructuring is negatively correlated to the overall number of creditors who 
take part to the restructuring, while it is positively correlated to the percentage of outstanding 
debt toward banks and financial institutions (Gilson et al., 1990) 
When the high incidence of holdout problem determines the impossibility to reach an 
agreement, the only solution is the access to Chapter 11 protection, where the legal extension 
of the reorganization plan to dissenting creditors works in favour of a positive outcome of the 
negotiations. Practically, in Chapter 11 procedures, after the formulation of the reorganization 
proposal, impaired creditors are grouped in homogeneous classes with respect to the origin of 
their credit, the priority level, the presence of guarantees, and they are asked to vote for the 
acceptance or the rejection of the plan in a public hearing. The compulsory application of the 
agreement to all claimholders and the limited room for legal challenge reduce the possibility of 
free riding, since if the majority is reached all creditors bear both the benefits and the costs, 
while in case of rejection the restructuring fails, and the firm is forced to be liquidated. 
Beside the holdout problem, another factor that affects the success of a private restructuring is 
the complexity of the financial structure. The contemporaneous presence of junior and secured 
creditors in the negotiations, together with physiological uncertainty on Enterprise Value, 
undermines the probability of obtaining a successful restructuring plan. In fact, these groups of 
creditors have opposite interests in the fixation of the reference value of assets and they will 
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compete for the control of the restructured firm by trying to obtain an equity interest in the 
restructured business. Subordinated creditors are interested in arguing the amount of the 
Enterprise Value is higher than the amount of debt owed to senior creditors: in this manner 
senior creditors are fully repaid, then junior creditors' claims are restructured partly in cash or 
debt and partly through the issuance of new shares, with their potential for unlimited capture of 
all the value created by future improvements of business activities. 
On the other side, the senior but unsecured creditors have the incentive to set an Enterprise 
Value slightly lower than the debt they are entitled to receive: in this case their financial rights 
become the “fulcrum securities” and the creditors will obtain a relevant equity stake over the 
new firm. At the top of the capital structure, secured creditors, whose collateral value is higher 
than the amount of debt, are not affected by the restructuring: they will receive the full amount 
of both in the restructuring and in the liquidation of the firm. (Moyer et al., 2012) 
By contrary, the external supervision of independent practitioners and powers owned by the 
judicial authority allows distressed firm to reduce its liabilities to a more sustainable level. On 
this point, an empirical study based on a sample of 108 United States-based firms presenting a 
situation of distress due to high leverage, states that, while the level of “leverage remains high 
after both out of court restructuring and Chapter 11 reorganization, […] it remains much higher 
after out of court restructuring” (Gilson 1997, page 162). The study has found a positive 
correlation between nominal amount of pre-restructuring liabilities and debt resulting from the 
reorganization for restructurings undertaken out of the courts, while this correlation has not 
been found in the sample of firms which restructure their debt through a Chapter 11 procedure. 
Therefore, Gilson states that in workouts, the presence of transaction costs limits the reduction 
of debt, while in Chapter 11 they “do not appear to be a major deterrent to reducing debt”. (Op. 
Cit., page 163) This fact is due to some positive features of the judicial procedures, such as 
minimization of the blocking power by dissenting creditors, facilitation of assets sales and 
mandatory disclosure of the relevant information about business perspectives. 
To complete the framework about the position and interest of stakeholder, it is important to 
specify the role of incumbent shareholders and directors in the approval and implementation of 
restructuring. As already anticipated, they are granted the right to take the first moves for the 
restructuring by officially declaring the state of crisis, then have the power to propose a solution 
to conduct the negotiations. To ensure this advantage is exploited in the best interest of the firm 
as a unitary entity, it is important to provide within the plan some considerations to these 
categories, notwithstanding their responsibility in the causation of the crisis. In fact, directors 
and managers in charge will put their maximum effort in the turnaround process if their rewards 
are conditional to the result of their actions. 
49 
 
With respect to former shareholders of the distressed firm, while the economic value of their 
equity stake is practically lost because of the insolvency, they continue to retain the corporate 
governance rights that the Business Law ensure to them. More specifically, operations that 
affect the property structure of the firm, such as increase in shareholders' capital through 
issuance of new shares, realized through a fresh cash injection or the equitization of defaulted 
liabilities, must be expressly approved by the incumbent shareholders also under in-court 
restructuring procedures pending. Since the lack of their approval blocks the resolution of the 
crisis, it is reasonable to sort out the deadlock by giving them a small equity stake as reward for 
their consent on the entry of new shareholders and the resulting shift of control. By 
consequence, although this solution violates strict priority rules in the attribution of the 
restructured firm's financial claims, turnaround plans usually reserve a small equity stake, to be 
issued in the form of shares or warrants, to the former shareholders of the insolvent firm and to 
the top management team who will negotiate and then implement the turnaround plan. (Moyer 
et al., 2012) 
 
2.7. DEBT AND EQUITY AS OPTIONS 
To better understand the complex relationships among shareholders and claimholders, Resti & 
Sironi (2007) provide a useful insight about the financial situation of a business that falls into 
insolvency. They refer to the paper written by Merton in 1974, who applied Black & Scholes 
(1973) valuation model of option, to the valuation of corporate debt and contingent claims. 
The model assumes, as simplifying assumption, that all corporate liabilities are represented by 
single zero-coupon bond with a fixed maturity (that may be assumed equal to weighted average 
maturity of existing debt), and that a company is in default when asset value is lower than 
nominal value of its liabilities. Since corporations are granted the legal benefit of limited 
liability, equity owners are not asked to personally repay corporate passive obligations, so they 
simply declare the state of insolvency and they leave assets in the hands of creditors. It follows 
that the profile of shareholders’ payoff as function of the Enterprise Value is equivalent to the 
payoff profile of a long position on a call option: in case of default equity holders get nothing 
and they simply lose their initial investment. Otherwise, whether the overall value of corporate 
assets is higher than debt, equity holders exercise the call option by repaying the debt and 
retaining the differential between Enterprise Value and face value of debt, with a potential upper 
unlimited payoff. 
By contrary, in the case assets value is lower than amount of debt to be repaid, shareholders 
does not exercise the option by passing the control of corporate assets to owners of debt claims. 
In this way, debt-financers’ position may be viewed as a short position on a put option, since in 
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the case the debt is repaid, their payoff is upside limited to the face value of debt, while in case 
of default, they receive the full amount of the Enterprise Value, losing the differential between 
Enterprise Value and the value of the contractual repayment of debt. 
To apply Black and Scholes model for options, the underlying asset is assumed to be the 
comprehensive set of corporate assets, while strike price is the amount of debt to be repaid at 
maturity. After these specifications, payoff profiles of debt and equity claims may be resumed 
in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 – Payoff of debt and equity 
 Source: http://www1.udel.edu/Finance/dandeli/FINC851/lectures/l4/img00001.gif  
Moving from theory to practice, the shift of the control rights from equity holders to creditors 
is triggered by the opening of the insolvency proceeding, since the bankruptcy judge, the 
receivership and the appointed consultants start to work in favour of the mass of creditors. After 
the default, creditors are given the power to take decision about the technique for sorting out 
the crisis: reorganization, sale of the unitary business or separate liquidation of the assets. In 
case of sale, a third party acquires the control on the business’ assets, while the creditors’ rights 
are limited on the cash proceeding from the sale. In case of reorganization, after the completion 
of the procedure, the creditors become the new owners of the firm and they have the right to 
decide the destiny of the operation. Nowadays, reforms of bankruptcy procedures have 
determined that the options of reorganization and sale have become closer, since the creditors 
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seem to play “the same role as shareholders of a solvent enterprise – that is retaining the 
company or selling it, whichever they perceive to be to their greatest advantage” (Bernstein 
2007, page 8) 
Furthermore, the view of debt and equity as option allows the exploitation of Black and Sholes 
model for computation of option value, which may provide useful insights for the determination 
of the value of outstanding debt and equity in the case the firm is in a situation of decline and 
crisis. The relevant variable of this model is volatility in the market value of corporate assets 
(and therefore in the Enterprise Value): high volatility, due to uncertain perspectives of recovery 
of the business or, more broadly, of the industrial sector or the overall economy, generates a 
positive value of equity although analytical Discounted Cash Flow models state that present 
value of current assets and future assets is lower than outstanding liabilities. The reason is that 
high volatility generates positive equity value “because of the time premium on the option (the 
time until the bonds mature and come due) and the possibility that the value of the assets may 
increase above the value of the assets may increase above the face value of the bonds before 
they come due”. (Damodaran 2010, page 406) 
 
2.8. DEBATE ON RESIDUAL OWNER IN DISTRESSED FIRMS 
Some scholars have pointed out that conflicts among owners and creditors belonging to 
different priority levels, and consequent difficulty in the formation of decisions are due to the 
lack of a residual owner in situations of distress. They consider the fact that, when the firm is 
in a positive phase, the institutional provision about the power to take strategic decisions in the 
head of directors appointed by the shareholders guarantees the overall creation of value. In fact, 
shareholders assume the role of residual owners, defined as the “persons whose interests are 
identical with those of the firm as a whole” (LoPucki 2004, page 1342), since both positive and 
negative effects of their decision affect their wealth via the modification of value of their shares. 
From this consideration, it was proposed that decisions concerning debt restructurings and 
allocation of property rights in the new business should be taken by stakeholders who are 
directly affected by the consequences of their choices. Unfortunately, when the firm is 
distressed, the presence of multiple classes of claimants and uncertainty on value create 
difficulties in the identification of the residual owner. In fact, both shareholders and creditors 
are affected in the opposite directions by decisions taken by the management of a firm close to 
insolvency, generating conflict of interests and failure of this theoretical governance approach. 
The empirical study of LoPucki (2004) based on a sample of 98 U. S. public companies which 
exited from Chapter 11 in the 1990s has found that only in the 38 % of cases it was possible to 
identify a single class of investors as residual owners after the confirmation of the respective 
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reorganization plan. In the other 62 % of the sample, the position of residual claimants had been 
shared by two or more different classes of investors. In these situations, the conflicting position 
of stakeholders may create difficulties in the arrangement of a governance scheme which 
ensures that the economic incentives of the decision makers are aligned with the interests of the 
entire firm. Therefore, the legal framework should provide a system of duties and fines to 
improve the efficiency of the procedure and to avoid the threat of liquidation of businesses 
which are still valuable as going concern. Under the assumption that it is possible and 
straightforward to identify a residual owner, in LoPucki opinion, the approach toward the 
residual owner should be used in a negative way: “the bankruptcy system should identify those 
who clearly and obviously are not residual owners and deny them […] representation.” 
(LoPucki 2004, page 1364) 
By converse, the study by Rasmussen (2004) states that the current practices for redefinition of 
property in distressed firms work quite well, since creation of new value is mainly achieved 
after the restructuring. He observes that, pending the reorganization proceeding, the actual 
control on business conduction is taken by senior creditors through the veto rights on relevant 
transaction and on the appointment of key managers. Also, the possibility for senior creditors 
to receive both debt and equity securities in the restructured firm gives origin to an incentive 
scheme similar to the position of a residual owner. Furthermore, although conflict of interests 
for residual owners belonging to different priority levels supposed by LoPucki are not shown 
to affect the investment policy of the firm, “conflict disappears (or at least is greatly reduced) 
by the end of the bankruptcy proceeding” since “after the case is over, both groups of erstwhile 
debtholders will be shareholders, at that time, they want to maximize the value of equity”. 
(Rasmussen 2004, pages 1461-1462) It follows that conflicts among claimholders are focused 
on determination of the firm’s residual value; at the end of the case all new shareholders, 
although belonging to different classes, have the incentive to work together to improve value 
of their shares through good investments in new projects. 
Moyer et al. (2012) suggest the approach of the fulcrum security, defined as “the last creditor 
tranche or group that receives anything in the restructured firm”, by consequence “the owner(s) 
of this tranche of securities tends to gain control of the restructured firm’s equity through the 
restructuring process” (page 60). With the help of this definition, the residual owner may be 
defined as the category of debtholders who receives a controlling stake of equity in exchange 
for old claims because of the combined effect of low Enterprise Value and the application of 
priority rules in the restructuring. At the end of the reorganization, that specific category of 
claimants keeps the control over the business and it becomes the new residual owner. As it will 
be seen in Chapter 3, fulcrum security approach is largely used by distress investors, who 
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acquire the control of declining firms by buying the defaulting claims and playing an active role 
in the negotiation process. 
 
2.9. CORPORATE REORGANIZATION LAW IN ITALY 
Focusing on the institutional environment in Italy, it must be specified that Italian Bankruptcy 
Code is historically focused on the liquidation of the disarrayed firm, being in this sense quite 
similar to the situation described by Baird and Rasmussen (2002) about the United Kingdom. 
The insolvency was viewed by the lawmaker as an infective disease, so Bankruptcy Code was 
aimed at the shutdown of the firm to avoid propagation of distress to related businesses, and to 
severely punish the failed entrepreneur. In fact, insolvency law used to be focused on the 
safeguard of the creditors’ interest for the recovery of their claims, rather than on incentivizing 
the preservation of the residual value of the business through an effective turnaround process. 
(Giacosa & Mazzoleni, 2012) 
In the recent years, under the pressure of increasing globalization, evolution of financial 
markets and modifications of competitive strengths, a series of reforms have taken place. As a 
result, now the institutional system considers the corporate crisis a normal situation, thus 
providing to distressed firms the instruments to restructure its claims while preserving the 
continuity and the residual value of the business; it also allows the entrepreneur in good faith, 
to close its insolvent firm and eventually to restart a new experience, having abolished any 
limitation of personal freedom after the closure of the procedure. 
Italian Bankruptcy Code regulates two types of judicial procedures: bankruptcy liquidation 
(fallimento), addressed to the businesses staying in irreversible crisis; and composition with 
creditors (concordato preventivo), for the resolution of the crises, both reversible and 
irreversible, with the consent of debtholders. Furthermore, insolvency law provides two 
instruments for the legalization of the out-of-court debt restructurings: certified plan (piano di 
risanamento attestato) and approved restructuring agreement (accordo di ristrutturazione dei 
debiti omologato). These legalization instruments, guarantying the existence and the fairness 
of a restructuring plan, incentivizes its adoption and the obtainment of consents over it because 
of these main legal effects, which are produced in various intensity: 
- Exclusion of clawback actions for acts, payments and issuance of guarantees undertaken 
in execution of restructuring plan; 
- Exclusion from criminal provisions for actions connected to the implementation of the 
plan in case of subsequent failure; 
- Block of current and future enforcement actions undertaken by defaulted creditors; 
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- Mandatory extension of the content of the restructuring agreement to dissenting and 
non-participant creditors. 
In this paragraph the main features of the institutions are now described, starting from the 
certified plan, with its low impact on business conduct but with low protective effect, to the 
bankruptcy liquidation, characterized by the interruption of the business and high pervasiveness 
of the judicial intervention. Beside these institutions, Italian framework provides a special legal 
discipline for restructuring and recovery of the biggest distressed firms. This special discipline 
gives origin to procedures of extraordinary administration of big distressed firms, characterized 
by intervention and supervision of both judicial authority and political authority (the Ministry 
of Economic Development). 
 
2.9.1. Certified plan 
The certified plan, regulated by article 64, paragraph 3, letter d) of Italian Bankruptcy Code, is 
a document elaborated by a distressed entrepreneur, containing the actions to be implemented 
for the achievement of “restructuring of the debt” and “restoration of the equilibrium in the 
financial structure”. The plan must be accompanied by a report written by a Chartered Auditor 
and Accountant, independent from the distressed firm, where he certifies that data included into 
the plan have been verified by him and that action plan is feasible and aimed at the resolution 
of the crisis. The professional is directly appointed by the entrepreneur and its judgement must 
not be compromised by personal or labour relationships with the business and with any subjects 
interested in the restructuring, moreover the law expressly requires he did not work in the 
interest of the firm for five years preceding the appointment for certification of the plan. 
The nature of the actions contained into the plan is various and it goes from measures for 
reduction of the financial burden, such as rescheduling of reimbursements, renegotiation of 
loans, write-offs of liabilities, to extraordinary operations on capital or dismissal of assets and 
business units. To be complete and consistent, the content of the plan shall include the 
hypothesis and assumptions at the basis of the proposed action, then it shall highlight the overall 
capability to produce positive economic results and subsequent cash inflows in a level sufficient 
to ensure the equilibrium with cash outflows, including the positive impact of the obtainment 
of new financings. (Giacosa & Mazzoleni, 2012) 
The only formality, beyond the attestation of feasibility by the independent auditor, required for 
the validity of the certified plan is the presence of certified date on the document, to ensure the 
plan had actually been written before the implementation of restructuring actions and to avoid 
abuses. Therefore, certified plan is a unilateral act of the entrepreneur, it is neither subjected to 
approval by creditors, nor to judicial control, not even to compulsory disclosure of information 
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or publication. Despite the content of the legal provision, usually the intention of writing a 
certificate plan and its content are shared with the most relevant stakeholders and with subjects 
directly involved into its implementation, after a proper negotiation and informal consent. 
Certified plan is bound to produce its effect only in case of subsequent insolvency and after the 
opening of a bankruptcy procedure: in such a situation acts, payments and issuance of 
guarantees undertaken in execution of the plan are legally exempted from clawback actions 
taken by the receivership. The application of certified plan has limited room in case of deep and 
complex crises because the law does not require any type of judicial approval after the 
formation of the certified plan. Therefore, scholars point out the risk that the bankruptcy court, 
in case of subsequent insolvency of the firm, carefully examines the documents and then it 
declares the plan not suitable to consent the restructuring of the debt and to re-equilibrate the 
financial structure. It follows that in these situations the court have the power to disqualify the 
certificate plan, so it does not grant the benefit of exemption from clawback and it allows the 
bankruptcy receivership to nullify also actions taken in execution of the certified plan, causing 
uncertainty about the actual degree of protection given by this legal instrument. (Sciuto, 2009 
and Sandulli, 2006) 
Furthermore, it must be specified that the voluntary publication of the certified plan in the 
Business Register allows the distressed firm to obtain some fiscal benefits: the exclusion from 
the taxable income of the extraordinary proceeds from write-offs of liabilities in the head of the 
distressed firm and, similarly, the fiscal deduction of impairment of claims in the head of 
creditors. (Alletto, 2014-15) 
 
2.9.2. Approved restructuring agreement 
A more sophisticated legalization instrument is the approval of restructuring agreements 
regulated by article 182-bis and following of the Italian Bankruptcy Code. The procedure 
requires an agreement between the distressed firm and its creditors, in a minimum share of the 
60% of the value of outstanding claims and is constituted by the external control of the 
agreement which activates the protective effects guaranteed by the legal rule. Like the content 
of the former tool, the agreement must be addressed to restructuring of debt, to be undertaken 
in various ways, from rescheduling of existing debt to contribution of fresh cash in the form of 
equity or bridge loans. Differently from the certificate plan, the provision puts a special 
attention on the treatment of creditors excluded from the agreement: the firm shall provide 
evidence that the implementation of the agreement will supply the financial resources necessary 
to the full satisfaction of the excluded creditors within 120 days from the approval. About the 
external controls, an independent auditor, who is nominated by the firm in compliance with the 
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above-mentioned provisions about certified plan, must provide the certification on accuracy of 
corporate data, on the feasibility of the agreement and on the expectations of complete 
satisfaction of excluded creditors. Then, the firm formally asks to bankruptcy court the approval 
of the agreement, which shall be accompanied by the certification of the auditor and by a set of 
documents about the actual economic and financial situation, the detailed indication of 
corporate assets, debts, guarantees issued and rights possessed by third parties. After the 
opening of the file at the court, the agreement shall be published in the Business Registry: from 
the moment of publication the law provides the automatic block for 60 days of all enforcement 
actions toward the distressed firm.  The bankruptcy court, after the verification of the regularity 
of the documentation, approves the agreement, thus producing these effects: 
- Continuation of the automatic stay for 120 days from the approval; 
- Exemption from clawback actions on acts, payments and issuance of guarantees planned 
in the agreement, in case of subsequent bankruptcy; 
- Exemption from criminal fines in case of subsequent insolvency limited to the content 
of the agreement; 
- Preferential reimbursement of debts for loans undertaken in the form of “new finance” 
at the end of an eventual bankruptcy procedure. 
To avoid the adoption of opportunistic enforcement measures by creditors, the firm may also 
anticipate the activation of the automatic stay, providing the bankruptcy court evidence about 
the ongoing negotiations. In this case the firm shall file, within 60 days, the approval of the 
agreement resulting from the negotiation or it may request the opening of the procedure of 
composition with creditors. 
So, it is possible to point out that the approval of the restructuring agreement is an out-of-court 
instrument for the restructuring of distressed firm, with an intervention of the court limited on 
the formal aspects which gives stability to the content of the agreement. The legal stability of 
the agreement limits the holdout problem by favouring the creditors’ participation to the 
agreement. In fact, creditors classified as excluded from the agreement, although they hold the 
right to be fully paid, face difficulties in taking enforcement actions and in asking for 
bankruptcy liquidation whether they payment does not occur; finally, in the adverse hypothesis 
the subsequent bankruptcy is opened and proceeds form liquidation are distributed, non-
participants are given a lower payoff than participants because of the safeguard of acts 
implemented under the framework of the restructuring agreement. 
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2.9.3. Composition with creditors 
Composition with creditors is regulated by article 160 and following of Italian Bankruptcy 
Code. According to Cian (2014), the institution allows a distressed entrepreneur to submit to 
his creditors a proposal for partial or deferred satisfaction of their claims, while keeping the 
managerial power over the firm. In case of acceptance by creditor and subsequent judicial 
approval, distressed firm’s liabilities are limited to the content of the proposal and the exceeding 
obligations are definitively written off. 
After an eventual temporary block of enforcement actions, the so-called phase of concordato 
con riserva, which may be asked by the firm through a specific petition to bankruptcy court, 
the opening of the composition with creditors is reserved to the initiative of the distressed firm’s 
directors. They shall present to bankruptcy court the restructuring plan containing the proposal 
for the settlement of crisis, together with detailed documentation about corporate assets, 
outstanding debts and preference rights, guarantees and other rights possessed by third parties. 
The firm shall provide bankruptcy court a report from an independent auditor which certifies 
the accuracy of the corporate data presented in the plan and the feasibility of proposed actions. 
After the filing, the bankruptcy court nominates the delegated judge, the judicial supervisor 
(commissario giudiziale) and it calls the involved creditors in a public hearing. Pending the 
composition procedure, directors shall provide periodic information to the court and they shall 
ask the court’s authorization for preferential payments and business actions over a relevant 
amount or classified into extraordinary administration acts. The supervisor oversees actions 
taken by directors, having in each moment the power to propose the court the stop of the 
procedure and the opening of a bankruptcy liquidation. He also informs corporate creditors 
about the existence of the procedure, through a written report about the causes of the crisis, the 
feasibility and the features of the proposal of composition, then he formally calls creditors at 
the hearing for the approval. 
The legal provision grants the freedom about the specific content of the proposal: on one hand 
the firm may simply propose deferred or partial reimbursement of distressed debt, or liquidation 
of corporate assets; on the other hand, it could formulate more articulated solutions. In fact, the 
proposal may be based on contribution of assets to a new company, the merger of distressed 
company with another legal entity, and the subsequent satisfaction of creditors through the 
destination of shares or other securities issued by the resulting company. In these situations, the 
shareholders' meeting of distressed firm shall approve the issuance of new shares or the 
extraordinary corporate operations before the formalization of consent by creditors, then the 
execution of the operation is deferred after the judicial approval of the composition. (Palmieri, 
2009) Other available solutions may involve third parties as providers of real or personal 
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guarantees for the settlement of the crisis: a peculiar situation is the commitment undertaken by 
an external assignee (in Italian: assuntore) to assume business assets and to repay connected 
liabilities in conformance to the proposal of composition. 
With respect to liabilities owed by the distressed firm, the proposal may group the creditors in 
classes composed by homogeneous claims and position, then the firm may differentiate the 
treatment offered to each class. On this point, the formulation of the offer is subject to some 
legal constraints according to article 160, to avoid that the formulation of proposals alters 
priority rules. The partial satisfaction of preferred claims has been admitted by reform of 
Insolvency law in 2005, thus facilitating the adoption of this legal tool by distressed firms, but 
the proposal shall ensure that “the percentage, time and guarantees of the final settlement shall 
not be lower than those offered to creditors belonging to a lower priority level”. (Cian 2014, 
page 458) Preferred creditors shall be offered at least a sum equal to proceeds that are likely to 
be obtained in case of forced sale of their encumbered assets, by considering their actual level 
of priority together with the liquidation value estimated by an independent expert. Part of 
preferred claim higher than value of the encumbered assets is allowed to be partly repaid, but, 
for this portion, the preferred creditor “shall be offered something more of what is devoted to 
creditors originally belonging to a lower preference level, although not everything available”. 
(Cian 2014, page 458) 
To approve the proposal, creditors may express their vote in the specific public hearing or by 
correspondence, considering the clause that if they do not vote there are computed among 
favourable. The proposal is approved whether it receives the absolute majority of positive votes 
computed on the monetary value of claims. In case creditors have been grouped in different 
classes, the approval of the proposal requires, together with the majority of overall value of 
claims, the majority of separate approvals by classes: each class is considered to approve the 
composition if it obtains the majority of positive votes by claimholders included in the class. 
Then, more than half of impaired classes shall approve the composition. 
The effect of creditors’ approval is that all liabilities originated before the opening date of the 
procedure, shall be settled according to the content of the proposal of composition, which 
expresses percentage of reduction of the credit, new expiry dates, and eventual deferred 
payments or non-monetary settlements. This modification of original claims affects also 
creditors who dissented at the call for votes and tort claims which have not been already 
quantified in monetary terms. By contrary, all claims originated after the opening of the 
composition are not affected by any impairment or rescheduling and they shall be fully paid 
within their contractual expiration; however, they are granted the benefit of preferential 
satisfaction in case of subsequent insolvency. Dissenting creditors have the only right to file for 
59 
 
opposition to the bankruptcy court: the judge accepts the opposition only in case the creditor 
provides evidence that the satisfaction offered through the composition is lower than proceeds 
he is deemed to obtain after a bankruptcy liquidation. 
Since procedure for composition with creditors is quite rigid, the institute has traditionally been 
used for the liquidation of the corporate assets, to take advantage from its lower pervasiveness 
than liquidation under bankruptcy. Nowadays, the 2012 reform has explicitly ruled the 
composition under going concern (concordato in continuità), ruled by article 186-bis of Italian 
Bankruptcy Code, thus introducing into Italian legislation an institution inspired by U. S. 
Chapter 11. The new provision is applicable whether the plan is based on continuation of the 
business activity or on the transfer of all or part of the business to other legal entities. In this 
situation, distressed firm shall provide a specific certification of an independent professional 
who declares that the keeping of the going concern allows the better satisfaction of the creditors’ 
interests with respect to the liquidation. 
In line with the U. S. discipline, under composition with creditors, distressed firm may ask 
judicial permits aimed at the obtainment of new financing necessary to ensure its survival or at 
the termination of unfavourable executory contracts. In the unfortunate case of subsequent 
bankruptcy, occurred during the composition of after its approval, the actions formerly 
authorized by the court or in execution of the approved plan are exempted from clawback 
actions. 
While the reform makes the composition under going concern a useful instrument of the 
recovery of situations of distress, Giacosa & Mazzoleni (2012), observed that its application 
had been rare. Although their paper was published short time after the reform, they point out 
that its adoption is not favoured by creditors, since composition is thought to present higher 
impairments of claims than the restructuring agreement. Also, despite the provision on preferred 
reimbursement, internal procedures widely spread among banks prevent the supply of 
financings to firm under composition, thus limiting the adoption of this instrument for sorting 
out the crises. 
Since 2015, the legislator has disincentivized the use of composition with creditors for the 
liquidation of the firm, providing the compulsory minimum recovery of 20 % of the distressed 
claims owed toward non-preferred creditors. (Odcec Treviso, 2016) 
 
2.9.4. Bankruptcy liquidation 
The last resort solution for situations of distress is bankruptcy liquidation (fallimento). After a 
petition submitted by the firm itself, by a defaulted creditor or by the public persecutor, the 
court ascertains the state of insolvency and therefore it declares the bankruptcy. The 
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entrepreneur loses the administration of its assets and personal goods (situation called in Italian 
spossessamento), which pass under the control of a lawyer or chartered accountant nominated 
by the court, the bankruptcy receiver. All the debts and preference rights owed by the distressed 
firm shall be verified by the receiver and approved by the judge after a specific petition from 
the creditor, then the requests which pass the verification are included in a specific list of 
admitted claims (stato passivo). The receiver arranges the dismissal of corporate assets through 
various techniques: as unitary complex or in atomistic way, by public auctions or competitive 
procedures, trying to maximize proceeds from forced liquidation. He also safeguards the 
residual interests of the insolvent firm through various powers: to collect outstanding 
receivables, to close pending contracts and litigations, and to take clawback actions for acts and 
payments which caused a damage on the position of the creditors and were undertaken in the 
year before bankruptcy declaration. Cash collected through the liquidation, net of the procedural 
expenses and professional fees, is intended first to preferential claims originated by the 
provisional going concern or by previous attempts of restructuring (approved restructuring 
agreements or composition with creditors), then to preferred claimholders in strict conformance 
to the hierarchy of priority rights; the portion of preferential claims exceeding the proceeds 
from liquidation of their encumbered assets is disqualified from priority and treated as 
unsecured claim. Finally, the residual cash is distributed to non-preferred creditors in proportion 
of the nominal value of their original claim. 
While the state of bankruptcy implies the cessation of the going concern and the mandated 
liquidation of the assets withheld by the entrepreneur, bankruptcy law allows the provisional 
continuation of the going concern (esercizio provvisorio) whether it ensures the better 
satisfaction of creditors. In fact, continuation of the going concern may be useful to preserve 
value of goodwill and intangible assets, which would be suddenly destroyed in case of abrupt 
interruption of all business activities. The receivership values the opportunity and asks the 
authorization to the court, which is released for a defined period and it is subjected to the 
consent of the creditors’ committee. In this case, the receiver has the power to directly manage 
the firm, and the resulting new liabilities will be repaid with preference, or he may lease the 
business to third parties. Anyway, this exceptional tool is functional to the realization of the 
going concern value through the disposal of functioning business unit in the hands of an 
acquirer, and in the case the going concern leads to a dangerous consumption of financial 
resources it shall be immediately ceased. 
Another possible outcome of the bankruptcy procedure, alternative to the forced liquidation of 
asset and distribution of proceeds according to strict priority rules, is a negotiated settlement of 
the crisis called in-bankruptcy composition (concordato fallimentare). It consists by an 
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agreement aimed at debt restructuring and creditors’ satisfaction, with better recovery of 
distressed claims than the expected result from the planned bankruptcy liquidation. 
This procedure may be initiated by a creditor, a group of them or by a third party as external 
guarantor, only after the approval of the list of admitted claim. The failed entrepreneur, instead, 
has a restricted time window to eventually advance a proposal of agreement, since the law wants 
to incentivize the composition of situation of decline and crisis thus avoiding the opening of 
bankruptcy procedure. Analogously to the composition with creditors, the practical realization 
of in-bankruptcy composition is not constrained by the law, so it may be constituted by partial 
repayments of creditors, transfer of the firm to creditors, or interventions by third parties as 
guarantors for the satisfaction of creditors. 
The proposal of agreement shall be submitted to bankruptcy judge, who verifies its fairness 
with the support of the receiver and the creditors' committee. In case of admission, creditors are 
informed about the content of the proposal and they are asked to vote for the approval. Then, 
after the approval by the majority of unsecured and impaired creditors, the bankruptcy court 
definitively approves the composition. The approval of the composition produces the closing 
of the bankruptcy procedure without liquidation and dissolution, so corporate assets and 
administration powers on the firm are retransferred from the receivership to the entrepreneur. 
The entrepreneur is therefore obliged to repay its bankruptcy liabilities in conformance to 
conditions and percentages negotiated in the composition, and he is freed from the repayment 
of the exceeding parts. 
 
 
 
2.9.5. Extraordinary administration 
Under Italian law, situations of distress regarding more relevant firms are sorted out through a 
special insolvency procedure called “extraordinary administration of big firms in crisis”. The 
institution is regulated by Legislative Decree 270/1999, and, according to article 1, it is aimed 
at “the preservation of productive assets through continuation, reactivation of reconversion of 
business activities”. It means that the procedure is oriented at safeguard of production and 
employment levels, together with interests of creditors. Firms are eligible to access to 
extraordinary administration whether they are in situation of insolvency and they meet the 
following requirements: they have more than 200 employees and the overall liabilities exceed 
the 66 % of both the book value of assets, as in the balance sheet, and the revenues level in the 
last year. 
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The procedure starts from the declaration of insolvency by the bankruptcy court and the 
appointment of a judicial supervisor (commissario giudiziale). The supervisor shall ascertain 
the possibility of the return of the insolvent business to a situation of economic equilibrium: 
whether the recovery is possible, the powers pass to an extraordinary administrator 
(commissario straordinario) appointed by the Ministry of Economic Development, otherwise 
the procedure is converted into an ordinary bankruptcy liquidation. The biggest firms may enjoy 
a special procedure regulated by Legislative Decree 347/2003 (“Parmalat insolvency decree”) 
which allows them to avoid the phase of preliminary valuation, submitting to the Minister and 
to bankruptcy court a petition for the immediate opening of the extraordinary administration. 
In both cases, the management powers over the firm are taken by the administrator and he is 
given the right to unilaterally cause the termination of disadvantageous pending contracts. Then, 
the administrator shall prepare a program aimed at either the restructuring and recapitalization 
of the distressed firm or at dismissal of business units to third parties, which is subject to the 
approval by the Minister.  The administrator remains in charge also for the execution of the 
approved program. Pending the procedure, going concern of the business is maintained, 
eventually liquidating or ceasing the non-core and unproductive activities, and credits arising 
from the continuation of the business are satisfied with priority. 
With respect to the liability side of the insolvent business, all enforcement actions are blocked; 
the verification of claims and the distribution of proceeds originated from the dismissal of assets 
and business units follow the rules of bankruptcy liquidation, except for the possibility for 
suppliers and employees to receive anticipated payments. Alternatively, the extraordinary 
administration is also likely to be settled toward creditors through a composition proposed by 
the insolvent firm or by a third party. 
 
 
 
2.10. CLASSIFICATION OF ITALIAN LEGAL TOOLS 
Buttignon (2016) proposes a classification of instruments for resolution of financial distress 
provided by Italian bankruptcy law according to two dimensions: confidentiality of the crisis 
versus strength of the solution. Confidentiality dimension refers to the level of information that 
the business is obliged to give to external stakeholders in compliance with the legal discipline: 
disclosure of information is very low for certificate plan, while it gradually increases for 
procedures characterized by intervention of the judicial authority. The dimension of strength is 
connected to the intensity of the main legal consequences of the instruments, and it is 
summarized in Table 2.1. 
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 Certified 
plan 
Approved restructuring 
agreement 
Composition with 
creditors 
Block of enforcement No Yes Yes 
Exemption from clawback Medium High High 
Exemption from criminal fines No Yes Yes 
Binding of dissenting creditors No No Yes 
Table 2.1 – Legal effects of Italian Bankruptcy Law Institutions 
Personal elaboration from Cian (2014) and Buttignon (2016) 
From the joint analysis of the two dimensions, Figure 2.2 shows a positive correlation between 
the strength of the effects produced by the above-mentioned legal instrument and the intensity 
of their impact on external stakeholders of the distressed firm. 
 
Figure 2.2 – Strength, external impact and judicial intervention of Italian Bankrupty Law institutions 
Personal elaboration from Buttignon (2016) 
Moreover, Giacosa and Mazzoleni (2012) have developed a matrix tool aimed at suggesting the 
appropriate legal tool for the formalization of the restructuring plan. It considers, on a 
dimension, the depth of the situation of financial distress and the correlated intensity of 
sacrifices requested to creditors, while the other dimension refers to commitment of involved 
stakeholders to support the restructuring. 
In case of low intensity of the crisis, the risk of subsequent bankruptcy is remote, so if the 
support by stakeholders is low, the restructuring plan should be legalized either through the 
Liquidation with 
eventual 
temporary going 
concern 
Restructuring with eventual 
liquidation of non -core assets 
Bankruptcy 
Certified 
Plan 
Approved 
Restructuring 
Agreement 
Composition 
with 
Creditors 
Strength of the solution 
Im
p
ac
t 
o
n
 e
xt
er
n
al
 s
ta
ke
h
o
ld
er
s 
Type of Judicial intervention 
 
NONE FORMAL SUPERVISION PERVASIVE 
 
 
Extraordinary 
Administration 
64 
 
certification ex article 67 or through the judicial approval ex article 182-bis, to show the 
credibility of the plan to involved creditors. Under the hypothesis of high consent over the 
restructuring plan, legalization is not necessary, so restructuring agreement may follow the 
provisions of private law, since the threat of legal challenge is remote. 
Whether the intensity of distress is high, and the support of stakeholders is low, the situation is 
quite severe, since the firm cannot find rapid solutions through an emergency plan, while it 
remains exposed to enforcement action: the unique way to avoid further losses of value is the 
filing for composition with creditors. In case of good level of support by the involved 
stakeholders, despite the incidence of the requested sacrifices, the reorganization is legalized 
through the approved restructuring agreement, because the judicial formal control ensures the 
stability of actions to be undertaken. 
The model is resumed in Table 2.2. 
 
 Low commitment High commitment 
Low intensity of the 
crisis 
Certified plan or approved 
restructuring agreement 
Private agreement (no need of 
legalization instruments) 
High intensity of the 
crisis 
Composition with creditors Approved restructuring 
agreement 
Table 2.2 – Selection of the legal instrument for restructuring plans 
Source: Giacosa and Mazzoleni (2012), page 303 
 
2.11. CHOICE BETWEEN JUDICIAL AND NON-JUDICIAL PROCEDURES 
From a general point of view, it is possible to state that the institutional framework provides 
many ways for the resolution of a corporate crisis. The decision between a private settlement 
or a public procedure is not straightforward, since it depends from the intensity of the distress, 
the business perspectives and dynamics of relationships among corporate stakeholders. 
According to Gilson (2012), firms are more likely to arrange a private restructuring whether 
it’s the value of the business is based on intangible assets and human resources, and the 
acquisition of revenues from clients depends on trust and the assurance of business continuity, 
such as consultancy firms and, in general, businesses supplying services characterized by 
continuity over a definite (or indefinite) time window. In these situations, access to workout 
ensures the confidentiality about the situation of crisis, since the eventual leak of information 
leads to the sudden deterioration of corporate image and trust, causing the immediate drop in 
revenues from the core activities. With respect to the liability side, the presence of a simple 
financial structure and the prevalence of banking debts favours the unanimous consent on the 
restructuring plan under private negotiation, thus reducing the legal and procedural costs. 
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Finally, also the identity of the owner affects the choice: “distressed private equity-backed 
companies are more likely to restructure their debt out of court, do so in less time, and are more 
likely to survive than comparable public companies”. (Gilson 2012, page 30) 
By contrary, in businesses where leasing contracts contribute to the financial burden, such as 
airline companies, it is reasonable to file for a judicial procedure to trigger the renegotiation of 
the agreements. For the same reason, judicial procedures best fit for the definitive settlement of 
liabilities representing a threat for the future survival of the firms: we refer to claims derived 
from tort responsibility, environmental litigations (for example damages related to asbestos), 
pension agreements and criminal fines. Moreover, a business is more likely to file for a judicial 
composition whether its financial structure is articulated in many priority levels, it includes 
publicly traded bonds, and its workforce is unionized, “because voting rules in bankruptcy do 
not require as large a majority […] to pass a plan, and the judge can resolve disputes [through] 
cram down powers” (Ibidem). 
Finally, provision on priority financing within in-court restructuring is valuable for the 
distressed firm possessing valuable real assets and needing immediate oxygen for the business 
continuity in the form of bridge loans. 
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CHAPTER 3 – VALUE CREATION THROUGH FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND 
ACTIVE INVESTORS 
As widely known, businesses continuously invest financial resources to sustain their core 
activities and to ensure cash inflows as return for investments previously taken. Situations of 
imbalance between cash inflows and outflows, which are normal during phases of start-up and 
growth of businesses, shall be sorted out through the collection of financing resources from 
external stakeholders mainly in the form of equity or in the form of debt. This chapter is aimed 
at explaining the impact of the choice about debt or equity financing on the corporate structure 
and on value creation. Then it is briefly presented the role of some financial operators, private 
equity investors and distressed investors, specialized in the achievement of rapid increasing in 
value through the modification of the structure of liabilities in the target firm. 
 
3.1. EQUITY AND DEBT 
The definition of equity refers to all the contributions in cash or in kind that external investors 
permanently devote to a business. Legal provisions state that a firm does not have an ex-ante 
defined contractual obligation to return or to reward the sum received in the form of equity, in 
fact in case of insolvency the contribution is totally and definitively lost by the investors. As 
compensation for their contribution, equity investors collectively receive a sort of property right 
on the business, having the power to appoint and remove directors, who are entitled to take all 
strategic and operating decision in the company’s name, under the mandate to maximize the 
creation of value for equity investors. Equity investors have also the right to approve 
extraordinary operations, such as mergers, spin-offs, voluntary liquidations, or radical changes 
in operating activities. From the financial side, equity investors must approve the yearly 
financial statements, and, in case of positive economic results, they may ask the firm to pay 
them the surplus of financial resources generated by operating activities in the form of dividends 
or share repurchases. 
The other main source of financings, debt, refers to financial resources obtained through lending 
agreements, where the lender provides the firm a certain amount of financial resources (the 
principal) which shall be returned and explicitly rewarded in conformance to a predefined 
reimbursement schedule, which is negotiated between lender and borrower according to 
financial needs and cash flow structure of the business. Because of the variety of financial 
needs, lending agreements may present very different contractual clauses and debt may be 
classified according to various dimensions. Some of the most relevant categories of debt refer 
to the following features:  
- Expiration of the lending agreement (short-term or long-term debt); 
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- Presence of guarantees (secured or unsecured debt); 
- Priority level negotiated (senior or junior debt); 
- Variability of interest rates (fixed or floating rate debt); 
- Presence of options for anticipated reimbursement by the borrower; 
- Presence of options for conversion into equity instruments upon discretion of the lender; 
- Incorporation of creditors’ rights into securities (bond or non-bond debt). 
 
3.2. INTERACTION BETWEEN FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND VALUE 
Under normal market conditions, the mix of equity and debt in the financial structure influences 
Enterprise Value of a business: considering the synthetical formula for valuation already 
presented in Chapter 1, the financial structure of a business affects the cost of capital. In this 
context, modifications in financial structure of a firm such as substitution of shareholders’ 
equity with debt financings generates modifications in Enterprise Value, so recapitalizations are 
eligible to be used as instruments for value creation. The traditional view on debt financings 
states that debt creates value via increasing of both Return On Equity, the ratio between 
economic result and shareholders’ equity, and Earnings Per Shares, the economic result divided 
by number of outstanding shares. But positive effects on EPS and ROE are only part of the 
effects produced by a change in the financial structure: on the other side the riskiness of cash 
flow increases, and the cumulated effects is neutral for the Enterprise Value. 
Modigliani & Miller, in their famous paper elaborated in 1958, developed a theoretical 
framework known as First Proposition of Modigliani & Miller, which states that, under ideal 
conditions, choices about the financial structure of a business are neutral on Enterprise Value. 
The proposition states that in absence of market frictions, the financial structure is neutral: “the 
market value of any firm is independent of its capital structure and is given by capitalizing its 
expected return at a rate appropriate to its class”. (Modigliani & Miller 1958, page 268) 
According to them, the value of a business is contained only in the assets side of the balance 
sheet, being originated only by present value of future cash flows arising from outstanding 
investments discounted for a factor which reflects the riskiness of the cash flows. With the help 
of a famous metaphor, it can be stated that financial structure does not increase the size of the 
pie, which represents the value of the business, but it only rules the formation of the slices of 
the pie, so the division of value among investors in the firm’s capital. 
The neutrality of the financial structure would hold in a perfect capital market, which is 
characterized by the following assumptions: 
- “Investors and firms may exchange the same set of securities at a market price equal to 
the present value of their future cash flows; 
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- There are neither taxes, nor transaction and issuing costs connected with trading of 
securities; 
- Decisions on capital structure do not affect the cash flows generated by the firm’s 
investments and they do not provide new information about cash flows”. (Berk & 
DeMarzo 2011, page 482) 
Under the hypothesis of perfect capital markets, to obtain economic value of a business, future 
cash flows originated by operating activities shall be discounted at the unlevered cost of capital 
(KA), a discount rate which measures the riskiness of the cash flows and it represents the return 
required by investors to withhold the overall set of corporate. As suggested by Berk & DeMarzo 
(2011), in absence of market frictions, the unlevered cost of capital is the average of the cost of 
equity (KE) and the cost of debt (KD), weighted for the respective shares of financial debt (D) 
and equity (E), both computed at market values) over the Enterprise Value (V), according to the 
following equation: 
𝐾𝐴 =
𝐷
𝑉
𝐾𝐷 +
𝐸
𝑉
𝐾𝐸 
Then, the Second Proposition of Modigliani and Miller suggests the relationship between 
leverage and cost of equity: the expected return for equity “is equal to the appropriate 
capitalization rate for a pure equity stream in the class, plus a premium related to financial risk” 
(Modigliani & Miller 1958, page 771); which is represented by this formula: 
𝐾𝐸 = 𝐾𝐴 +
𝐷
𝐸
(𝐾𝐴 − 𝐾𝐷) 
It follows that two hypothetical firms with the same assets base but different financial 
structures: one financed only by equity and the second financed with a mix of debt and equity, 
they present the same overall cost of capital (KAU = KAL) but the cost of equity for the unlevered 
firm will be lower than the cost of equity in the levered firm (KEL > KEU). The cost of equity 
measures the financial risk of a firm: if the incidence of debt in the liabilities side of a firm rises, 
the risk borne by equity holders increases proportionally, also in absence of risk of default. In 
fact, the presence of debt influences the volatility of rewards to equity capital: if levered and 
unlevered firm have the same asset base and cash inflows, the commitments to repay 
outstanding debts reduce the amount of economic profit and cash flows available to equity 
investors, therefore equity investors in a levered firm ask higher return with respect to a firm 
financed only by equity. (Berk & DeMarzo, 2011) 
However, the First Proposition of Modigliani and Miller holds only in absence of market 
frictions and it is considered an ideal principle: in the real world, market distortions produce 
modifications in value of businesses as an effect of changes in the financial structure. 
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The most known market distortion, which shall be expressly considered in corporate valuation, 
is the asymmetrical fiscal treatment of remuneration paid to debtholders and equity-holders: 
while payments of interests on debt is deductible from taxes as a corporate cost, payments of 
dividends is fiscally neutral from the point of view of the taxation of corporate income. It 
follows that the presence of financial debt in the liabilities side of a balance sheet produces a 
fiscal shield which avoids the taxation of part of the corporate profits, thus increasing value 
created for equity-holders. From valuation point of view, tax savings originated by the 
deduction of interest expenses shall be estimated and their present value shall be added to 
present value of cash flows arising from operations to obtain the Enterprise Value. The 
estimation of the tax savings originated by deduction of financial expenses relies on the 
assumption that the amount of corporate taxable income is higher than deductible financial 
expenses, otherwise part of the fiscal shield is inevitably lost. It follows that the obtainment of 
these tax savings is risky, since it depends on the volatility in cash flows generated from 
business operations. Therefore, in accordance to Koller et al. (2015), to compute the present 
value of fiscal shield originated by debt, it is necessary to assume that the riskiness of tax 
savings is equal to the volatility of cash flows arising from operating assets, then to discount 
the forecasted tax savings at a rate equal to the cost of capital KA. Assuming also that the 
debt/equity ratio, computed on market values, is fixed by the firm’s directors and it is kept 
constant to a target level, it is possible to obtain the following formula for the overall cost of in 
presence of fiscal shield on debt, widely known as Weighted Average Cost of Capital, where τ 
states for the marginal tax rate on corporate taxable income. 
𝐾𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =
𝐷
𝑉
𝐾𝐷(1 − 𝜏) +
𝐸
𝑉
𝐾𝐸 
Apart from positive effect of the fiscal shield, the presence of financial debt activates other 
distortions of capital markets which impact value creation. In Chapter 2, legal and business 
effects of default and insolvency were presented. In a perfect capital market, the situation of 
insolvency would simply produce the transfer of corporate assets in the hands of debtholders, 
as predicted by Merton’s model on equity and debt like options, without further losses on 
Enterprise Value. Unfortunately, direct and indirect costs of insolvency constitute a market 
imperfection which produces changes in value depending on the financial structure. In fact, a 
highly leveraged firm shows a certain probability of becoming insolvent and sustaining the 
related cost of distress, and this probability is higher than a comparable firm financed only 
through equity capital. Therefore, to compute Enterprise Value of the leveraged business, costs 
of default shall be estimated and weighted for probability of manifestation, then the expected 
value shall be deducted from present value of future cash flows originated by corporate assets. 
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Another category of market imperfections refers to the modifications produced by financial 
debt on the relationships between management and shareholders. In presence of asymmetrical 
information and delegation of decisional power by the ownership to management team, the 
effort of managers is negatively affected by moral hazard. Without an adequate monitoring of 
the managerial performance and incentive-based compensation, directors and management may 
put in place initiatives which transfer benefits and value from financial investors to them. For 
example, they may undertake investment projects characterized by a low or negative Net 
Present Value or Internal Rate of Return, they may put a low effort on their working activity, or 
they may set an excessive level of personal benefits and compensations at the expense of the 
firm. A common type of dangerous choice made by management is the undertaking of 
investments focused on the enlargement of the business dimensions until a level where 
economies of scales are not maximized, with only compliance to their personal ambitions, 
rather than paying attention on the obtainment of a fair Return on Invested Capital. (Berk & 
DeMarzo 2011) 
According to Jensen (1986), the availability of relevant amount of liquidity in the corporate 
treasury puts an incentive to the adoption of opportunistic behaviour by managers which leads 
to inefficiencies and reduces the value creation. By contrary, the presence of obligations to 
repay the financial debt drives away part of the liquidity withheld by the firm, thus increasing 
the incentive to increase the effort in the managerial activity and to take care about value for 
shareholders, by avoiding extra benefit and by carefully value the future investment plans. 
Therefore, in presence of debt, management team shall seek for reliable positive cash flows 
from business operations which allow the firm to correctly satisfy the obligations of repayment 
of principal and interest, in order to avoid events of default. 
Finally, the presence of debt, especially short and medium-term debt, acts as an instrument of 
monitoring of the managerial performance because “debt allows investors to discipline 
management and provides information useful for this purpose [since] they gather information 
from the firm’s ability to make payments and from a costly investigation in the event of default”. 
(Harris & Raviv 1990, pages 322-323) In this context main lenders play the role of external 
supervisors of the managerial policies, since they will enter in a new debt financing or renew 
existing loans after a careful valuation of the current investments and the future perspectives of 
the business.  
On the other hand, the presence of a too high level of debt, which is not suitable to be repaid 
through the expected level of future cash flows, does not incentivizes an efficient managerial 
activity and the high quality of investment. In fact, when the unsustainability of the debt burden 
is ascertained, the situation of debt overhang attracts risky initiatives characterized by 
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unbalanced profile of return and low or negative expected present value, since only very 
positive payoff with low probability of manifestation would create value for the shareholders, 
while the losses would damage only lenders. Also, the asymmetrical splitting of payoffs, 
produces the consequence that investment projects with a fair and positive Net Present Value 
are likely to be rejected by the management since the value created by these projects will be 
devoted only to debtholders rather than to shareholders. 
 
3.3. CHOICE OF THE OPTIMAL FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 
At this point it is necessary to summarize modifications of Enterprise Value induced by the 
interaction of financial debt and environmental market imperfections. To obtain the Enterprise 
Value of a levered business, it is necessary to start from the unlevered value of assets, which 
includes the expected present value of future cash flows arising from both outstanding 
investment and from future growth opportunities. (Damodaran, 2001) 
Then the positive effects of debt shall be added to the unlevered value: first present value of 
fiscal shield on financial expenses, then expected benefits from more efficient management due 
to the commitments on debt reimbursement. By contrary, asset value shall be reduced by the 
expected direct and indirect costs of insolvency and by negative effects on the quality of 
investments caused by an eventual situation of debt overhang. (Berk & DeMarzo, 2011) 
To make an appropriate choice of a firm’s debt level, management should first pay attention on 
the optimization of the fiscal shield: in fact, the amount of financial expenses exceeding the 
projected EBIT, will not contribute to value creation since it cannot originate deductions on 
income taxes. Then, debt amount and reimbursement schedule should be sufficiently high to 
ensure that managers put the appropriate effort on their activities and they avoid unnecessary 
compensation, but sufficiently low to avoid situation of default and the undertaking of too risky 
investment. With respect to repayment schedule, it should be based on planned cash flow, 
forecasted on a conservative scenario: in this way, risk of distress and the expected cost of 
insolvency, but also transaction cost and refinancing cost are minimized. 
Furthermore, a relevant factor to be considered in the setting of financial structure is the need 
of flexibility to face unexpected situations. The intensity of requested flexibility depends the 
positioning of the firm and its industry in its own life-cycle, the predominance of fixed or 
intangible assets in the asset side of the firm, volatility and predictability of the economic result 
and expected generation of cash. Hence, a firm should be mainly financed with equity when it 
needs high flexibility due to the presence of multiple uncertainties: for example, if a business 
is young and innovative, it is facing high investments in research, development and other 
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intangible assets, it operates in risky and volatile industries, or it presents low revenues but good 
opportunities for growth. (Damodaran, 2010) 
On the opposite side, mature firms belonging to non-cyclical and highly-regulated businesses 
or characterized by relevant amount of fixed assets and constant generation of cash, present low 
risk of distress, low need of flexibility and lower volatility of cash flows; therefore, they are 
eligible to obtain positive effects on value from financial debt through the fiscal shield on 
interest expenses and through reduction of moral hazard and inefficient choices of directors and 
management. 
With respect to the obtainment of financings through issuance of new equity, it must be 
considered that equity capital does not imply obligations of reimbursement, so the operation 
strengthens the financial structure and reduce the risk of insolvency. Unfortunately, increase in 
share capital is affected by asymmetrical availability of information about future perspectives 
of the firm between management and potential investors, therefore it is not usually considered 
for mature firms: adverse selection leads to the scepticism of potential investors who ask a 
reduction of the equity price demanded by the firm. That is why publicly traded firms 
announcing an increase in share capital experience a reduction in share price and market 
capitalization, producing a physiological reduction of investment value and the dilution of 
shareholders’ control rights. (Berk & DeMarzo, 2011) 
Also, it is inevitable that equity subscriptions by external investors cause the entry of new 
shareholders and the need to share decisional powers by setting a new governance structure. 
The alternative is that incumbent shareholders decide to invest its personal wealth in the firm 
to keep its controlling position unchanged, but it depends on considerations about personal 
wealth of investors and their propensity toward risk.  
For these reasons, management and shareholders of mature and non-distressed firm does not 
like to finance the new investments through increases in equity capital, so they first exploit 
accumulated earnings, then new financial debt as sources of financings. According to the 
pecking order hypothesis by Myers (1984), the raising of financings through increasing in 
equity capital is considered by management as a last resort option; by contrary, they devote 
their effort to remunerate equity investors through payment of dividends and share repurchases. 
However, the preference order should not be strictly considered in its hierarchy, since in some 
cases the market conditions and the high level of debt, although not yet unsustainable, determine 
the managerial decision to obtain new financings via fresh equity capital. 
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3.4. COST OF EQUITY AND COST OF DEBT  
From the perspective of external investors, value of financial instruments is computed from 
future cash flows which are expected to be received, properly discounted according to time 
value of money and their riskiness. To set the appropriate discount rate, financial markets do 
not consider the incidence of specific risks which are likely to affect only the firm issuing the 
instruments, such as risks connected to managerial errors, turnover of key human resources, 
weak commercial strategy, or scandals affecting the corporate image. The reason is that 
investors have the possibility, through the access to global financial markets, to hold a large 
portfolio of securities whose specific risk are not correlated: investments in such diversified 
portfolios reduce the volatility of payoff to investors and they are they offer protection to 
specifics risks carried on by securities. 
Therefore, discount rates shall consider risks affecting the overall economy which are not 
diversifiable trough the holding of a wide investment portfolio: when a downturn in the 
economy occurs, the value of investments falls because of higher perceived volatility and 
pressure for selling the securities and liquidation of the positions. This type of risk is the market 
risk of an investment, and it is measured through a correlation factor (the beta) between return 
of investment under analysis and return of a portfolio of assets taken as reference. 
The Capital Assets Pricing Model, developed by L. Linter and W. F. Sharpe, is the most widely 
used model for the determination of the cost of capital and it is exemplified by the following 
equation: 
𝑟𝑖 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝐸[𝑟𝑚𝑘𝑡] − 𝑟𝑓) 
 
CAPM states that riskiness of an investment, and by symmetry rate of return required by 
investors, is measured by the sum of risk-free rate and an appropriate risk premium adjusted for 
the sensitivity of the investment to the market. The risk-free rate component (rf) measures the 
time value of money and it is taken from market yield of securities without risk of default, such 
as government bonds with AAA rating. The risk premium defined by CAPM is the expected 
rate of return (E[rmkt]) of a very diversified portfolio of securities: the most used proxies for 
this portfolio are represented by worldwide indexes of equity securities such as S&P 500 or 
MSCI World Index. The risk premium shall be multiplied by the beta of the security (βi), which 
measures the sensitivity of the return of the security with respect to the return of the market 
portfolio. This model is widely used in the determination of the cost of capital because of its 
solid theoretical background, its immediate practical application and the focus on a single and 
measurable risk factor. (Koller et al., 2015) 
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Damodaran (2001) states that risk premium of securities is also influenced by the nationality of 
the issuer: countries presenting emerging economies or political instability are riskier than 
advanced and growing countries such as Germany and United States. To properly include the 
country risk in determination of the cost of capital, he suggests considering the country rating 
and to multiply the related default spread by the ratio between volatility of local equity and 
local government bonds. The computation gives the Country Risk Premium, which shall be 
added to market risk premium previously computed. 
With this specification, formula for computation of cost of capital becomes 
 
𝑟𝑖 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑟𝐶𝑅𝑃 + 𝐸[𝑟𝑚𝑘𝑡] − 𝑟𝑓) 
 
where   𝑟𝐶𝑅𝑃 = 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 × 
𝜎𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝜎𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑
 
 
When discount factors have been determined, market value of equity and debt claims issued by 
a specific business may be computed by first estimating payoffs which are expected to be 
originated by the instrument and then discounting them at the appropriate risk profile. Since the 
accounting equivalence between assets and the sum of equity and liabilities shall hold not only 
for nominal values, but also for market values, an accurate estimation of the Enterprise Value 
of a business must be equal of the sum of market values of its outstanding shares and financial 
liabilities. 
From these considerations, it follows that payoffs to be used inputs for the valuation of 
operating assets, debt and equity instruments are: 
- Expected value of future cash flows generated by the business, for operating assets 
value; 
- Expected value of repayment of principal and interests, for debt claims; 
- Expected value of dividends and accumulated earnings, for equity claims. 
Also, applicable discount rates change among instruments because of diversity in the risk 
profile of debt and equity claims, due to the priority of debt repayments and the symmetrical 
residuality of payoffs to equity holders. It follows that the applicable discount rates are 
respectively: 
- Cost of capital (KA), measuring the operating risk of the overall business; 
- Cost of debt (KD), measuring the default risk on bonds and other financial liabilities; 
- Cost of equity (KE), measuring the financial risk connected to equity holdings. 
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Cost of capital, cost of equity and cost of debt are measured according to Capital Assets Pricing 
Model, by adding to the rate of return of risk-free security prevailing on the financial markets 
the return of the market portfolio, eventually corrected for country risk, adjusted for the 
respective correlation factor β. The methodology requires the choice of appropriate reference 
financial instruments and carefully measure its rate of return to obtain consistent and useful 
proxies of risk-free rate and the return of the market portfolio. 
Like the costs of equity and debt, also the betas for debt and equity within a business are tied 
by the Second Proposition by Modigliani and Miller, according to the following equation, which 
includes also the effect of tax shield of interest expenses: 
𝛽𝑈 =
𝐷
𝑉
(1 − 𝜏)𝛽𝐷 +
𝐸
𝑉
𝛽𝐸 
From a practical point of view, equity beta of a firm is directly measurable only for listed 
companies and it is determined from the linear regression between the historical return of the 
share and market portfolio. The reliability of equity betas of a company determined on market 
data is based on the implicit assumption that the capital market is efficient, and it correctly 
prices the security under analysis, so it is important to verify the reliability of the observed beta 
through the following procedure, suggested by Koller et al. (2015), which shall inevitably be 
used for valuation of unlisted firms because of lack of data.  
The indirect determination of the equity beta requires two input factors: the unlevered beta, 
computed at industry level, and the leverage ratio (D/E) of the firm under analysis, computed 
from their market values. 
To obtain industry beta it is necessary to identify a sample of listed firms comparable to the 
business to be valued in terms of expected future cash flows and volatility: the exposure to the 
same market forces and competition determines the reasonability of the implicit assumption 
that businesses belonging to the same industrial sector are more likely to present comparable 
riskiness and cash flows profile. (Damodaran, 2001) 
The following step is the measurement of the beta equity for each firm of the sample through a 
linear regression between the historical return of the comparable and the return of the reference 
market portfolio previously chosen. The regression should include at least 60 points on monthly 
return, to ensure the statistical relevance of the result (Koller et al., 2015, page 298). At this 
point, it is needed to separate the riskiness of equity depending on the financial structure from 
the riskiness depending on the underlying operations to obtain the unlevered beta. So, for each 
firm, it is necessary to take the weighted average of observed beta equity and beta of debt. With 
respect to the latter value, Koller et al. (2015, page 301) suggest taking an approximated value 
of 0.3 which is valid for non-distressed businesses. Weight factors shall be the incidence of 
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market values of equity and net debt in the financial structure, according to the formula 
previously seen. 
After the obtainment of a set of unlevered betas related to firms included into the sample, the 
median value is reasonably the unlevered beta for the industry. The median value is preferred 
by Koller et al. with respect to the simple average because the effect of outliers is excluded. 
Finally, to determine the equity beta of the target firm the industry unlevered beta is adjusted to 
re-include the financial risk originated by the presence of debt on the target firm, according to 
the following formula: 
𝛽𝐸 = 𝛽𝐴 +
𝐷
𝐸
 (𝛽𝐴 − 𝛽𝐷) 
Unlevering and relevering of beta factor is needed in determination of the opportunity cost for 
equity investments, since it included the overall market risk borne by equity investors, which is 
the sum of operating risk and financial risk. Operating risk, measured by unlevered beta, 
depends on correlation between the volatility of cash flow generated by the business and 
volatility of the market portfolio. Therefore, industries with low unlevered beta show low 
business riskiness, since their revenues and EBITDA are not likely to be eroded by economic 
downturns, while the financial performance of industries with high unlevered betas is heavily 
affected by situations of crisis. 
On the other hand, financial risk measures risk borne by equity investors of a leveraged firm 
with respect to an investment in shares of an identical firm financed only though equity capital. 
In fact, the presence of financial debt constitutes an element of rigidity which influences the 
expected of compensation to equity holders: because of the priority repayment of principal and 
interest, eventual limited reductions in cash flows and EBITDA from operating activities, may 
lead to wide reductions in the distribution of dividend and cause relevant losses in shareholders’ 
equity. Therefore, notwithstanding the risk of default on debt repayments, financial risk is 
determined by the simple presence of financial debt and it is directly correlated to leverage 
ratio. (Berk & DeMarzo 2011) 
Moving to determination of financial liabilities value, it is influenced by risk of default, which 
is the risk that principal and interest are not timely honoured by the borrower because of a 
situation of insolvency. Since the intensity of trading of listed bonds on financial market is very 
limited, it is not possible to measure the beta of debt through linear regression models. 
Therefore, it is necessary to determine a credit rating, which is an assessment of the solidness 
of the firm issuing the debt and its expected capability to honour its financial commitments. 
While, for listed bonds, the credit rating is assigned by specialized agencies who evaluate the 
issuer through proprietary models, for other forms of debt is necessary to observe relevant 
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financial ratios such as leverage, interest coverage and EBITDA/debt ratio to determine a 
synthetic credit rating. Then, according to Koller et al. (2015, page 305), cost of debt for 
investment grade firms is determined from “the average yield to maturity on a portfolio of long 
term bonds with the same credit rating”. By contrary, for speculative debt instruments (which 
are assigned a credit rating below than BBB) it is more accurate to perform an analytical 
valuation of expected cash flows to debtholders. The valuation is performed by modelling some 
positive and adverse scenarios, then by assigning their probability and finally by estimating the 
financial resources available to debt repayment in each scenario. In these situations, the 
economic value of debt differs from nominal value of contractual repayments and it is obtained 
by discounting the expected payoff at the cost of debt for investment grade securities (KD); the 
actual return for the investor (on a mark to market basis), or Yield-to-Maturity is the discount 
rate r* which properly discounts promised debt repayments to make them equal to computed 
economic value, according to the following equality: 
 
𝐸(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠)
1 + 𝐾𝐷
=
𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
1 + 𝑟∗
 
Since debt is usually subject to preliminary valuation of the lender and the issuance of 
guarantees which makes the insolvency risk very modest for mature firms, the observed cost of 
debt is quite low. Cost of debt rises when its weight in the corporate financial structure is 
predominant with respect to equity value and disequilibria in the sources of financing produces 
a relevant risk of insolvency. In this situation the risk profile borne by debt holders becomes 
similar to risk faced by shareholders of a mature and non-distressed business, according to 
Merton’s option theory of financial structure.  
In conclusion, cost of capital is the weighted average of cost of equity and cost of debt, and it 
represents the risk borne by an investor who owns both debt and equity instruments of a 
business in proportionate shares. In this way, the investor is exposed to a risk equal to the 
volatility of cash flows directly originated by operating activity. The computation of cost of 
capital is easy in the case the firm is committed to keep constant leverage ratio at a target level 
and the riskiness of the fiscal shield of interest expenses is the equal to operating cash flow 
riskiness: in this case the cost of capital is the Weighted Average Cost of Capital. 
When leverage ratio is not constant, financial practitioners suggest the computation of a 
business’ assets value according to the Adjusted Present Value method. This methodology 
consists in the estimation of value of the operating cash flows, under the hypothesis of absence 
of financial debt; then present value of fiscal shield on interest expenses is separately estimated 
and its present value is added to present value of business operations. 
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 3.5. ACTIVE INVESTORS  
In developed countries, financial markets constitute the infrastructure where consumers and 
institutions, holding surplus financial resources arising from their personal savings, are put in 
contact with subjects who have an immediate need of liquidity; through this market they may 
satisfy their reciprocal needs with mutual benefit and higher efficiency for the economic system. 
Under the hypotheses of efficiency of financial markets and the absence of arbitrage 
opportunity, all financial instruments are exchanged at a fair price, so sellers and acquirers 
cannot create economic value through the only trading of securities. In this sense, “trading is a 
zero-sum game [since] the total gains of winners are exactly equal to the total losses of the 
losers”. (Harris 2003, page 176) Moving from theory to real world, it is difficult that market 
price of securities fully reflects the best estimate of uncertain fundamental value, mainly 
because prices are affected by the behaviour of traders who possess different level of 
information on fundamental value. In this framework, trading is not a zero-sum game anymore, 
since speculative investors have the possibility to create value by properly analysing the 
available information to infer the mispricing of financial products, then trying to trade the 
mispriced security and to profit from the correction operated by markets. 
Moving a step forward, some players in the financial markets, that we call active investors, are 
involved in augmenting the efficiency of the overall economic system. In fact, financial markets 
favour the transfer of property rights of businesses to their respective “best owners”, who are 
the controlling subjects possessing the capabilities and competencies to maximize the 
Enterprise Value, and, in this way, markets increase the efficiency of the overall economic 
system by ensuring best exploitation of assets and resources. The transferability of undervalued 
businesses allowed by financial markets has also a positive role in corporate governance, since 
the threat of substitution reduces the risk of inept management by incentivizing a maximum 
effort toward efficient and sustainable value creation. (DePamphilis, 2015) 
For example, it may happen that some operators recognize in advance that directors of a listed 
company are carrying on inefficient strategies, which are not capable to maximize value created 
by available resources. Therefore, its market value of equity declines to reflect the lower 
potential for future value creation; in this way the firm becomes cheaper and an external 
investor may be interested in buying a controlling stake of it through a tender offer. The investor 
buys the equity stake at its current market value, which is depressed by the inefficient 
management, then he elaborates and implements a more efficient business strategy aimed at 
increasing the overall Enterprise Value. If the strategy is successful, the new owner of the 
business obtains a remuneration for his intervention equal to the increase in market value of the 
financial instruments he owns caused by the better strategy. (Favotto et al, 2012) 
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The investor who implements this active strategy for creating value may be an industrial 
investor or a financial investor. The industrial investor is a firm involved in ordinary industrial 
activity which is interested into acquisitions of other businesses as part of its corporate strategy. 
Beside the undervaluation of the business to be acquired, the investor puts its attention on the 
creation of value through the synergies from the integration of the target firm into the acquirer. 
Although the intensity of their activism on the financial markets is led by the planned strategy 
for growth and obtainment of valuable resources, industrial investors occasionally perform 
acquisitions and they are focused on business related with their activities, according to a 
strategy of horizontal expansion, vertical expansion or diversification. (DePamphilis, 2015) 
On the other hand, financial active investors are constituted by institutions who act as 
intermediaries between holders of excess financial resources and businesses; their activity is to 
collect savings and to invest the amount collected into inefficient firms, then to boost their value 
creation through the substitution of top management and the change of strategy. Financial active 
investors may be classified as mutual investment funds, pension funds, hedge funds and private 
equity firms. While mutual funds and pension funds buy small equity stakes and they address 
their activity in the improvement of corporate governance by challenging management on 
“issues as antitakeover defences, CEO severance benefits, and employee stock option 
accounting”; hedge funds and private equity firms are focused in changing “a firm’s strategic, 
operational, or financial strategies, often generating attracting financial returns for 
shareholders”. (DePamphilis 2015, page 33) 
 
 3.6. PRIVATE EQUITY  
Investment funds managed by private equity firms are characterized by high average return 
which matches the riskiness of their investment strategy: for this reason, money they collect 
and invest derives from institutional investors and high net worth individuals. Private equity 
firms are devoted to maximization of net value of the fund in the interest of their investors by 
undertaking the right choices of investment, improvement of value and dismissals. To properly 
collect money from investors and manage the investments in operating businesses, the private 
equity firm constitutes one or more investments funds, which legally constitute sets of assets 
separated from each other and from the private equity firm. Financial resources owned by the 
investment funds, constituting their equity capital, are contributed by investors, who are given 
as counterpart the proper number of quotas in the fund. Investment funds sponsored and 
managed by private equity firms are usually closed-end funds: the capital contributed by 
investors is tied for a defined period, it follows that investors cannot ask the anticipate 
repayment of invested capital before the agreed expiration date of the fund. 
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From the point of view of managers of the private equity firm, the expiration of the fund 
represents their commitment to liquidate it within a defined date, by selling the controlling 
stakes of the target firms and then refunding the investors. The result is that improvements of 
Enterprise Value in the target investments deriving from higher efficiency in financial and 
operational policies are expected to be achieved in a medium time horizon and then monetized 
through a strategy for their dismissal carefully defined from the beginning. On this point, a 
paper by Achleinter et al. (2012) explains that private equity firms have three main channels to 
exit from an investment while “attempting to realize the value created over the holding period: 
[…] public, private and financial […] The public exit channel refers to the initial listing on a 
stock exchange, the IPO, and the subsequent sell down of the stakes. […] The private exit 
channel refers to the sale to a strategic acquirer, and to buybacks and management buyouts or 
buyins. [Finally,] the financial exit is the sale of a portfolio company to another PE firm” (pages 
102-103). The authors exclude bankruptcy as an exit strategy, since it is a necessary outcome 
in case the implemented strategy to improve the Enterprise Value was not suitable for the 
business. From their empirical analysis, it results that the 55 % of firms acquired by the 
observed private equity funds were sold to a strategic investor, the 31 % of the sampled firms 
were sold to financial investors and the 15 % was listed in the stock exchanges. 
Private equity firms create value for their investors through the provision of financial 
engineering and operational expertise to their target firms: operational and financial engineering 
are strictly intertwined since the new financial structure “drives the need to the operating 
performance to meet debt service requirements; in turn the anticipated improvement in 
operating performance enables the firm to assume greater leverage”. (DePamphilis 2015, page 
480) Financial engineering is defined as “the creation of a viable capital structure that magnifies 
financial return to equity investors” (Ibidem), and it exploits the previously presented 
imperfections of financial markets which allow the choices about financing a business to affect 
its enterprise value. 
From the historical point of view, private equity firms took origins in the United States in the 
1970s and their rapid growth in economic importance was strictly related to the development 
of the market of junk bonds, financial instruments with high risk of default and high nominal 
yield, devoted to the collection among institutional investors of debt to finance risky operations. 
The most famous sponsor of private equity transaction was the investment bank Kohlberg 
Kravis Robert (KKR) founded in 1976, which, through its specialized funds, undertook the big 
acquisition of RJR Nabisco, a group operating in the tobacco industry. (Potito 2009) The most 
common private equity strategy was focused in public-to-private transactions, which consisted 
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in the acquisition of listed companies which operated in mature businesses and did not present 
concentrated and stable ownership, through tender offers aimed at delisting the target firm. 
The U. S. economic crisis in the early 1990s determined the crisis of private equity since many 
firms were obliged to declare bankruptcy: reduction of their operating margins caused the 
unsustainability of the debt burden. The problem was emphasized by the market euphory in the 
years between 1985 and 1990, which led to the overpayment of many target firms in the context 
of the leveraged transaction, and the subsequent assumption of unsustainable financial burdens: 
the typical example is the above-mentioned RJR Nabisco, which was restructured and sold in 
1991 because the cash flow generated by operation was lower than the expectations. The private 
equity market experienced a phase of decline and it was affected by bad reputation since in that 
period investors bore spectacular losses. 
Nowadays, private equity firms operate in advanced countries with attention on the 
sustainability of the transactions and they are especially focused on the acquisition of non-listed 
companies and non-core divisions to be dismissed by bigger firms. The new positive wave of 
private equity had been permitted by the availability of below-investment grade bonds and new 
products of financial engineering, which, until financial crisis of 2008, were considered by U. 
S. financial institutions a source of financing more relevant than traditional banking loans. 
(Whitman and Diz, 2009) 
Finally, it is possible to say that private equity investments are characterized by high level of 
cyclicality, since capital committed by investors rises in the positive phase of the economy and 
it rapidly falls in downturns: in fact, private equity experienced another period of euphory in 
2006-2007, before the subprime loans crisis, followed by a sharp decline in 2008. (Kaplan & 
Stromberg, 2009) 
 
3.7. LEVERAGED BUY-OUT 
As described by Kaplan & Stromberg (2009), the main instrument of financial engineering, 
employed by private equity investors to modify the financial structure while boosting the 
creation of Enterprise Value, is Leveraged Buy-Out. The term Leveraged Buy-Out defines a set 
of techniques consisting in the acquisition of a firm through financial resources obtained from 
loans and bonds provided by financial institutions; then, after the completion of the acquisition, 
the obligation to repay the debt is assumed by the acquired firm. 
Through Leveraged Buy-Out, private equity investors obtain the control of target firms with a 
limited investment of equity capital: in this way the private equity firm expects to maximize the 
rate of return for investors. After the liquidation of the investment fund, investors firm expect 
to obtain a positive return which benefits from both the expected Net Present Value of the fiscal 
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shield on financial expenses and from the additional value created by the higher operational 
efficiency. 
In practical terms, Leverage Buy-Out acquisitions are characterized by a two-steps transaction: 
in the first phase the investor acquires the majority of the target’s share capital through a debt 
financing, then in the second step the target firm assumes the obligation to repay the debt. The 
aim of the latter transaction is to ensure the direct satisfaction of debt obligations through the 
cash flows of the target firm itself. (Potito, 2009) In fact, in this way, the investor is allowed “to 
pledge the assets and future cash flows of the target firm as collateral for his acquisition debt”. 
(Müller and Panunzi 2004, page 1221) 
From the target firms’ point of view, financial resources obtained through the loan negotiated 
by investors are completely devoted to the seller of the business, without affecting the target’s 
balance sheet in the first step of the transaction. After the second step the situation changes: the 
target firm assumes all the obligations connected to the transaction. The consequence is that a 
relevant part of operating cash flows arising from the business conduct are driven out from the 
firm and devoted to the satisfaction of lenders to comply with the interests of investors. By 
consequence, debt reimbursement negatively impacts the cash flow statement of the target firm, 
since the original debt was never entered in the corporate treasury, neither it was used to 
undertake investments with a positive effect on the future cash flows, except for the fiscal shield 
on interest expenses. With respect to profit and loss statement, it is negatively affected by the 
interests, but this effect is partly compensated by the reduction of income taxes due to the 
deduction of financial expenses. Since the debt burden puts pressure in the cash management, 
the firm’s directors are forced to remove all the inefficiencies in corporate governance and 
operations to satisfy all the outstanding obligations and to achieve a positive net result in the 
profit and loss statement. For example, the management put its effort in the reduction of the 
costs and the volume of working capital, in the dismissal of non-core assets and business units 
and the maximization of return from new investments. (Potito, 2009) 
To be eligible as target for acquisitions by private equity investors, and especially leveraged 
acquisitions, industrial firms shall present, from the economic and financial side, high positive 
levels of EBITDA and strong generation of cash flows to permit the adequate remuneration of 
their investors in both debt and equity instruments. Their financial structure shall be 
characterized by very low leverage ratio and unexploited debt capacity, to properly take the 
benefits on value creation arising from the financial debt; also, the firm shall constantly generate 
a return rate higher than its cost of debt. The interest in LBOs increases if the target firm owns 
a wide base of real assets, especially real estate assets, which are eligible to be sold in liquid 
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markets at a price higher than its accounting value without negatively affecting the core 
business activities. (Potito 2009, pages 165-166) 
From the strategic side, these firms should operate in mature businesses with low risk and 
constant generation of revenues, which is not relevantly affected by the physiologic cyclicality 
of the economy. The firms should also stay in the maturity phase of their lifecycle and present 
a low need of investments in operating assets; by contrary, firms in a phase of expansion are 
not eligible because of a bigger share of the cash flows shall be devoted to investments in fixed 
and working capital to properly satisfy the growing clients base. Finally, at the organizational 
level, the business should possess a clear and stable functional structure and a managerial team 
capable and motivated toward the change and the improvements. In fact, to ensure the success 
of the LBO, the target firm shall rapidly overcome the two main shocks induced by the 
transaction: the sudden change of the reference shareholders and the presence of a relevant 
percentage of debt in the liability side of the balance sheet. (Potito 2009, page 169) 
Michael Jensen (1989) confirms that the best candidates of LBO transactions are “low-growth, 
old-line firms [that] don’t typically invest in R&D” (page 82), since from his empirical study a 
very small fraction of a sampled businesses involved into this type of transactions reported 
Research and Development costs in their financial statements. 
With respect to rise of Merger & Acquisitions through Leveraged Buy-Outs, which is typical in 
periods of economic prosperity, a famous paper by Michael Jensen (2010) states that, first, 
leveraged transactions have effectively achieved their objective to create value for shareholders 
“from real increases in productivity rather than from simple wealth transfers to shareholders 
from other parties such as creditors, labour, government, customers or suppliers” (page 77). He 
affirms that active investors have originated a new corporate governance structure, 
characterized by higher efficiency than the traditional conglomerate firm: the strategic decision 
about buying, holding or selling a business are taken by the investment firms, which are 
structured as agile partnerships employing some tens of people and they “play a role that is 
similar in many ways to that of the main banks in the Japanese groups of companies” (page 80). 
The efficiency of the strategic choices is helped by the practise of relating the decision makers’ 
compensation to the performance of the investment funds they manage, and by the absence of 
interconnections among the businesses belonging to the same investment firm, which, 
differently from diversified corporations, make impossible the transfer of cash between two 
operating firms. 
With respect to the high debt burden connected to LBOs, an eventual economic crisis is likely 
to reduce the operating cash flows and the Enterprise Value, quickly leading the firm to the 
insolvency. However, the costs of insolvency of highly leveraged firms is estimated to be much 
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lower if compared to traditionally leveraged firms presenting a Debt/Value ratio close to 20 %. 
In fact, highly leveraged firms in default have residual Enterprise Value much higher than 
Liquidation Value, so “there is [high] value that can be preserved by resolving the insolvency 
problem in a fashion that minimizes the value lost” (page 83). By contrary, traditionally 
leveraged firms in default present such a low residual value liquidation is the most reasonable 
solution, with the connected conflicts among investors and misallocation of valuable assets. 
As seen in Chapter 2, because of the concentration of debt claims and the relevance of going-
concern value in highly leveraged firms, the composition of the crisis though an out-of-court 
procedure is more favourable than a judicial procedure. In fact, “it is likely to be more costly to 
trigger the cumbersome court-supervised bankruptcy process that diverts management time and 
attention away from managing the enterprise” (Ibidem). Through a private settlement of the 
crisis, the stakeholders avoid the procedural costs of bankruptcy and their connected indirect 
costs. Also, the conflict of interests between different classes of shareholders, which in normal 
condition require the intervention of the bankruptcy court, are reduced since in LBO transaction 
“claimants hold approximately proportional strips of all securities” (page 84). 
Definitively, Leveraged Buy-Out transactions are powerful instruments to re-boost the process 
of value creation for mature and slow growing firms because the high level of debt and the 
alignment of managerial incentives put pressure on efficiency and to the adoption of best 
practises in governance and operating activities. With respect to debt instruments financing the 
transaction, they are riskier than normal debt and exposed to the cyclicality of the economy, so 
they may be considered as quasi-equity instruments and they fit for speculative investors, but 
on the other hand they limit the complexity of reorganization in case of insolvency. The market 
of LBOs is also highly cyclical, with both high volume of completed transactions, and profit 
obtained by investors in periods of prosperity and, symmetrically, low number of LBO 
acquisitions and relevant losses during economic downturns. 
 
3.8. LEVERAGED BUY-OUT TECHNIQUE 
Although leveraged transactions may be undertaken in several ways, the most common scheme 
consists in the constitution of a specific corporation which undertakes the acquisition of the 
target company, then financial debt is transferred from the vehicle to the target through the 
merger of both companies. After the investors have selected the target of the acquisition, they 
have obtained all the information required with the consultancy of an investment bank together 
with legal and accounting professionals, they constitute a limited liability legal entity, the so-
called “New Company” as vehicle for the acquisition. The NewCo negotiates the provision of 
the financial resources necessary to pay the seller in two forms: for the part of the price which 
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is disbursed by the private equity investor, in the form of equity capital contribution, while the 
part which is covered by debt is received through a bridge loan provided by specialized financial 
intermediaries. The bridge loan is a short-term loan undertaken to permit the payment of the 
acquisition price to the seller, and it is bound to be refinanced by definitive long-term loans or 
bonds after the completion of the acquisition. 
Then, the NewCo prepares a formal tender offer to target firm’s shareholders, whose definitive 
acceptance produces the transfer of financial resources to the NewCo, then from the NewCo to 
the sellers; and symmetrically the ownership of shares whose holders accepted the offer is 
transferred to the NewCo. Finally, the NewCo is merged by incorporation into the acquired 
target firm, transferring the financial debt in the head of the operating firm itself. Alternative 
techniques to produce the assumption of financial liabilities by the target may imply the transfer 
of financial resources from the target to the NewCo in the form of dividends, royalties or unfair 
prices for supplying of goods and services. (Potito, 2009 and Müller and Panunzi, 2004) 
At this point, the definitive financing agreements are signed between the financial institution 
sponsoring the transaction and the operating firm. According to Kaplan & Stromberg (2009) 
and Potito (2009), the overall financial structure is composed by a mix of different debt 
instruments with different priority levels and different amortization plans reflecting the future 
cash flows as projected by investors and management. For example, in the Anglo-Saxon 
environment, financial debt ranges from the 60 % to 90 % of the acquisition price, while the 
remaining share from 10 % to 40 % of the price are contribution in the equity capital of the 
NewCo coming from the investors promoting the transaction. With respect to debt financings, 
its normal composition is characterized by priority senior debt on a percentage from the 50 % 
to 70 % of financial liabilities and by junior debt or hybrid instruments of debt plus call options 
on the remaining part. 
A relevant part of the financial term sheet disciplines the provision guarantees on the obligation 
to repay the debt. First, financing institutions negotiate a set of covenants aimed at ensuring the 
sustainability of financial structure and the efficient conduct of the business, to create the best 
situation that ensures punctual repayment of principal and interests. In fact, covenants constraint 
the managerial decisions impacting on economic result and cash flows, since their breach 
constitutes an event of default which gives the lender the right to ask the immediate repayment 
of the outstanding debt. The most common covenants are referred to the setting of target 
economic and financial ratios to be respected by the business, the level of operating and 
financial investments, the possibility to modify the structure of equity and liabilities through 
distribution of dividends and undertaking of new loans. 
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Then, the financial term sheet regulates the issuance of collaterals by the resulting firm to the 
lenders as guarantees in case of default. Collateral are constituted by pledges and mortgages on 
real and financial assets owned by the operating firm, in conformance to the applicable law; in 
some cases, they may be provided also by third parties, such as investors in the private equity 
funds. It must be remembered that, through the merger of the two firms, the lending institutions 
enjoys the generic guarantee on the overall set of assets automatically provided by contract law. 
It follows that within the contest of the LBO, the assumption of financial debt by the target firm 
increases the collateralization of the loans, thus strengthening the position of lenders. In fact, if 
the merger between NewCo and target firm, or the other transfer of the financial liabilities did 
not take place, the financial debt would be guaranteed by the NewCo assets, which would have 
only consisted in the shares of the target firm and the eventual cash on treasury. From the 
lender’s point of view, the only collateralization of target shares is quite risky: in fact, in the 
case the target firm is not listed, as usual for private equity, their market value is difficult to be 
determined since it depends on the availability of information about the issuer, at the same time 
it is quite difficult to find an acquirer for the pledged share package than for eventual valuable 
real estates owned by the target firm. 
With respect to business law provisions regulating Leveraged Buy-Out transactions, it is 
important to highlight that Italian Civil Code states at article 2358 that financial assistance is 
forbidden: it means that corporations shall not offer loans and guarantees to favour the transfer 
or the subscription of their own shares. When the first leveraged transactions were undertaken 
in Italy, a minority of business law scholars pointed out that the scheme violates the prohibition 
of financial assistance on its substantial aspects, since, after the merger between the target and 
the NewCo, the target firm guarantees the transaction with the assets it owns. 
According to Potito (2009), the reform of corporate law in 2004 has overcome these doubts by 
specifically regulating leveraged transactions through the article 2501-bis of Civil Code. The 
reform increases the transparency of the leveraged transactions toward stakeholders and 
investors through the mandatory disclosure of relevant information, with the aim to verify the 
presence of solid strategic and financial rationale for the acquisition. In fact, the draft term of 
the merger between the NewCo and the target firm shall disclose these information: 
- the financial resources needed to satisfy the outstanding obligations; 
- the business rationale of the transaction; 
- a business plan explaining the operating goals and the source of financial resources 
Furthermore, the following documents shall accompany the draft term of merger: a report by 
the external auditors of the involved firms and a certification on the reasonableness of the 
merger from an independent expert. (Potito 2009, page 176) 
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3.9. LBOs AS SOLUTION OF HOLDOUT PROBLEM IN ACQUISITIONS 
From a general point of view, transactions aimed at the transfer of business take place when 
increase in value creation and higher efficiency for the overall economy are expected. In fact, 
the acquirer profits from the transaction if the generates a positive difference between the price 
paid for the acquisition and the value generated by its activity aimed at the removal of 
inefficiencies or at the achievement of synergies in combining and integrating the acquired 
business with others. (Koller et al, 2015) 
A fundamental assumption is that both the seller and the acquirer define the economic value of 
the business on the ground of the expected present value of future cash flows and agree on its 
determination. This value defined by parties is the minimum selling price which shall be paid 
to the seller. In some cases, this hypothesis is not verified since the transaction is affected by 
asymmetrical information, so the seller, especially for small firms, does not clearly know the 
perspectives of his business, or he prefers to retire from entrepreneurship rather than obtaining 
a price reflecting the fair market value. 
According to Grossmann and Hart (1980), under the hypothesis that price is not affected by 
asymmetrical information and both parties agree on the market price of the business and on the 
value of synergies, the transaction may be affected by the holdout problem. In fact, since the 
seller reasonably knows that the acquirer undertakes the transaction because he expects to create 
additional value from the increasing of the efficiency of the business, he will try to obtain part 
of the acquirer’s profit, corresponding to part of the value of synergies, by asking a selling price 
higher than its current market value. According to game theory, the acquirer will agree on the 
request if he still expects to obtain a positive surplus for the transaction, it means that extra 
price asked by the seller shall be lower than the expected improvements of Enterprise Value for 
the target firm. By contrary, if extra price requested is equal or higher than the expected value 
of improvement, the acquirer refuses the transaction since he would be damaged by it, and 
therefore the seller would not realize the value of his business. 
In the context of the acquisition of a listed firm through a tender offer the holdout problem 
becomes severe and, as explained by Müller and Panunzi (2004), Leveraged Buy-Out is a useful 
technique for ensuring the success of the transaction by neutralizing its effects. In this situation 
incumbent shareholders receive a proposal to buy at a fixed price by the potential acquirer. 
Small equity holders have the incentive to refuse the offer, if they hope that a sufficient number 
of shareholders, allowing the obtainment of a controlling stake, accepts the proposal and sells 
the shares to the acquirer. In fact, by refusing the proposal, the small shareholder keeps its status 
and he may enjoy the improvements of equity value due to the activity of the new controlling 
shareholders. This incentive to refuse leads to holdout situation since nobody will accept the 
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tender offer: the transaction will not take place and the planned improvement of the business 
will not occur, thus avoiding opportunity to profit for the sellers and the acquirer. 
A possible solution, proposed by Grossman and Hart, which ensures the success of the 
transaction by neutralizing the holdout problem is the declaration of the acquirer who promotes 
the tender offer to expropriate part of the target’s assets by directly acquiring them at a price 
lower than their fair value or, more generally, to undertake commercial transactions with related 
parties at conditions not aligned with market prices. According to this plan, minority 
shareholders who do not accept the tender offer lose the opportunity to profit from the 
improvement of Enterprise Value originated by the change of control. In fact, positive effect on 
equity value due to the implementation of a new strategy is compensated by reduction of equity 
value caused by the conduct of unfair transactions. In fact, the hypothetical transfer of assets is 
decided and conducted by the majority shareholder who acts both in his personal name and in 
the name of the firm he controls. In this way the majority shareholder or a company related to 
him who receives the assets, obtains an economic profit equal to the loss borne by minority 
shareholders, which should reflect its expected compensation for the acquisition of the target 
company and the managerial actions taken to boost its Enterprise Value.  
Unfortunately, according to legal rules about companies, the transfer of assets among related 
parties at unfair price is forbidden since the management shall comply with fiduciary duties 
towards the overall set of shareholders, so management must not undertake operations which 
damages the shareholders. Therefore, the management and the controlling shareholders who 
undertake similar operation are highly exposed to legal suits by the minorities, and it is likely 
that the court challenges the unfair transaction or obliges the controlling subjects to compensate 
the damage caused to minorities. 
Instead, Müller and Panunzi state that the announcement of a Leveraged Buy-Out transaction 
by the potential acquirer who promotes the tender offer, although it has a similar economic 
substance from the point of view of the minority shareholders, it represents a possible solution 
of the holdout problem since it presents a lower legal risk. The similarity between LBO and the 
transaction with related parties is that through the assumption of financial debt, part of the pre-
existing value of equity capital is transferred to the holders of financial debt. Although this 
transfer of value, reduced the overall equity capital, the management who undertakes a 
Leveraged Buy-Out transaction is reasonably not guilty of violation of fiduciary duties toward 
minority shareholders, since also controlling shareholders are negatively affected by the 
transaction. In this situation, a legal suit for violation of fiduciary duties may be initiated only 
if there are evidences of fraud: the compliant shall prove that, according to an ex-ante 
examination of the business, the impossibility to satisfy obligations of debt repayment through 
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operating cash flows was easily ascertainable from information available at the time of the 
transaction. 
 
3.10. DISTRESSED INVESTORS 
In a situation of financial distress, notwithstanding if originated by highly leveraged 
transactions, another type of activist investors may enter the scene and take the control of the 
reallocation of property rights: the distressed investors. Like private equity firms, distressed 
investors are financial intermediaries who collect savings from peculiar classes of investors, 
then they establish one or more investment funds which undertake and actively manage the 
operating investments. 
The target of distress investors is very different from private equity firms: they acquire 
securities issued by companies that are unlikely to satisfy their obligations or that have recently 
filed for bankruptcy procedures to restructure their financial exposition. The purchase of debt 
claims which are defaulted or unlikely to pay is aimed at obtaining a key role in the phase of 
negotiations for the restructuring of liabilities and the subsequent reallocation of the property 
rights in the distressed firm. Distressed investors expect to obtain a profit for their investors 
from the spread between the purchase price of distressed claims and the price obtained from the 
selling of the business after restructuring or proceeds from its eventual liquidation. They may 
also arrange bridge loans devoted to their target firms whose continuation of the operating 
activity is threatened by the lack of liquidity on treasury. (Moyer et al., 2012) 
The outcome of distress investing is conditioned on the uncertainty about both the 
reorganization process and the implementation of a new effective business strategy which 
permits the definitive overcoming of the crisis. To maximize the value obtained from distress 
investments, they are characterized by a medium-long time horizon rather than the short term; 
in this manner the investor works for a comprehensive strategy aimed at the full recovery of 
value destroyed by the crisis and then he considers the dismissal of the target. 
It follows that successful distressed investors are characterized by early identification of the 
firms which present a situation of potential distress and by clear understanding of the causes of 
poor performance and insufficient generation of cash. In fact, their analysts try to predict the 
dynamics of the customers’ behaviour and the competition within specific industrial sectors to 
focus on a subset of firm which are likely to enter in a situation of decline. When a firm 
presenting actual or potential difficulties in the satisfaction of its outstanding obligations is 
identified, the investment fund enters in the firm if it considers that the underlying business 
activity is valuable and if the involved stakeholders give him the possibility to quickly decide 
and take all the necessary actions for the restructuring and recovery of the business. 
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Timeliness of the intervention by the distressed investment funds is a critical variable which 
conditions the financial return obtained by the distressed investor: an early entry of the investor, 
although it implies higher cash disbursement for the distressed securities, presents higher 
probability of ending up in a successful restructuring and a profitable exit. By contrary, whether 
the distressed investor intervenes in a later phase of the business’ decline and crisis, the financial 
instruments are acquired a very low price, but the return to value creation requires high effort 
and further investment by the fund and it present a more uncertain outcome. (Zotti, 2017) 
The entry of distressed investors in a distressed firm is characterized by the acquisition of a 
relevant share of one or more classes of defaulted debt claims. According to Moyer et al.  
(2012), first the distressed investor undertakes an estimation of the residual Enterprise Value of 
the distresses business, which is compared with the nominal value of the outstanding liability. 
Then, it analyses the level of collateralization and priority rights of each financial claim, trying 
to identify the claims which are not expected to be fully repaid in case of liquidation. In this 
way, the investor tries to identify the fulcrum security, a subset of financial instruments which 
present high probability of insolvency on principal and interest, so they are likely to be 
converted in equity within a restructuring procedure. For listed bonds, the consolidation of the 
majority stake of the bonds in the hand of the distressed investors, facilitates the negotiations 
and limits the holdout problem, since it becomes easier to obtain the required quorum for the 
conversion of debt instruments. Also, the distress investor may acquire financial instruments 
belonging to different classes: in this way he limits the conflict between different classes of 
creditors and the subsequent risk that inefficient choices negatively affecting the future of the 
business are taken. 
The acquisition is undertaken through a tender offer or private negotiations within the bond 
markets, if debt instruments are listed, or through private agreements with the borrower for 
loans, mortgages and non-listed securities. Because the high risk of default and insolvency is 
reflected into the market price, listed debt instruments trade at a price much lower than the 
nominal value; analogously privately-placed debt is acquired by the distressed investor at a 
price which considers the risk of insolvency, the uncertainty in the reorganization process and 
an adequate expected profit for the investor. 
According to Moyer et al. (2012), the market price of listed bond issued by distressed firm is 
lower that its intrinsic value, increasing the potential for profitable investments by distressed or 
speculative investors. The depression of market prices may be explained by the following 
reasons: 
- asymmetrical information about the actual severity of the distress and the presence of 
legal procedures: 
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- illiquidity of the security: the low number of transaction increases the bid-ask spread; 
- aversion for speculative instruments: many investors take the commitment to avoid 
investments in speculative bonds, so they quickly sell their instruments in case of 
downgrading; 
- need of specialized skills and knowledge to profitably invest in distressed bonds 
- high riskiness and uncertainty. 
From the point of view of the institution selling the debt instruments, “distressed investors are 
a valuable source of liquidity that enables the original investor […] to reduce their exposure to 
the often risky process of bankruptcy” (Moyer et al. 2012, pages 59-60). After the dismissals 
of bad credits, the institution recognizes in his profit and loss statement a definitive loss, rather 
than an uncertain impairment of the claim, which otherwise would be kept in the financial 
statements until enforcement procedures was pending, and it may lead to additional economic 
losses. Also, through the selling of distressed claims, lending institutions increase the 
transparency of their financial statements and they free up capital to be invested in good 
financial assets. 
With respect to small and medium enterprises presenting a situation of financial distress but 
good perspectives on the side of the operating business, the early intervention by distressed 
investors helps these businesses to maintain a defined guidance over the ordinary conduct of 
the operations. In fact, small and medium firms do not possess specific knowledge on 
turnaround process, thus increasing the severity of the crisis. In case of distress, the refence 
shareholders have the incentive to leave the guidance of the business operations, since they will 
not enjoy the eventual value created by their effort. 
On the other hand, small and medium firms entertain lending relationships with many banks to 
satisfy their financial needs, by taking part to several small lending agreements with different 
lending institutions rather than contracting a big credit facility with a single bank. Although 
banks perceive a lower credit risk due to the lower exposition, so they favour this practice, they 
have a low incentive to proper monitor the creditability of the borrower because the loan is 
small with respect to the scale of the bank’s assets and they expect the monitoring is conducted 
by the other banks. From the lack of incentive to take care about the proper repayment of the 
outstanding loans, it follows that in case the borrower enters a crisis, banks do not take the effort 
to sustain the recovery of the business through concession of bridge finance or dilation of 
payments. Analogously, in case of bankruptcy procedure, the involved banks may refuse to take 
part to the restructuring to avoid conflicts among institutions and they limit themselves to wait 
for the distribution of proceeds from dismissal of the overall business or separate liquidation of 
assets. (Zotti, 2017) 
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It follows that neither the shareholders nor the financial institutions have the incentive and the 
power to take decisions oriented to the survival of a small business in a medium-term horizon: 
the lack of a solid guidance rapidly reduces the residual value. In this scene, the intervention of 
distressed investors with a clear strategy for the recovery benefits both the non-interested 
investors, who rapidly recover part of their credits, and the distressed firm, which does not 
suffer the conflicts among creditors and it can refocus on the operating activity.  
Definitively, the presence of distressed investors in financial markets is very likely to positively 
affect the efficiency of the overall economy since it facilitates the adoption of efficient choices 
for the recovery of distressed firms rather than prolonging the crisis until it becomes 
irreversible.
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CHAPTER 4 – SEAT PAGINE GIALLE CASE STUDY: ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL 
AND CORPORATE EVENTS 
 
4.1. PRESENTATION OF THE BUSINESS 
According to the information memorandum for the listing of Spyglass S.p.A. on the Italian 
stock exchange, released to the financial community on 19 December 2003, the core activity 
conducted by Seat Pagine Gialle (SPG) is based in the Italian market and it belongs to directory 
segment of media and publishing industry. Its main products are the books Pagine Gialle and 
Pagine Bianche, released on a district base and updated year by year. These publishing products 
divulgate the key information, collected from telephone companies and stored in the corporate 
database, about users of landline phones (name, address and telephone number) within a 
specific district. 
Pagine Gialle product, founded in 1966, is distributed and delivered for free at domicile to all 
users of landline phones; the book, containing the directory of business users of telephone 
classified by categories of economic activity they carry on. The classified directory makes 
Pagine Gialle a useful tool to help the final users to find and put them in contact with the closest 
artisans, professionals or specialized business able to satisfy their needs. While all the 
subscribers of non-domestic telephone lines of the district are listed in Pagine Gialle, Seat 
business model is characterized by the commercial offer to acquire the possibility to highlight 
their key information or to insert advertising spaces into the pages, to increase the visibility and 
the knowledge of the businesses among the public. 
Pagine Bianche is the historical product of Seat and it consists in a district-based directory of 
users of landline telephone, both domestics and non-domestics, classified by municipality and 
following a strict alphabetical order. Pagine Bianche offer provides advertising spaces devoted 
to businesses, to increase their level of knowledge among the public, and to governmental 
organizations, to provide useful information to citizens. The publishing of Pagine Bianche is 
ruled by Italian regulations on telephone services, which obliges the Italian biggest provider of 
telephone services, Telecom Italia, to distribute the directory to landline telephone users. It 
follows that Telecom Italia formally acquires the product from SPG at a symbolic price, since 
the industrial and commercial costs of the publishing are covered by the advertising and 
Telecom Italia share of price refers to distributional and delivery costs, which are definitively 
charged to all telephone users through the telephone bill. 
From this brief presentation, it is possible to say that the core business of SPG operates in a 
two-sided market: the generation of revenue is based on the collection of institutional 
advertising among businesses and governmental organizations, to be delivered to the final users 
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as part of the directory of telephone users. The core asset of Seat is the database of telephone 
users, which is exploited both as list of potential acquirers of advertising and as final product 
to be incorporated in the telephone directories. The operating cycle, lasting about less than a 
year, starts with the orders for advertising space and the definition of the advertisements 
together with the clients; when the collection of orders is completed, the firm internally defines 
the layout of directory book, which is printed and delivered to the public through external 
suppliers. To reduce the operating risks, SPG directly buys in advance the paper it needs from 
international suppliers and it stores the main raw material in the warehouses of the external 
printer. 
Beside the original business of paper directories, Seat has enlarged its activities in other 
European countries (Germany, France, Spain) and in the areas of marketing information and in 
the so-called “directory assistance”: the supplying of information upon specific telephone 
request by the user. Also, to face the change in technology occurred since the 1990s, Seat started 
to develop digital solutions (CD-ROMs, website) replicating the information of the directories, 
which played a secondary role with respect to the paper product. 
The core business of paper directory has experienced a sudden decline and obsolescence with 
respect to final users and advertisers since 2005, because of the disruptive innovations from 
new technologies, especially the diffusion of fixed and mobile Internet connections, the 
increasing role of search engines as platforms for institutional advertisements and the easy 
access to information ensured by smartphones. The decline of the core activities on directories 
caused a sudden reduction in cash flows and Enterprise Value, leading to the need to redefine 
both the financial structure and the business strategy to ensure the survival of the going concern. 
 
4.2. REMOTE HISTORY 
SPG history and its business of telephone directories in Italy take origin in the year 1925, when 
a corporation called Società anonima Elenchi ufficiali per gli Abbonati al Telefono was 
established in Turin by the local telephone company, SIP, jointly with an advertising agency. In 
1933, the telephone company SIP was affected by the shocks deriving from the 1930s economic 
crisis and therefore it was acquired by Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale, the Italian 
governmental agency established in those years with institutional aim to take intervention into 
businesses distressed by the crisis and to help the recovery of the overall Italian economy. After 
the acquisition, Seat became a branch of the sub-holding STET-Società Torinese per l’Esercizio 
Telefonico, a company owned by IRI and devoted to control and direction of all the Italian 
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telephone companies acquired by the agency and their related businesses.1  
In 1996, under the pressure from the European Union to reduce the level of public debt and 
limit the public intervention in the economy, IRI was bound to liquidation and most of its 
subsidiary businesses were transferred to private owners. Within this context, the directory 
division of STET was spun-off and incorporated into Seat Pagine Gialle S.p.A., a new 
corporation with shares listed in the Italian stock exchange with IRI as majority shareholder, to 
permit the subsequent transfer of the control to private entrepreneurs. 2 In November 1997, the 
Italian Government sold the controlling stake held through IRI, equal to the 61.27 % of the 
ordinary capital, to the vehicle Ottobi, a consortium of investors formed by De Agostini Group, 
the financial institutions Banca Commerciale Italiana, Abn Amro, Mediocredito Centrale and 
Citigroup and private equity funds sponsored by BC Partners, CVC and Investitori Associati. 3 
In 2000, after the concentration of all telephone subsidiaries of STET group in the company 
Telecom Italia S.p.A., and its subsequent transfer to a group of private investors, the majority 
stake of SPG was transferred from the consortium Ottobi to Telecom Italia. The acquisition was 
heavily influenced by the positive momentum of businesses related to internet and new 
economy, and the strategic rationale was the consolidation of media and publishing activities 
owned by Telecom Italia to boost their expansion in the internet market. In fact, after the 
acquisition, Telecom Italia created a new subsidiary named after Seat Pagine Gialle, operating 
in the traditional directory business, in television business through the channels LA7 and MTV, 
in web-based services through the brands Virgilio and Tin, and in stationery business through 
the control of Buffetti Group. 
Because of the economic crisis following the burst of Internet bubble in the first years of 2000s, 
Telecom Italia and minority shareholders suffered spectacular loss on SPG equity value. The 
subsequent change of future perspective in media and publishing industries led Telecom Italia 
to the decision to augment its value through the dismissal of business units operating in mature 
markets and characterized by stable revenues and customers, solid generation of cash and slow 
growth. At the same time Telecom Italia decided to focus on the business of television 
publishing and internet advertising. Therefore, Telecom Italia decided to spin-off the business 
units operating in Directories, Directory Assistance and Business Information from SPG group: 
after a competitive process, a consortium of private equity firms was interested in the 
acquisition. Both parties agreed to demerge the company into two corporations: Telecom Italia 
                                                          
1 http://archiviostorico.telecomitalia.com/sites/default/files/primo%20bilancio%20Stet%201934_0.pdf 
2 http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/1996/09/14/seat-pagine-gialle-la-stet-ha.html 
3 Report released by the judicial supervisor of composition with creditors of Seat Pagine Gialle S.p.A. and Seat 
Pagine Gialle Italia S.p.A. ex article 172 of Italian Bankruptcy Code, page 14. 
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Media, with television, internet and stationery business units, to be retained by the 
telecommunication company, and a new SPG, controlling the above-mentioned divisions, to be 
definitively sold. 
Please note that in the following parts of the chapter, aimed at the analysis of business, financial 
and corporate events occurred since 2003 to nowadays, the names Seat Pagine Gialle and Seat 
or the acronym SPG are always referred to the corporation resulting from this latter 
extraordinary operation, expressly excluding television and internet operations. 
The consortium was formed by four private equity firms, of which three firms had already taken 
part into Ottobi venture: BC Partners, CVC, Permira and Investitori Associati, through a chain 
of corporate vehicles specifically established to perform the operation. According to the 
investment agreement, the above-mentioned spin off was executed on 1 august 2003, then on 8 
august 2003 Telecom Italia transferred the 62.5 % of Seat Pagine Gialle S.p.A. shares it owned 
to the vehicle Silver S.p.A. Then, in compliance to Italian securities law, Silver launched a 
mandatory tender offer on shares withheld by minority shareholders at a price per share equal 
to the acquisition price paid to Telecom Italia. The tender offer was accepted by a very small 
number of shareholders, equal to a percentage of the 0.0263 % of the outstanding ordinary 
shares.4 After the conclusion of the tender offer, SPG was controlled by Silver S.p.A., owning 
the 62.52 % of the outstanding shares, and the remaining 37.48 % was owned by a myriad of 
small shareholders. 
In details, the new corporation SPG, as resulting from the demerger of 1 August 2003, was 
structured according to three divisions: Directories, Directory Assistance and Business 
Information. With respect to the core business unit of Directories, Seat used to operate in Italy, 
United Kingdom and France. Italian operations published and distributed the core products 
Pagine Gialle and Pagine Bianche, previously described, to 20 million families and to 3 million 
businesses, vehiculating about 700,000 institutional advertisements per year. Beside the paper 
edition, the same information about telephone users and advertisers was available also through 
the CD-ROM editions and specialized websites for both products. Seat published also local 
maps and useful guides, named after Tuttocittà, and specialized volumes for businesses analysts 
and purchases managers, whose product names were, respectively, Annuario Seat and Kompass. 
In United Kingdom, Seat group was the second operator in directories business and it used to 
publish local directories with the brand Thomson through the subsidiary TDL Infomedia. 
Through, the local directories, both in paper and web-based version, and the connected service 
of business information, TDL Infomedia enjoyed the 14 % of UK directories market with about 
                                                          
4 Information memorandum about the listing of Spyglass S.p.A. on the Italian stock exchange, page 189. 
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100,000 advertising customers. In France, Seat group used to publish, through the subsidiary 
Euredit, a European directory of businesses, translated in 16 different languages and distributed 
at continental level to help the selection of business’ suppliers all over the Europe. 
Directory Assistance business unit was aimed at the supply of useful telephonic information to 
final customers through in-bound call centres in Italy, United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and 
Austria. On the Italian market, directory assistance was constituted by the famous telephone 
service 89 24 24 Pronto Pagine Gialle, while non-Italian business units were managed through 
a Germany-based subsidiary, Telegate A. G., which is listed on Frankfurt stock exchange.  
Finally, Business Information unit was referred to the French subsidiary Consodata S. A., 
controlling operations in Italy, United Kingdom, France, Spain and Belgium. The subsidiary 
was sold in the first months of 2004 except for the Italian branch of the business unit, withheld 
at support of the core business. Consodata group provided Marketing services through 
proprietary and external databases and collection of data about consumption behaviours: 
information is sold to businesses interested in properly segmentation of potential clients and 
selection of the target customers.5 
 
4.3. INSIDE THE ACQUISITION: BUSINESS STRATEGY 
With respect to the acquisition of SPG by the consortium of Private Equity funds, it was 
motivated by an ambitious plan for growth in revenues and value creation from financial 
restructuring. In fact, the new owners assumed a relevant growth of revenues and EBITDA on 
the ten-year period from 2004 to 2014. In this period, they assumed average growth rate in 
revenues of 4.3 % and average EBITDA growth of 5.5 %. More specifically, revenues had been 
estimated to pass from 1,609 million Euro in 2004 to 2,418 million Euro in 2014. Similarly, 
EBITDA had been estimated to double over the period: from 663 million Euro in 2004 to 1,122 
million Euro in 2014. 
The boost of economic results was explained by an aggressive strategy focused on the 
improvement of Italian market and abroad expansion. With respect to Italy, planned actions 
were devoted on the valorisation of the Directories business through incremental innovation on 
paper products such as higher printing and colour quality, enlargement of the advertisers’ base 
through specific commercial offers for small and medium businesses and increase of efficiency 
in the selling network and collection of trade receivables. Further positive benefit was expected 
from the bundling of paper and website advertisings and by the growth on user base on Internet 
directories and the subsequent appreciation of advertisements on that channel, together with 
                                                          
5 Information memorandum about the listing of Spyglass S.p.A. on the Italian stock exchange, pages 30-37. 
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higher expected diffusion of phone directory assistance.6 
 
4.4. INSIDE THE ACQUISITION: NON-CONVENTIONAL LEVERAGED BUY-OUT 
However, the pillar of the acquirer’s strategy to boost Seat Enterprise Value consisted in the 
modification of the financial structure through an unconventional leveraged buy-out 
transaction. The starting point was that after the spin-off, SPG presented an equilibrate financial 
structure, characterized by an amount of financial liabilities, owed to the former owner Telecom 
Italia, equal to 513 million Euro, to be compared to a book value of shareholders’ equity equal 
to 1,063 million Euro at 30 September 2003. The solid generation of cash due to the stability of 
the business and the predictability of the revenues stream, together with the planned strategy 
for growth, would have permitted the creation of further value for shareholders from fiscal 
shield on interest expenses. The assumption of debt would also permit the alignment of Seat 
liabilities structure to its international comparable Directories firms. 
To implement the acquisition of Seat and the subsequent assumption of financial debt, the 
private equity funds BC Partners, CVC, Permira and Investori Associati established the 
following chain of four New Corporations: 
- Société de Participations Silver S. A., a Luxembourg-based corporation owned by the 
participating investment funds, proportionally to their equity contribution in the 
acquisition, and in minority owned by the new directors’ team of Seat 
- Sub Silver S. A., a Luxembourg-based corporation totally owned by the former 
corporation 
- Spyglass S.p.A., an Italian-based company totally owned by the former corporation; 
- Silver S.p.A., another Italian-based company totally owned by the former corporation. 
To undertake the acquisition, private equity funds collectively invested as equity capital a sum 
equal to 960 million Euro, devoted to the constitution of the chain of vehicles. The ownership 
shares of the equity stakes into the top NewCo were: 
 
Bc Partners funds 38.04 % 
Investitori Associati funds 5.85 % 
Permira funds 26.34 % 
CVC funds 29.27 % 
Other investors 0.05 % 
Table 4.1 – Ownership structure of Société de Participations Silver S. A. 
Source: Shareholders’ agreement on 9 August 2003, 
found on http://www.consob.it/web/area-pubblica/quotate/documenti/patti_parasociali/storico/ 
seat2.htm?hkeywords=&docid=0&page=0&hits=80&nav=false 
                                                          
6 Information memorandum about the listing of Spyglass S.p.A. on the Italian stock exchange, pages 197-200. 
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The purchase of Seat shares by Telecom Italia was then undertaken by Silver S.p.A. and the 
respective price of the share package, equal to 3,033 million Euro and corresponding to a price 
of 0.598 Euro per share 7 was paid through cash obtained by the equity contribution from 
Spyglass, equal to 874 million Euro, and a bridge loan of 2,207 million Euro provided by The 
Royal Bank of Scotland – Milan Branch. After the acquisition, the target company, through the 
intermediation of Silver, negotiated a separate loan with The Royal Bank of Scotland – Milan 
Branch, to be devoted to the repayment of financial liabilities owed toward Telecom Italia, equal 
to 513 million Euro. 
Rightly after the acquisition by Silver, balance sheets of Seat group and the acquisition vehicles, 
highlighting their sources of financings, can be resumed in Table 4.2. 
 
30 September 2003 
Sub Silver S.A. 
Assets Liabilities 
Spyglass shares (100 %) 874 960 Equity capital 
Other assets 86   
Total assets 960 960 Total liabilities 
 
Spyglass S.p.A. 
Assets Liabilities 
Silver shares (100 %) 874 874 Equity capital 
Total assets 874 874 Total liabilities 
 
Silver S.p.A. 
Assets Liabilities 
Seat PG shares (62.52 %) 3,037 832 Equity capital 
Cost of financings 17 2,231 Financial liabilities 
Current assets and cash 19 10 Other liabilities 
Total assets 3,073 3,073 Total liabilities 
 
Seat Pagine Gialle Group 
Assets Liabilities 
Fixed Assets 1,250 1,063 Equity capital 
Net Working Capital 378 565 Net Financial liabilities 
Total assets 1,628 1,628 Total liabilities 
Table 4.2 – Synthetic Balance Sheets of SPG and the acquisition vehicles at 30 September 2003 
Values in million Euro – Personal elaboration from Information memorandum about the listing of 
Spyglass S.p.A. at pages 173-187 and SPG interim financial statement at 30 September 2003. 
                                                          
7 Information memorandum about Lighthouse International Company S.A. € 1,300,000,000 8 % Senior Notes Due 
2014, found on Thomson Reuters Eikon database, page 39. 
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As described in Chapter 3, in an ordinary leverage buy-out, after the acquisition, the financial 
debt is bound to be assumed by the target through the merger by incorporation of the vehicle 
and the target company. This basic technique was not implemented in Seat acquisition because, 
despite the vehicle Silver did not own the totality of SPG share capital, the private equity 
investors were interested in retaining a controlling stake of Seat while keeping it listed on the 
Italian stock exchange. In fact, a relevant stake of minority shareholders refused the mandatory 
tender offer and, considering the prevalence of debt in the financial structure of Silver, the 
eventual merger between Silver and Seat would have caused a relevant dilution of the equity 
stake of the target owned by the private equity investors. 
Therefore, another scheme was implemented to complete SPG leveraged acquisition: the 
Luxembourg-based vehicle Sub Silver S.A. obtained a short-term credit line of Euro 2,240 
million to be devoted to the reimbursement of the debt previously undertaken by the Italian-
based vehicle Silver.8 From the technical point of view, the intermediate vehicle Spyglass 
increased its equity capital on 15 December 2003: in that date Sub Silver contributed a sum of 
109 million Euro as share capital and 2,129 million Euro as share premium reserve. Then, on 
the same date, Spyglass contributed the sum received by Sub Silver through the previous 
transaction to its wholly owned subsidiary Silver: the last transaction allowed Silver to totally 
reimburse in the same date the credit line obtained to execute the purchase of SPG shares, which 
took place on the same date.9 The balance sheet of the three vehicles involving into the 
transaction, as resulting after the increase in equity is resumed in Table 4.3. 
 
 
 
15 December 2003 
Sub Silver S.A. 
Assets Liabilities 
Spyglass shares (100 %) 3,114 960 Equity capital 
Other assets 86 2,240 Financial liabilities 
Total assets 3,200 3,200 Total liabilities 
 
Spyglass S.p.A. 
Assets Liabilities 
Silver shares (100 %) 3,114 3,114 Equity capital 
Total assets 3,114 3,114 Total liabilities 
                                                          
8 Information memorandum about Lighthouse International Company S.A. € 1,300,000,000 8 % Senior Notes Due 
2014, found on Thomson Reuters Eikon database, page 40. 
9 Information memorandum about the listing of Spyglass S.p.A. on the Italian stock exchange, page 40. 
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Silver S.p.A. 
Assets Liabilities 
Seat PG shares (62.52 %) 3,037 3,072 Equity capital 
Current assets and cash 53 18 Other liabilities 
Total assets 3,090 3,090 Total liabilities 
Table 4.3 – Synthetic Balance Sheets of SPG and the acquisition vehicles at 15 December 2003 
Values in million Euro – Personal elaboration from the Information memorandum about the listing of 
Spyglass S.p.A. on the Italian stock exchange at pages 17, 89 and 146. 
 
The following step of the transaction took place on 23 December 2003, and it consisted in the 
merger by incorporation of Seat Pagine Gialle into Silver and the subsequent incorporation of 
the resulting company into Spyglass. At the completion of the mergers, Spyglass changed its 
name into Seat Pagine Gialle S.p.A. and asked the admission of its shares to Milan stock 
exchange. The previous reimbursement of financial debt undertaken by Silver permitted the 
execution of the two mergers with an exchange ratio equal to 1, since the two vehicles were 
completed financed by equity and their assets consisted, directly or indirectly, into SPG shares. 
The mergers produced the following effects: the controlling shareholder Sub Silver S. A. 
became the owner of the 62.52 % of the operating company, at the same time minority 
shareholders were not substantially affected by the mergers, while accounting balance sheet of 
the operating company was relevantly modified. In fact, the mergers permitted the recognition, 
in the accounting books of the resulting company, of the difference between the accounting 
value of shareholders equity of the operating company after the demerger, equal to about 1,063 
million Euro at 30 September 2003, and the economic value of its equity capital as resulting 
from the financial markets. The two mergers originated both cancellation deficit and exchange 
surplus: the former corresponded to the differences between the accounting value of the former 
Seat equity, and the historical cost of Seat shares registered on the asset side of the vehicles’ 
balance sheets, referred to the economic value of the majority stake. At the same time, the latter 
correspond to the difference between the nominal value of equity belonging to shares issued to 
minorities and the accounting value of the minority shares of equity capital of the incorporated 
subsidiaries. In the balance sheet of the firm resulting from the merger, cancellation deficits and 
exchange surpluses were booked as goodwill, in the asset side, and as disposable share premium 
reserve in the liability side. (Potito, 2009) 
As a result, consolidated Balance sheet of Seat and Sub Silver at 31 December 2003 are 
represented by Table 4.4. 
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31 December 2003 
Sub Silver S.A. 
Assets Liabilities 
Seat PG shares (62.52 %) 3,114 960 Equity capital 
Other assets 86 2,240 Financial liabilities 
Total assets 3,200 3,200 Total liabilities 
 
Seat Pagine Gialle Group 
Assets Liabilities 
Goodwill 3,183 4,374 Equity capital 
Fixed Assets 1,430 460 Net Financial liabilities 
Net Working Capital 221   
Total assets 4,834 4,834 Total liabilities 
Table 4.4 – Synthetic Balance Sheets of SPG and the acquisition vehicles at 31 December 2003 
Values in million Euro – Personal elaboration from balance sheets attached to Information 
memorandum about the listing of Spyglass S.p.A. on the Italian stock exchange and SPG restated 
financial statement at 31 December 2003. 
The last step of the leveraged transaction was the distribution of an extraordinary dividend to 
the shareholders, to allow the repayment of the credit line obtained by Sub Silver S. A. and the 
assumption of financial liabilities by the operating firm. The distribution of the extraordinary 
dividend was approved by Seat shareholders meeting on the 15 April 2004 and paid on 22 April 
2004 for a total amount of 3,578 million Euro, equal to 0.43 Euro per share.10 
Rightly before the distribution of the extraordinary dividend, on 14 April 2003, Sub Silver 
divested part of SPG shares it held, equal to a percentage of 12.38 % of equity capital. After the 
transaction, Sub Silver held the 50.14 % of Seat equity capital, slightly higher than the minimum 
stake necessary to control the shareholders’ meetings through the majority of voting rights. The 
shares were sold to the investment bank Lehman Brothers, which had taken part in the definition 
of the leveraged transaction and the financial structure, at a price equal to 0.80 Euro per share, 
corresponding to total proceeds of about 804 million Euro and capital gain of 187 million Euro, 
since the accounting value of the divested equity stake was equal to 617 million Euro [ (3,114 
/ 62.52 %) * 12.38 % ]. Lehman Brothers immediately sold the shares acquired in the open 
market, while Sub Silver S. A. devoted a sum of 451 million Euro to the partial reimbursement 
of the bridge loan.11 
According to the shareholding structure resulting after the partial divestment, the extraordinary 
                                                          
10 SPG financial statements – fiscal year 2003. 
11 Information memorandum about Lighthouse International Company S.A. € 1,300,000,000 8 % Senior Notes 
Due 2014, found on Thomson Reuters Eikon database, pages 7-8. 
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dividend received by the controlling shareholder Sub Silver S. A. was equal to 1,794 million 
Euro; at the same time minority shareholders collectively received a sum of 1,784 million Euro. 
The dividend paid by Seat to the controlling shareholder Sub Silver was almost equal to the 
principal amount of the remaining financial loan after the above mentioned: in fact, the residual 
principal was about equal to 1,789 million Euro (2,240 – 451).  At the end of these complex 
operations, the vehicle Sub Silver withheld an amount of liquidity equal to 2,147 million Euro, 
resulting from the extraordinary dividend plus residual proceeds from the divestment of Seat 
shares (1,794 + 804 – 451). Assuming the total reimbursement of the principal, Sub Silver 
obtained an estimated net generation of cash close to 358 million Euro (2,147 million – 1,789 
million), corresponding to the 37 % of the sum initially contributed by private equity investors 
in the acquisition. The income obtained by Sub Silver is estimated in 1,981 million Euro, 
corresponding to the sum of received dividend and capital gain from partial divestiture (1,794 
+ 187). Please note that estimated income and cash generation does not include financial 
expenses on the credit line and transaction costs. 
SPG and Sub Silver balance sheets at 30 June 2004, as resulting from the distribution of the 
extraordinary dividend, are the following. 
30 June 2004 
Sub Silver S.A. 
Assets Liabilities 
Seat PG shares (50.14 %) 2,497 960 Equity capital 
Liquidity 2,147 1,981 Income 
Other assets 86 1,789 Financial liabilities 
Total assets 4,730 4,730 Total liabilities 
 
Seat Pagine Gialle Group 
Assets Liabilities 
Goodwill 3,183 708 Equity capital 
Fixed Assets 1,325 3,967 Net Financial liabilities 
Net Working Capital 167   
Total assets 4,675 4,675 Total liabilities 
Table 4.5 – Synthetic Balance Sheets of SPG and the acquisition vehicles at 30 June 2004 
Values in million Euro – Personal elaboration from Information memorandum about Lighthouse 
International Company S.A. € 1,300,000,000 8 % Senior Notes Due 2014, found on Thomson Reuters 
Eikon database and interim financial statement of SPG at 30 June 2004 
After the payment of the extraordinary dividend, the definitive long-term financial structure of 
SPG was set according to of the financial term sheets. Financial liabilities were regulated by an 
agreement with The Royal Bank of Scotland – Milan branch, providing a financial loan with 
floating rate of total 2,900 million Euro and 75 million Pounds, divided in the following 
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tranches: 
- 1,250 million Euro to be repaid in six-month instalments, until June 2010 
- 750 million Euro to be repaid half in December 2010 and half in June 2011 
- 750 million Euro to de repaid half in December 2011 and half in June 2012 
- 75 million Pound devoted to the anticipated reimbursement of financial bonds issued by 
the British subsidiary TDL, with expiration in 2009 
- 150 million Euro in the form of revolving credit line to finance eventual needs for 
Working Capital 
 
The second pillar of the financial structure was a subordinated debt negotiated with an ad hoc 
Luxembourg-based vehicle, called Lighthouse International Company S. A.: this vehicle 
collected financial resources through the issuing of high-yield bonds and then it lent to SPG an 
amount of 1,300 million Euro at 8 % interest rate: the coupon was due on six-month time basis, 
while the principal was due in bullet on April 2014. 
The financial loan with The Royal Bank of Scotland was guaranteed by the following collaterals 
issued by the operating firm: 
- Pledge on Pagine Gialle and Pagine Bianche trademarks 
- Pledge on SPG bank accounts 
- Transfer of SPG trade receivables 
- Pledge on share of SPG’s foreign subsidiaries 
- Pledge on SPG’s intercompany loans 
- Privilege on SPG fixed assets with book value not lower than Euro 25,000 
 
Furthermore, the loan was collateralized by Sub Silver S. A., granting a pledge on its majority 
stake of SPG shares, and by Société de Participations Silver S. A., who pledged its share of the 
vehicle Sub Silver S. A. At the same time, the subordinated loan was collateralized by SPG, 
Sub Silver and Société de Participations Silver in favour of Lighthouse bondholders with 
guarantees subordinated to the prior satisfaction of the obligation arising from the senior loan. 
It must be noted that the residual book value of shareholders’ equity, as resulting from the 
balance sheet on 31 December 2004, was equal to 675 million Euro, to be compared with its 
former amount of 4,374 million Euro before the distribution of the extraordinary dividend. 
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4.5. OPERATING AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE FROM 2004 TO 2007 
Relevant financial data of period examined in this paragraph, as resulting from official SPG 
financial statements, are resumed in Table 4.6. 
 
 
2004 (IAS) 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Revenues 1,410.1 1,430.6 1,468.8 1,449.6 1.375,0 
YoY Growth -2.86% 1.45% 2.67% -1.31% -5.15% 
Core Revenues 1,059.7 1,061.8 1,077.5 1,090.2 1,058.7 
EBITDA 614.4 626.6 611.2 648.1 602.7 
Marginality 43.6% 43.8% 41.6% 44.7% 43.8% 
EBIT 379.3 420.2 402.1 427.7 228.3 
Profit/Loss 86.1 138.7 81.8 106.2 (173.7)      
 
Equity 860.0 999.7 1,075.4 1,123.8 903.5 
Liabilities 4,533.0 4,317.3 4,152.1 3,981.9 3,901.3 
Intangible Assets 4,342.7 4,199.0 4,064.9 4,035.0 3.613.8 
Table 4.6 – Highlights of financials for fiscal years 2004-2008 – Values in million Euro 
Source: SPG official financial statements; 2004 values are taken from 2005 financial statement 
After the completion of the leveraged transaction, the economic performance of fiscal year 2004 
presented a decline in revenues of -2.86 % with respect to pro-forma data of year 2003, 
compensated by the improvement of EBITDA which grew on a 2 % rate. The economic result 
of year 2004 was characterized by a loss of 112 million Euro, which is attributable to the 
application of accounting principles prescribed by the Italian Civil Code, requiring the 
systematic amortization of book value of goodwill on a 20-year time basis. From the fiscal year 
2005, SPG was obliged by European regulations to adopt IAS-IFRS accounting principle, 
which required the impairment of goodwill only in case of loss on value as resulting from the 
yearly impairment test. Therefore, new regulations required Seat to reperform 2004 financial 
statements according to the new IAS-IFRS accounting principles, and the reperformed profit 
and loss statement presented a positive result of 86.1 million Euro. 
The economic performance of year 2005, resulting from new financial statements compliant 
with IAS-IFRS principles, was characterized by the following growth rates: revenue growth of 
1.45 %, EBITDA growth of 1.98 % and positive economic result equal to 138.7 million Euro: 
the positive result permitted the distribution to shareholders of 42 million Euro as ordinary 
dividends. The growth in revenues was not sustained by the operation in Italian Directories 
(labelled as “Core Revenues” in Table 4.6), which generated a level of revenues almost equal 
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to the precedent year. In detail, revenues from advertisements on paper products presented a 
small decline, which were compensated by the increase in revenues from web and voice 
products. By contrary, UK Directories and Directory Assistance business units, presented 
increases in revenues and EBITDA levels. Directory Assistance business unit, in 2005 enlarged 
its operations in France, trying to take advantage from new European rules aimed at higher level 
of competition on directory assistance services. With respect to accessory business units, in 
2005 SPG acquired an Italian firm, Cipi, operating in the market of promotional gadgets, to 
enlarge its commercial offer. 
With respect to financial liabilities side, in 2005 Seat reached an agreement with The Royal 
Bank of Scotland aimed at refinancing and rescheduling the financial debt. As a result, at the 
end of year 2005, the senior debt was articulated as following:  
- Tranche A, equal to 1,930 million Euro, due in six-month instalments from June 2006 
to June 2012 
- Tranche B, equal to 600 million Euro, expiring in June 2013 
- Tranche C, a revolving short-term credit line to cover financial need originated from 
increase in Net Working Capital. 
 
The solid generation of cash originated by ordinary business operations of SPG allowed the 
anticipated reimbursement to RBS of 94 million Euro and the negotiation of more favourable 
spreads on Euribor interest rate at the basis of the computation of financial expenses. 
Then, 2006 fiscal year was characterized by quite positive results: revenues equal to 1,469 
million Euro, with growth rate of 2.67 %, EBITDA equal to 611 million Euro, presenting a 
decline of -2.45 % on year 2005, net earnings equal to 82 million Euro. In 2006 too, positive 
profit and cash generation allowed the distribution of a total sum of 58 million Euro as ordinary 
dividends. Into details, revenues of Italian directories business unit experienced a growth of 1.5 
%, driven by the rise of web and telephone services which compensated the reduction of 
revenues of paper products. Directory Assistance business unit achieved positive results, 
especially in Spanish, French and Italian market, while during the year it stopped its operations 
in the Austrian market. With respect to Italian market, the division opened the new service 12 
40 Pronto Pagine Bianche, exploiting the opportunities from liberalization of directory 
assistance service for private telephone users. The new service presented rapid growth rate, 
sustained by a massive advertising campaign. By contrary, UK Directories business unit 
experienced the decline in revenues level of -1.2 % and the contraction in EBITDA. 
From the financial side, SPG realized the securitization of trade receivables, by transferring 
them to a Special Purpose Vehicle, which collected among institutional investors 256 million 
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Euro to pay the discounted value of receivables to Seat. From the accounting point of view, 
financial liabilities of the Special Purpose Vehicle toward external investors are included into 
Seat consolidated balance sheet in compliance with the applicable accounting standards, 
because of credit risk on trade receivables was not transferred to the vehicle. The liquidity 
obtained by Seat as proceeds from the securitization were devoted to the senior lender RBS as 
partial anticipated extinction of the financial loan. In the same year, SPG entered into a financial 
leasing agreement finalized to the restructuring and the acquisition of a real estate complex in 
Turin as new seat for the corporate headquarter. 
The 2007 fiscal year experienced a slightly decline of revenues of -1.31 % but substantial 
growth of the EBITDA of 6.03 %, which reached the level of 648 million Euro; the net result 
was positive and equal to 106 million Euro. Despite the positive profit, corporate directors deny 
distribution of ordinary dividends to strengthen the financial structure. While revenues from the 
core division experienced a growth of 1.2 %, the accessory business units presented a decline 
in revenues. In fact, revenues from UK Directories declined of 8.4 %, Directory Assistance 
division shrank by 1.5 % because of decline in French and German operations. With respect to 
extraordinary transactions, year 2007 was characterized by the acquisition from the Swedish 
directory publisher Eniro of the German-based company Wer Liefert Was; also, Seat entered in 
the Turkish market of media and internet through the establishment of a joint venture with a 
local partner.  
From the corporate point of view, the market performance on the stock exchange of SPG shares 
experienced a relevant decline of about 40 %, moving from 0.45 Euro per share at January 2007 
to 0.27 Euro at December 2007, following negative market expectations from the US crisis of 
subprime mortgages, the market riskiness of media industry and the financial risk originated by 
the high debt level. The volatility of the share was influenced also by the decision taken by the 
private equity funds which controlled the majority of Seat to divest their position. The decision 
was officially assumed in May 2007 through the hiring of a primary investment bank, but it was 
soon retired in October 2007 because of the weakness of financial markets and the difficulty in 
realizing a profitable sale. 
 
 
4.6. DECLINE AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS FROM 2008 TO 2010 
Relevant data of SPG financial statements from year 2008 to year 2010, which showed the first 
signals of financial disequilibria and represented the entry of the business into a phase of 
decline, resulting from downturn and deterioration of the core business of traditional directories, 
are resumed in Table 4.7.  
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Revenues 1,449.6 1.375,0 1.214,5 1.039,2 961,8 
YoY Growth -1.31% -5.15% -11.7% -14.4% -7.45% 
Core Revenues 1,090.2 1,058.7 952.2 797.5 748.5 
EBITDA 648.1 602.7 527.6 416.5 370.6 
Marginality 44.7% 43.8% 43.4% 40.1% 34.7% 
EBIT 427.7 228.3 245.7 (374.8) (433.0) 
Profit/Loss 106.2 (173.7) (35.6) (716.9) (789.0)  
     
Equity 1,123.8 903.5 1,039.3 228.7 (555.1) 
Liabilities 3,981.9 3,901.3 3,530.5 3,613.0 3,481.8 
Intangible Assets 4,035.0 3.613.8 3,428.6 2,728.4 2,019.0 
Table 4.72 – Highlights of financials for fiscal years 2007-2011 – Values in million Euro  
 Source: SPG official financial statements 
In details, weak performance of year 2008 was also a consequence of result of decline in the 
overall advertising market originated by deep economic and financial crisis which hit the whole 
European economy; therefore, revenues declined by 5.15 % and EBITDA declined by 7 %, 
reaching an absolute level close to the threshold of 600 million Euro. The main business unit of 
Italian directories declined in revenues by 2.9 %, while revenues from the respective UK 
operations decreased of 25.3 %, including the effect of the foreign currency. By contrary, 
Directory Assistance business experienced a growth of 2.5 % because of the acquisition of a 
German subsidiary, operating in the market of on-line advertising, aimed at the obtainment of 
positive synergies with the existing German branch and at the revitalization of the division. 
The negative perspective was reflected in the negative result of the yearly impairment test on 
goodwill and intangible assets, which led to the accounting recognition of 130 million Euro of 
impairments related to the subsidiaries TDL Infomedia, Europages and Cipi. Moreover, on 23 
December 2008, the German subsidiary Wer Liefert Was was rapidly dismissed from the group 
with a definitive loss of 79 million Euro. The impairment of goodwill and the negative result 
from the dismissals originated a negative result on the consolidated profit and loss statement 
equal to 173 million Euro. 
While obligations arising from financial debt had been regularly satisfied, since the total amount 
of financial debt at the end of year 2008 reduced to about 3,048 million Euro, the combined 
effect of deterioration in business perspectives, expected reduction in marginality and cash flow 
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generation, together with decision to implement a new business strategy since 2009 originated 
the need to undertake a process of restructuring both in business operations and in financial 
structure. 
 
4.6.1. Year 2009: Increase in share capital and new business plan 
Therefore, in January 2009 SPG, its controlling shareholders and The Royal Bank of Scotland 
reached an agreement on the modification of previously negotiated covenants regarding the 
senior loan, to adapt the financial constraints to new business scenarios. As counterparty for the 
covenants resetting, the senior lender asked Seat to strengthen the financial structure through 
an increase in share capital of 200 million Euro and the subsequent advanced reimbursement of 
100 million Euro with the proceeds from equity injection. Together with the covenant resetting, 
the spread on the Euribor rate was increased by 75 basis points, and the lender required the 
express commitment by controlling shareholders to exercise their option right on equity and to 
invest their proportionate share of 100 million Euro. On this point, the vehicles referred to the 
private equity firm BC Partners refused to participate in the equity injection and its option rights 
were transferred and exercised by the private equity funds CVC and Investitori Associati, who 
increased their participation stake in Seat share capital. 
Since the negative performance of financial and equity markets, which reflected the uncertain 
perspectives of the worldwide economy, conflicted with the urgency of Seat to collect equity 
capital and to honour the agreement with the lender, increase in share capital was characterized 
by an extremely high dilution ratio in the issuance of option rights to existing shareholders. In 
fact, before the increase in share capital existing shares were grouped according to the ratio of 
1 new share per 200 old shares, then, at the execution of the equity injection, shareholders had 
been given the option right to subscribe 226 new shares each 5 existing shares after the 
grouping. In this way, shareholders who did not exercise their option rights would have borne 
a dilution of their position by 97.84 %: in the hypothesis of complete subscription of the whole 
new equity by new investors, only theoretical because of the commitment of private equity 
funds to fully subscribe their proportionate share of equity, former shareholders would have 
collectively held only the 2.183 % of outstanding shares after the equity subscription. 
The above-described scheme constitutes a hyper-dilutive increase of capital, characterized by 
the assignment of a big number of option rights per existing share, and it was first implemented 
within the Italian stock exchange for this equity offer. The setting of such dilution ratios was 
aimed at augmenting the attractivity of the offer and to ensure the success of the transaction, in 
a generalized context of financial and economic crisis. From Seat point of view, the success of 
the increase of capital conditioned its vital perspectives: in case the equity injection failed, the 
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lender would not have granted the covenant reset, and the firm would have been in default. 
From the financial point of view, when an increase of capital with option rights starts, the option 
right, formerly incorporated into the share, is divided from the share and it is separately tradable 
in the stock exchange within a certain time window. During this time window, investors have 
an arbitrage opportunity, since the ex-price of the outstanding shares (resulting from the 
definitive separation of the option right) shall be equal to the current option price plus the 
subscription price, formerly fixed by the issuing company. Therefore, when option is tradable, 
its equilibrium price is computed according to the following formula: 
 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = (𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 
 
It must be remembered that at the end of the time window for option rights negotiation, the 
owner of the option has the faculty, not the obligation, to pay the subscription price and obtain 
new shares, otherwise the option expires without any consequences. The market reacted with a 
strong growth of ex-price of the share in the first days of separate trading of options, while the 
option prices reflected prices before the opening of subscriptions. Because of the high positive 
spread between prices of existing shares and options rights, the latter were deeply in-the-money 
and their holders were forced to exercise the option, subscribing the new equity and obtaining 
new shares, under the expectation to sell the shares and to profit from the position. The result 
was that during the exercise period, share prices doubled or even tripled day by day, moving 
from the initial price of 0.24 Euro to a maximum price of 1.04 Euro. It was clear that Seat 
securities were affected by a bubble, which burst right after the conclusion of the time window, 
falling a price of 0.17 Euro.  
However, from Seat point of view, the technique was very successful, since at the end of time 
window for exercise of the option the 98.71 % of option rights had been exercised; then the 
small unexercised options, although the subscription was guaranteed by the private equity 
funds, were offered in a public auction through the Stock Exchange and finally they were fully 
exercised. (Mantegazza 2009-2010) 
In the meantime, with respect to the operating side of the business, the management approved 
a new business plan focused on the development of internet-based marketing and advertising 
services. About the historical business line of directories, the plan was aimed at the sustainment 
of revenues from traditional products, through offers bundling on-line plus paper products for 
Small and Medium Enterprises. With respect to on-line products, Seat plans included the 
creation of websites and services for visibility on web search engines, the latter developed since 
March 2009 through a reselling agreement with Google. The management decided also to exit 
from French and Turkish operations belonging to the Directory Assistance business unit. The 
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change in strategy was motivated by the technological change and different availability of 
information to final users of directories, together with contraction in the market of advertising 
and the general crisis of publishing and media industry. 
It must be highlighted that in 2009 Seat experienced the substitution of its Chief Executive 
Office: on 29 April 2009 the Board of Directors accepted the resignation of Luca Majocchi, the 
CEO who guided Seat since the acquisition by private equity investors in 2003; its position was 
taken by Alberto Cappellini, with the mandate to transform Seat and implement the new strategy 
focused on the supply of web-based marketing services. 
Despite the approval of the new business plan, economic and financial results of 2009 were 
characterized by reduction in revenues of 11.7 % and reduction in EBITDA of 12.4 %: their 
monetary amount were respectively 1,214 million Euro and 528 million Euro. In line with the 
new strategy, web-based services increased their diffusion among customers, but revenues of 
the overall business unit of Italian Directories fell by 10 % and became lower than 1,000 million 
Euro. Furthermore, revenues originated from UK Directories decreased by a rate of 31 %, which 
included the negative consequence of currency depreciation. Also, UK operations were 
involved in the restructuring of the pension funds for local employees, which presented 
financial disequilibria. Net result of the overall Seat group presented a loss of 35 million Euro, 
affected by the impairment of goodwill and intangible assets for 91 million Euro. 
 
4.6.2. Year 2010: Emission of Senior Secured Bonds 
In 2010, generalized financial crisis, low aggregate expense on advertising by business, and 
decline in attractiveness of traditional paper products contributed to the continuation of 
reduction in revenues. Total revenues were equal to 1,039 million Euro, presenting a decline of 
14.43 % with respect to the previous year. EBITDA was equal to 416 million Euro, declining 
by 21 %: consequently, directors impaired goodwill value by an amount of 674 million Euro. 
The impairment, almost entirely attributed to goodwill referred to Italian Directories business 
unit, reflected the deterioration of future perspectives predicted by external equity analysts in 
term of negative long-term growth rate and higher discount rate, and the high risk of refinancing 
outstanding debt. The impairment heavily affected the profit and loss statement, which closed 
with a loss equal to 716 million Euro. Consequently, book value of shareholders’ equity was 
reduced to an amount of 229 million Euro. 
With respect to Seat operating performance, Italian Directories revenues were equal to 797.5 
million Euro: inside the division, traditional products declined by 7 %, while internet products 
grew by 36.7 %. Revenues from UK directories declined by 13.3 %, and revenues from 
Directory Assistance declined by 14 %, because of the dismissal of two Italian call centres. 
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Please note that economic and financial data for fiscal year 2010 presented in the paragraph 
have been taken from figures reperformed in 2011 financial statement for sake of continuity 
with future data. As it will be explained in Chapter 5, the reason is that since 30 June 2010, SPG 
changed its accounting criteria for recognition of revenues in its profit and loss statement, to 
reflect the predominance of internet advertising services, provided on a continual time basis, 
on traditional paper publishing, so figures are not fully comparable with 2009 performance. 
Moving to the financial situation, it resulted that Seat was asked to completely reimburse 
outstanding financial debt on a four-year time horizon. In fact, according to information 
disclosed in 2008 and 2009 financial statements, after the covenant resetting and increase of 
capital in year 2009, Seat was obliged to repay about 240 million Euro per year in 2010 and 
2011, plus an amount of 560 million Euro in 2012 as complete reimbursement of the Tranche 
A. Moreover, in 2013 Tranche B would have expired for an amount of 470 million, and in 2014 
it would have been the turn of the Lighthouse bond, with a principal of 1,300 million Euro. 
Unfortunately, the continual deterioration of revenues and EBITDA levels from years 2008 to 
2010 was reflected in the reduction of cash generation, putting a threat on the firm’s capability 
to honour the expiring obligations on repayment of principal and interest of the financial loans. 
The disequilibria in the financial structure were recognized by rating agencies Standard & 
Poor’s and Moody’s, which downgraded the corporate rating to B- in November 2010. 
For all these reasons, with the help of primary investment banks, SPG conducted negotiation 
with the senior creditor, The Royal Bank of Scotland, for the refinancing of the debt structure. 
The parties agreed on the issuance of long term bond loans whose proceeds had been devoted 
to anticipated reimbursement of the senior loan and resetting of financial covenants; because of 
the higher riskiness of the original loan, Royal Bank of Scotland increased the spread by other 
75 basis points for the residual amount of the principal. Through the bonds, Seat refinanced its 
senior debt by deferring the obligation to reimburse the principal to year 2017. Therefore, the 
first bond loan was issued at a nominal amount of 550 million Euro, nominal interest rate of 
10.5 % and expiration date on 31 January 2017. The bond loan was bought by investors below 
the par value, allowing Seat to collect 536 million Euro at an actual interest rate of 11 %, and it 
permitted the reimbursement to RBS bank of 507 million Euro, as partial repayment of the 
Tranche A of the senior loan. At the end of the year, Seat issued another bond loan, with nominal 
amount of 200 million, nominal interest rate of 10.5 % and expiration date on the 31 January 
2017. The result of the issuance was worse than the first bond, with a collection of 180 million 
Euro (90 % of the nominal) at an actual interest rate of 12.85 %. After the collection of proceeds, 
The Royal Bank of Scotland obtained the advance reimbursement of 172.4 million Euro. 
Both senior bonds were guaranteed by the same set of collaterals secured in favour of Royal 
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Bank of Scotland, except for the privilege on fixed assets with book value not lower than 25,000 
Euro. So, bond holders received specific real guarantees provided by Seat itself on Pagine Gialle 
and Pagine Bianche trademarks, on the shares of the subsidiaries Thomson Group and Telegate, 
plus pledges on assets withheld by the vehicles of the controlling shareholders, especially on 
their controlling stake of SPG shares. According to a specific Intercreditor Deed, it was agreed 
with The Royal Bank of Scotland that obligation arising from the bonds had the same priority 
levels with respect to the senior loan: proceeds from the eventual enforcement of collaterals 
should be distributed to bond holders and senior lenders proportionately to the nominal amount 
of the principal due.12 
Though this transaction, Seat was able to refinance almost half of its outstanding debt with The 
Royal Bank of Scotland, by reducing its obligation to repay the principal for years 2011, 2012 
and 2013 from 1,265 million Euro, computed according to the previous lending agreement, to 
666 million Euro computed at 31 December 2010. The refinanced debt was transformed in long-
term obligation, with a six years maturity. As a counterpart, the refinancing generated the rise 
in the cost of debt, from the average level of 5.8 % in 2009 to 7.6 % at the end of 2010, which 
reflected the riskiness of the big debt burden, the worldwide financial crisis and the weakness 
of Seat capability to generate strong and sustainable cash flows. 
 
4.7. YEARS 2011-2012: RESTRUCTURING OF JUNIOR DEBT 
After the conclusion of the emission of the Senior Secured Bonds in 2010, continual reduction 
of revenues and the deterioration of market performance forced Seat management to open a 
phase of negotiation with overall involved stakeholders to achieve a restructuring of the 
financial structure, to increase its solidity in a long-term horizon. The necessary financial and 
business advisors were hired in March 2011, and after the obtainment of the necessary 
formalities, Seat opened the negotiation with representatives of controlling shareholders and 
involved creditors, grouped in three committees: Bondholders committee, referred to the 
Lighthouse subordinated bonds, Senior committee, referred to bonds issued in 2010 and the 
Senior Creditor, The Royal Bank of Scotland. Seat management, supported by its advisors, 
proposed the conversion in equity capital of the subordinated loan obtained by Lighthouse 
bondholders, whose definition of details required long negotiation among involved stakeholders 
before their representatives granted their definitive approval. The final term sheet of 
restructuring was approved by Seat on 31 January 2012, and it was characterized by numerous 
legal and technical step for its implementation, since the restructuring was subject to British, 
                                                          
12 Information memorandum on Seat Pagine Gialle € 550,000,000 10.5% Senior Secured Notes Due 2017, found 
on Thomson Reuters Eikon database, page 101. 
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Luxemburg and Italian jurisdictions. The restructuring was aimed in causing a deep 
modification in ownership structure and financial structure, according to the following 
paragraphs which resume the articulated content of restructuring. 
First, financial claims held by Lighthouse bondholders were converted into ordinary shares of 
the issuing vehicle, Lighthouse International Company; then, Seat subordinated financial 
liabilities toward Lighthouse were bound to be cancelled through the merger by incorporation 
of Lighthouse into Seat and the contemporaneous extinction by confusion of the claim. As 
counterparty for the write-off of that financial liability, Lighthouse bond holders obtained the 
majority stake of the corporation resulting from the merger. More specifically, it was negotiated 
that after the merger, Lighthouse bondholders were given the 88 % of the share capital of the 
resulting company, while the former shareholders, including the private equity funds, retained 
the 12 % of the equity stake. For sake of precision, bondholders were given the 90 % of the 
shares, but at the same time incumbent shareholders received an equity warrant with symbolic 
strike price, which consented the immediate subscription of a percentage of shares equal to the 
2 % of equity capital. The nominal amount of Lighthouse bonds converted into equity was 
1,235 million Euro, and the residual debt of 65 million was converted into a new tranche of 
senior bond loan with the same contractual conditions and expiration date as the other two 
senior bond loans. 
Moving to the senior components of Seat financial structure, the outstanding loan with The 
Royal Bank of Scotland, previously due in 2012 and 2013, was modified into a unique credit 
line of 596 million Euro with expiration date on the 30 June 2016 and increased spread on 
Euribor rate equal to 5.4 %. Pre-existing senior bond loans were kept unchanged. At the end of 
the transaction and considering the positive effect of cash flows generated by business activities, 
net financial liabilities declined from 2,736 million Euro at the end of 2011 to 1,328 million 
Euro at 31 December 2012. 
Financial liabilities were assisted by a guarantee on Seat assets, issued through the total 
contribution of overall assets and liabilities of Seat Pagine Gialle S.p.A. to a non-operating 
wholly owned subsidiary, Seat Pagine Gialle Phone Services S.r.l. After the contribution, the 
name of the subsidiary changed into Seat Pagine Gialle Italia S.p.A., and all its shares had been 
pledged in favour of senior bondholders and senior lender on a pari passu basis. The 
contribution produced the effect that, in conformance with Italian Civil Code, SPG and SPG 
Italia were joint and severally liable for obligations arising from lending agreements towards 
RBS bank and Senior bondholders. SPG became a holding company devoted to the 
management of its unique asset, the total share capital of the subsidiary which effectively 
carried on the overall business activities. The constitution of SPG Italia was negotiated to 
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compromise the interest of senior creditors, who requested a guarantee on Seat property rights 
of equity capital, with interest of subordinated bond holders, who collectively asked to receive 
shares free from liens and encumbrances, together with the continuation of their listing in Milan 
Stock Exchange. 
The proposal was formally accepted by all involved stakeholders in March 2012 and the consent 
started the execution of the required legal and technical procedure, including the opening of a 
bankruptcy procedure called “administration” under British jurisdiction to permit the 
conversion of Lighthouse bonds into Lighthouse shares. The formal approval of the merger 
between Lighthouse and Seat was obtained on the 12 June 2012 by Seat extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting, and the transaction was completed on the 1 September 2012 with the 
execution of the merger and the subsequent contribution of assets to the new operating 
company.  
The restructuring procedure was conducted under the legal protection of the Certificate Plan 
ruled by article 67 paragraph 3 letter d of Italian Bankruptcy Code: SPG obtained a certification 
by Prof. Lorenzo Pozza about the susceptibility of the complex set of transactions to restructure 
the outstanding debt and to reduce the unsustainable debt exposure, aimed at the prevention of 
legal challenges in case of subsequent insolvency procedures. After the completion of the 
equitization, shares were mainly in the hands of four distressed investors, who had collected 
the Lighthouse bonds before the equitization and controlled a comprehensive stake of 39.79 % 
of outstanding shares. New shareholders nominated a new Board of Directors with Chairman 
Guido De Vivo and Chief Executive Officer Vincenzo Santelia. On this point, it is important to 
clarify that in the meantime of the restructuring procedure, the Chief Executive Officer seat 
remained vacant since the end of March 2012, because of the sudden death of Mr. Alberto 
Cappellini. 
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4.7.1. Operating and financial performance 
This paragraph presents economic and financial data from SPG official financial statements 
issued in the years of the out-of-court restructuring, resumed as usual in Table 4.8. 
 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
Revenues 1.039,2 961,8 808,8 507.9 
YoY Growth -14.4% -7.45% -15.9% -22.9% 
Core Revenues 797.5 748.5 626.7 475.1 
EBITDA 416.5 370.6 296.0 89.5 
Marginality 40.1% 34.7% 36.6% 17.6% 
EBIT (374.8) (433.0) (1,754.9) (234.4) 
Profit/Loss (716.9) (789.0) (1,049.6) (347.8)  
    
Equity 228.7 (555.1) (968.2) (1,323.4) 
Liabilities 3,613.0 3,481.8 2,130.0 2,164.0 
Intangible Assets 2,728.4 2,019.0 416.8 130.3 
Table 4.8 – Highlights of financials for fiscal years 2010-2013 – Values in million Euro 
Source: SPG official financial statements 
In details, year 2011 financial statements, which did not consider the effect of the Lighthouse 
restructuring under negotiation, are characterized by the decline of relevant financial data: total 
revenues declined by 7.45 % and its amount was below the billion threshold, equal to 962 
million Euro, while EBITDA declined by 11 %, reaching an amount of 372 million Euro. The 
performance of Italian directories business unit was equal to 748.5 million Euro, shrinking of 
6.1 % with respect to the previous year, despite the increasing in diffusion of new Internet-
based marketing services. Also, other business units presented declining revenues equal to 17.3 
% for UK Directories and 14.8 % for Directory Assistance. 
2011 profit and loss statement was characterized by another relevant impairment of goodwill 
per an amount of 696 million Euro, which determined an overall net consolidated loss of 789 
million Euro. From the balance sheet point of view, the relevant loss led to the complete erosion 
of the book value of shareholders’ equity, which presented a negative value of 555 million Euro 
at 31 December 2011. 
In 2012, revenues presented a decline of 15.5 % with respect to year 2011, reaching the level 
of 808 million Euro, and EBITDA was equal to 296 million Euro, presenting a contraction of 
20 %. The main business unit, Italian directories, reduced its revenues of 16.3 %: the decline 
was experienced by both traditional services and new web marketing services. According to the 
financial statement, the decline of Seat core business was determined by a generalized reduction 
of advertising expenses in the Italian market which impacted Seat turnover since 90 % of 
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revenues were originated from the supplying of advertising services. In addition, in 2012, Seat 
experienced high churn rate of clients determined from the cessation of the policy, adopted in 
the previous year, of renewal of annual advertising agreements before the natural expiration at 
lower price. The advanced renewal of agreements produced the partial recognition of revenues 
for services to be offered in 2012 in the previous year, deepening the revenues decline in 2012. 
Revenues from UK Directories business unit declined by 6.2 % because of natural decline of 
paper products and the stable performance of internet products. Directory Assistance division 
experienced a reduction of revenues of 15.8 % because of the continual decline of interest and 
utilization of the service. 
At the light of the general decline of all products and services offered by SPG and the situation 
of financial distress which required the heavy restructuring of financial liabilities, the economic 
result of Seat is heavily impacted by the almost total impairment of goodwill and intangible 
assets, per an amount of 1,887 million Euro. In addition, in 2012 Seat sustained extraordinary 
expenses for the complex equitization of Lighthouse bonds per an amount of 68 million Euro, 
of which 43 million Euro in the interest of financial creditors. As counterparty, the restructuring 
determined a positive income of 670 million Euro resulting from the writing-off of a 
corresponding amount of financial liabilities. The bottom line of 2012 profit and loss statement 
presented a loss of 1,050 million Euro, determining a negative book value of shareholders’ 
equity equal to – 968 million Euro and requiring the adoption of additional extraordinary 
measures to restore the economic and financial equilibrium. 
 
4.8. YEARS 2013 – 2014: COMPOSITION WITH CREDITORS 
After the conclusion of the financial restructuring and the entry in charge of new Directors, 
between November 2012 and January 2013 the new Board of Directors conducted a review on 
economic result for the year 2012 and future perspective of the business. It became clear that 
actual results were much lower than forecasted in the financial documentation at the basis of 
the restructuring procedure just completed, and consequently the budget for the year 2013 
needed a downside update, at the light of the contraction in advertising expenses of Italian Small 
and Medium Enterprises. According to the contraction of the 2013 budget, management 
considered that Seat could not generate a level of cash flows sufficient to ensure the regular 
payment of principal and interests expiring in 2013, equal to about 200 million Euro. From the 
financial statements point of view, the budget contraction and deterioration of future 
perspectives required a relevant impairment of goodwill on balance sheet, which was actually 
written in 2012 financial statements, determining an enormous loss leading to negative book 
value of equity. From the legal point of view, according to articles 2446 and 2447 of Italian 
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Civil Code, the insufficient book value of shareholders’ equity required the immediate 
recapitalization or the opening of the corporate liquidation. To face this complex situation, in 
January 2013 the Board of Directors stopped the payment of expiring financial expenses, and 
on 6 February 2013, SPG, jointly with SPG Italia, filed a petition to Turin Court for the 
obtainment of a period automatic stay (so-called Concordato con riserva), aimed at the 
presentation of a proposal of composition with creditors to the bankruptcy court within 120 
days. The petition for the automatic stay blocked eventual enforcement actions by financial 
creditors and put the business under the supervision of a judicial supervision and a delegated 
judge. Under the automatic stay, the ordinary conduct of the business was permitted, with the 
limit to not execute payments of debts originated before the petition date without the consent 
of the judge. The petition blocked also the legal obligation for shareholders to restore the level 
of share capital or deliberate the liquidation of the business because of the negative book value 
of shareholders’ equity. 
The first proposal for the settlement of the crisis was presented on 28 June 2013, and it was 
characterized by a mixed solution in cash and equity. Seat proposed the partial deferred payment 
of financial debts together with the conversion in equity of their unpaid portion; for other non-
preferred debts, they were partly repaid with dilations. After the submission of the proposal to 
Turin bankruptcy court, the Court officially admitted it on 10 July 2013. 
According to the report issued by Dott. Ranalli and submitted by Seat to the bankruptcy court, 
the proposal planned the settlement of distress claim and modification of financial and equity 
structure according to following conditions: 
- Total cash payment of non-financial preferred claims and preferred quota of financial 
claims, on the limit of liquidation value of pledged assets; 
- Cash payment of non-preferred share of financial claims per an amount close to 20 % 
of their nominal value, according to a payment schedule in eight instalments from 2015 
to 2018. 
- Assignation to financial creditors of the 88 % of share capital of the corporation 
resulting from the restructuring, through emission of new ordinary shares. 
- For non-preferred non-financial claims, Seat proposed the cash payment of the 60 % of 
their nominal value, deferred into five annual instalments. 
Unfortunately, during the second semester of year 2013, Seat management and involved 
stakeholders reviewed the business perspectives, expecting a substantial downturn in future 
volume of operations and generation of cash flows. The outcome of review required the 
presentation of a new proposal of composition with creditors on 16 December 2013, whose 
content is described in detail in the following paragraph. 
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It must be noted that in the same period, the British subsidiaries Thomson and TDL Infomedia, 
presiding the business unit of UK Directories, exited de facto from the control of Seat group 
because they were subjected to the bankruptcy procedure called “administration” under British 
law. The main reason of financial distress and insolvency of the British subsidiaries was the 
underfinancing of the pension fund of TDL Infomedia employee, and the impossibility for the 
subsidiary to cover the resulting disequilibria. 
 
4.8.1. Content of the definitive proposal 
The preliminary step of the proposal of composition was referred on the corporate level and it 
was characterized by the planned merger by incorporation between the holding company SPG 
and its operating subsidiary SPG Italia. The merger was aimed at the reduction of general and 
administrative costs, at the light of the fact that the holding company did not carry on any 
activity except for management of the controlling right on the operating subsidiary. 
From the point of view of the business strategy, Seat proposed the reduction of industrial costs 
through the merger of the two historical products, Pagine Gialle and Pagine Bianche in a single 
paper product. Anyway, corporate strategy was based on the refocusing on Italian market as 
core market, and to strengthen the business segments of web-based advertising and creation of 
websites, to be developed also through acquisition of smaller firms operating in the same 
industry. Seat corporate strategy prescribed the dismissal of non-core subsidiaries: on the first 
semester of 2014, pending the composition procedure, SPG sold its equity stake of the 
subsidiary Cipi, operating in the market of promotional gadgets. At the same time, Seat acquired 
the total equity stake of Glamoo, a firm operating in the segment of web couponing and 
advertising. 
With respect to the settlement of liabilities, creditors were grouped in four classes, and in 
compliance with legal prescriptions, claims towards the holding SPG were kept separate from 
claims towards the operating subsidiary SPG Italia, although the two legal entities were bound 
to be merged after the final approval of the composition. The classes were formed as followings: 
- Class A, constituted by credits with preference rights, per an amount of 24.9 million 
Euro referred to SPG Italia and 6.4 million Euro referred to SPG; 
- Class B, constituted by credits originating from the lending agreement with The Royal 
Bank of Scotland, per an amount of 668 million Euro, jointly and severally due by SPG 
and SPG Italia; 
- Class C, constituted by credits towards senior bondholders, per an amount of 858.6 
million Euro, jointly and severally due by SPG and SPG Italia; 
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- Class D, composed by the other non-preferred credits, per an amount of 71.6 million 
Euro referred to SPG Italia and 13.3 million Euro referred to SPG. 
 
After the formation of classes of claimants, SPG and SPG Italia proposed the definitive 
settlement of liabilities as following: 
- Class A credits to be fully paid in cash with recognition of legal interest within four 
months from the approval of the composition; 
- Class B credits to be split into preferred share of 17.8 million Euro and non-preferred 
share of 650.2 million Euro. Preferred share was deemed to be fully paid in cash, while 
about non-preferred share, it was proposed the satisfaction through assignation of shares 
of the new corporation, according to the following ratios: 596 shares per Euro of SPG 
liability, equal to the total amount of the principal due, and 3,834 shares per Euro of 
SPG Italia liability, corresponding to residual part of principal after the cash payment; 
- Class C credits to be split into preferred share of 21.5 million Euro and non-preferred 
share of 837.1 million Euro. Preferred share was deemed to be fully paid in cash, while 
about non-preferred share, it was proposed the satisfaction through assignation of shares 
of the new corporation, equal to the total amount of the principal due, and 3,699 shares 
per Euro of SPG Italia liability, corresponding to residual part of principal after the cash 
payment; 
- Class D credits to be only partly satisfied on cash: the new corporation promised to pay 
the 5 % of nominal value of SPG liabilities, and the 20 % of nominal value of SPG Italia 
liabilities. 
 
The classification of liabilities had been done according to the legal provision on composition 
with creditors: apart from the Class A, grouping all the credits with general preference rights 
directly originated by the law, financial creditors were included into Classes B and C, while the 
other credits, mainly composed by trade payables towards suppliers, were grouped into Class 
D. Because of the financial nature of creditors of Classes B and C, reflecting the higher risk 
propensity of the claimants, the proposed settlement for these classes is substantially constituted 
by the total ownership of the distressed firm. By contrary, the non-financial nature of Class D 
creditors suggested Seat to propose the cash settlement of that category of distressed liabilities. 
It must be noted that non-preferred quotas of Classes B and C credits and Class D credits held 
the voting right for the approval of the composition in the specific hearing called by bankruptcy 
court. The result of that classification of claims is that the majority prescribed by Italian 
Bankruptcy Law is reached if the distressed firm obtains the positive vote by the majority of 
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the two classes of financial creditors. 
With respect to the separate classification of financial liabilities, it was motivated by the 
presence of collateralization in fixed assets with book value higher than 25,000 Euro only in 
favour of The Royal Bank of Scotland. Because of the higher collateralization of the senior 
loan, Class B presents higher ranking in hierarchy of priority rights, which is reflected in the 
offering of slightly higher number of shares per Euro of non-preferred claims belonging to Class 
B than the corresponding claims of Class C. This classification of financial debt in two classes, 
together with the legal provisions on bond loans produced peculiar effects about the approval 
of the proposal: Class B is formed by a unique creditor with voting right (RBS bank), so the 
inevitable outcome of Class B voting was the unanimous consent or rejection. Analogously, 
Class C voting rights are given to each of the three tranches of the shareholder loan (550 million, 
200 million and 65 million): each tranche has only one voting right to be expressed through a 
representative who refers the outcome of the separate meeting where single bondholders 
express their opinion and they decide according to majority rules. For these reasons, it can be 
affirmed that the overall outcome of the composition depended only on the decisions taken by 
senior creditor and senior bondholders. 
To quantify the treatment of financial creditors, it is needed to describe the ownership structure 
and estimate the value of equity capital of Seat after the implementation of the proposal. The 
ownership structure of the corporation resulting from the merger of the holding and the 
operating company is defined by adding shares to be issued in execution of the composition 
with creditors to pre-existing shares. With respect to the estimation of equity capital, it was 
determined by the financial advisor KPMG Advisory in 200 million Euro, corresponding to a 
value per share – after the equitization of financial debt – equal to 0.000031 Euro. 
The ownership structure of the reorganized business, as resulting from the transaction is 
resumed in Table 4.9. 
 
Shares Percentage Estimate of Value Owners 
16 billion 0.25 % 498,000 Euro SPG former shareholders 
2,898.1 billion 45.10 % 89.8 million Euro The Royal Bank of Scotland 
3,512.5 billion 54.65 % 108.9 million Euro Senior Secured Bondholders 
Table 4.9 – SPG shareholding structure resulting from the equitization of financial claims 
Source: Slideshow attached to KPMG Advisory opinion, slide 7, found on 
https://www.italiaonline.it/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/SPG_Relazione_finale.pdf 
Pending the procedure of composition with creditors, on 9 May 2014, the Board of Directors 
of SPG received from D-Mail a proposal for the integration of D-Mail into Seat Group. D-Mail 
was operating in the segment of publishing and e-commerce of durable goods, and it was facing 
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a situation of financial distress since it had filed the judicial approval of restructuring 
agreement. The proposal was characterized by the acquisition of Seat by D-Mail through an 
offer in cash and D-Mail shares to financial creditors.13 After a careful examination of the 
proposal, Seat Board of Directors declined the proposal since it was judged to present a high 
level of riskiness and uncertainty. The features of the proposal were not sufficient to determine 
the stop of the procedures for the approval of the pending composition with creditors, and the 
consequent starting of the preparation of a new composition with creditors centred in the 
integration of both group. Directors highlighted the fact that an eventual procedure of 
integration between Seat and D-Mail could be valued and eventually pursued upon willing of 
the new ownership structure after the approval and execution of the pending composition. 
 
4.8.2. Compliance of the proposal with Best Satisfaction Test 
As seen in Chapter 2, the continuation of the going concern within the procedure of composition 
with creditors shall be functional to the best satisfaction of creditors “in comparison with the 
concretely practicable alternatives”, and the proposal of composition shall offer them at least 
what they would receive in case of bankruptcy liquidation of the business. These points, 
conditioning the legal regularity of the proposal, had been analysed in the report of judicial 
supervisor Prof. Enrico Laghi released according to art. 172 of Italian Bankruptcy Code for the 
voting of creditors and in the report by Dott. Riccardo Ranalli attached to the definitive proposal 
of composition. Both experts, according to the legal doctrine, define the best solution of Seat 
crisis not in comparison with the infinite corporate strategies available for the recovery of 
distressed business, but compared with the other applicable legal instruments: the bankruptcy 
liquidation and the extraordinary administration. 
Answering to a specific request of Turin Bankruptcy Court, Prof. Laghi states at page 149 and 
followings of its report, that continuation of the going concern under composition with creditors 
(pursuant art. 186-bis of Bankruptcy Code) is the best solution to ensure preservation of value 
for the distressed firm. In fact, the applicable alternative of the provisional going concern under 
bankruptcy “would inevitably damage the preservation of customer relationships [since] the 
continuation of the provisional going concerns it subject to the valuation of the creditors’ 
committee on a three-months basis”. It follows that the provisional going concern damages the 
business value, impeding the renewal of advertising agreements with customers, who trust “in 
the business continuation with indefinite time horizon and not within a definite time limit”. 
Also, “the business is founded on the utilization of intangible assets […] bounded to a rapid 
                                                          
13 https://www.milanofinanza.it/news/seat-d-holding-offre-piu-cash-e-azioni-dmail-in-concambio-
201406101538504234 
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and irreversible loss of value in any scenario characterized by the technical cessation of the 
going concern”. Furthermore, in the second report by Dott. Ranalli (page 145) it is specified 
that in case the churn rate becomes close to the 30 %, and substitution of clients does not take 
place because of uncertainty on supplying of advertising services, the economic equilibrium is 
not reached and provisional going concern damages the creditors. 
With respect to the alternative of extraordinary administration, the report states that the latter 
institute is aimed at realizing the restructuring and the recovery of equilibrium in a distressed 
firm without considering the interest of creditors; in that framework the safeguard of business 
continuity is always ensured, and if necessary it is realized at expenses of debt claimholders.  
Then, the report by Dott. Ranalli estimates the liquidation value on separate basis of assets 
owned by the two companies, to compare amount of estimated proceeds from liquidation with 
the proposed settlement of distressed claims under the composition. Table 4.10 resumes the 
estimated proceeds from forced liquidation of SPG Italia assets:14 
 
Assets Liquidation Value 
Customer Database 0.9 million 
Trademarks 14.9 million 
Pledged fixed assets 0.9 million 
Other fixed assets 0.8 million 
Telegate shares 22.7 million 
Telegate holding liquidation 1.1 million 
Consodata shares 3.0 million 
Paper inventory 2 million 
Accounts receivables 68.8 million 
Liquidity 186.1 million 
Effect from continuity -7 million 
Total assets 294.3 million 
Table 4.10 – Estimation of proceeds from liquidation of SPG Italia 
Source: Attestation of the modified proposal of composition with creditors, page 142, found on 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/h5seyqc1tx4tih3/Ranalli%20-%20Seconda%20attestazione%20161-186-
bis%20SEAT%20PG.pdf?dl=0 
  
At this point, Dott. Ranalli considers that in case of interruption of the going concern, additional 
non-preferred liabilities, with respect to claims quantified in the proposal of composition with 
creditors, shall be satisfied by the bankruptcy procedure: reimbursement of advanced payments 
for services not provided, estimated in 44.2 million Euro, and reduction of real estate leasing 
                                                          
14 Second Attestation by Dott. Riccardo Ranalli ex article 161 Italian Bankruptcy Code, attached to the 
modification proposed by Seat on 20 December 2013, page 142. 
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for corporate offices estimated in 28 million Euro. Analogously, in case of discontinuity, 
bankruptcy procedure shall satisfy additional preferred liabilities for severance payments of 
employees and commercial agents, equal to a total amount of 37.2 million Euro, which were 
not included in the proposal because of the assumption of business continuity. 
Proceeds from liquidation of assets, estimated in 294.3 million shall be devoted to the integral 
payment of procedural expenses and preferred claims, whose sum is equal to 109.4 million. The 
residual amount of 184.9 million is devoted to the payment of non-preferred creditors on a 
strictly proportional basis. The ratio between nominal amount of non-preferred claims and sum 
available for their satisfaction is 11.08 % (184.9 divided by 1,668.2), lower than 20 % rate 
corresponding to satisfaction proposed to Class D creditors and to the estimate of equity value 
attributed to financial creditors. 
With respect to the holding company SPG, the liquidation value of its assets is equal to 27.7 
million Euro, almost entirely constituted by credits for taxes on income. Preferred claims and 
procedural expenses sum to 6.6 million, almost equal to the value resulting from the proposal 
of composition. Total non-preferred claims are equal to 1,573 million, of which 1,526 million 
referred to financial claims according to joint and several liability resulting from the 
contribution of operating assets and liabilities. The difference between 27.7 million and 6.6 
million is devoted to the satisfaction of non-preferred creditors, who receive the 1.35 % of the 
nominal value of their claims. It results that in this case too, proposed satisfaction under 
composition is higher than estimated proceeds from bankruptcy liquidation. 
Moving to the analysis of collateralization and preference right, it is important to remember that 
the applicable legislation confer to financial creditors the right to obtain the priority assignation 
of proceeds from forced liquidation of collaterals issued by SPG and SPG Italia at conclusion 
of the restructuring in year 2012. To ensure the fairness and the legal compliance of the content 
of composition proposal, the distressed firm is requested to present the court a report from an 
independent expert who estimated the net value obtainable from forced sell of the encumbered 
assets, according to article 160 paragraph 2 of Italian Bankruptcy Code. At this purpose, SPG 
and SPG Italia appointed Dott. Marcello Pollio, who conducted and reviewed a separate 
estimation of collaterals with the help of specialists. With respect to the operating firm, 
encumbered assets were constituted by Pagine Gialle and Pagine Bianche trademarks, equity 
investments in the subsidiaries Telegate A.G. and Thomson Ltd, and the overall set of fixed 
assets with book value not lower than 25,000 Euro. 
Main trademarks had been valued in a scenario of bankruptcy liquidation with business 
discontinuity according to “Relief from Royalty Method”, implying the computation of present 
value, discounted at the proper cost of capital, of royalties which are likely to be obtained under 
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a fair licensing agreement about trademarks under estimation. About the revenues generation 
by the trademarks, the expert assumed the business discontinuity and the subsequent transfer of 
the trademarks, which results in a reduction of revenue stream estimated into 30 % in the first 
year after the transfer and progressive recovery in a seven years’ time horizon. Conducting a 
separate estimation of revenues from paper operations and internet operations, because of 
different business cycle of the products, then computing the fair percentage of royalty on 
revenues and discounting the royalties stream at the cost of capital, resulting trademarks value 
are presented in Table 4.11. To obtain their net liquidation value, cost of maintenance and the 
costs of competitive procedure for dismissal must be deducted from market value estimated in 
a discontinuity scenario. Dott. Pollio estimates these costs in the 5 % of market value, leading 
to a net value of 14.9 million Euro. The overall computation is resumed in Table 4.11.  
 
 Estimated value 
Pagine Bianche – Paper 1.8 million 
Pagine Bianche – Internet 1.8 million 
Pagine Gialle – Paper 1.5 million 
Pagine Gialle – Internet 10.6 million 
Maintenance and procedural costs -0.8 million 
Net liquidation value 14.9 million 
Table 4.11 – Estimate of liquidation value of SPG Italia secured assets 
Source: Dott. Pollio report, page 62, found on https://www.dropbox.com/s/r1zxvxgetn8sonm/Pollio 
%20-%20Attestazione%20160%20co%202%20SEAT%20PG.pdf?dl=0 
 
Then, the expert estimates value of Telegate shares directly and indirectly withheld by SPG 
Italia and pledged in favour of the senior creditors: the operating firm directly owns the 16.24 
% of Telegate equity capital, plus another stake of 61.13 % through the wholly-owned 
subsidiary Telegate Holding Gmbh, incorporated under German law. Remembering that the 
shares of the subsidiary Telegate A.G. are listed in the Frankfurt stock exchange, Dott. Pollio 
did not trust the value expressed by the stock market since the majority stake was withheld by 
SPG Italia and competition for control of Telegate was not admitted; value of the equity stake 
directly owned by SPG Italia was therefore estimated through Discounted Cash Flows method, 
multiples determined by equity markets and multiples from recent transaction in similar 
industries. The expert estimated an Enterprise Value between 58 and 67 million; adding Net 
Cash to this value, total equity value ranges between 140.3 million and 149.3 million. Dividing 
the central value of the range, 144.8 million by the number of outstanding shares, 19.1 million, 
value per share is estimated in 7.58 Euro. The 16.24 % of total equity value is equal to 23.51 
million Euro, so the value of directly owned equity stake of Telegate is downside rounded in 23 
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million Euro. 
With respect to the indirectly-owned controlling stake of Telegate, its valuation was not 
requested since the proposal of composition assumed its dismissal through a competitive 
auction, whose proceeds would have been wholly and directly assigned to senior financial 
creditors, according to the existing pledge, in addition to cash and share payments promised 
from the proposal. In June 2014, one month before the public hearing for the approval of 
composition by impaired creditors, Seat filed a modification of the proposal in the sense that 
the whole set of shares owned by Telegate Holding would be distributed to financial creditors 
in proportion to financial claims, together with cash distribution of dividends the holding was 
entitled to receive during the composition procedure and precautionary deposited into a blocked 
bank account. 
Moreover, the expert, in the estimation of values of the UK-based subsidiaries Thomson and 
TDL Infomedia, determined a null economic value of their equity stakes. In fact, as previously 
mentioned, the UK subsidiaries were liable toward the pension fund of employees of about 26 
million Euro, which determined a negative value of equity both on book value and on market 
value and caused the opening of bankruptcy procedure of administration. 
Analogously, in a separate report, released in the interest of the holding company SPG, Dott. 
Pollio determined a null equity value of its equity investment into the subsidiary SPG Italia 
pledged in favour of financial creditors. The null value is determined by the relevant 
disequilibrium between Enterprise Value and outstanding financial liabilities, and the 
insufficient generation of cash flows by the operating business, situation which is at the basis 
of the petition for composition with creditors.15  
Finally, Dott. Pollio provides the estimation of fixed assets with book value not lower than 
25,000 Euro, pledged in favour of The Royal Bank of Scotland. The report states that “assets 
are constituted by informatic devices (telephone and computers) used by the company and 
containing the databases. Assets presents very high technical obsolescence and before the 
dismissal they have to be subjected to a careful cleaning of hardware from software and 
information.” (Page 54) With the help of an external consultant, liquidation value of those assets 
was estimated by applying to historical cost a devaluation rate determined in relation to cost of 
dismission, grade of marketability, separability and rapid advance of technologies: the 
devaluation rate ranged between 75 % and 98 %. Finally, total liquidation value of those devices 
was estimated into 930,000 Euro. 
In conclusion, the report estimated the value of encumbered assets withheld by SPG Italia equal 
                                                          
15 Report from Dott. Ranalli attached to the First Proposal of Composition of July 2013, page 323-324. 
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38.5 million Euro, of which 37.6 million Euro are bound to be shared among senior lender and 
senior bondholders on a pari passu basis, while the residual quota of 0.9 million Euro is devoted 
to the satisfaction of obligations towards The Royal Bank of Scotland. 
 
4.8.3. Approval and execution of the composition 
The definitive approval and implementation of the proposal of composition was subjected to 
several procedural steps: after the preliminary admission by Turin Bankruptcy Court, it required 
the verification by the judicial supervisor, the obtainment of prescribed majorities in the voting 
of creditors and finally the definitive approval by the Court. In the meantime, SPG shareholders 
were called in an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting to approve the increase of equity capital 
through the conversion of financial credits in shares and the resulting shift of control rights to 
financial creditors. The passage was quite critical because of the absence of direct shareholders’ 
interest in the approval of the operation since after the execution they would be almost integrally 
diluted. Furthermore, after the filing for composition with creditors, distressed investment funds 
who had accumulated a relevant stake of Seat equity through the equitization of Lighthouse 
bond, rightly after the opening of the composition had entirely sold their shares. The 
consequence was that equity ownership was totally spread among small shareholders, making 
more and more difficult to obtain the prescribed majorities for the approval of the resolution by 
shareholders’ meeting. To help the approval of the opening of equity capital by shareholders, 
Seat proposed the issuance of 339 billion equity warrants to be divided for free among 
shareholders participating to the meeting. The equity warrants would have expired in April 2016 
and they granted the possibility to subscribe new shares of the restructured company, 
corresponding to a comprehensive stake of 5 % of equity capital, at a strike price measured by 
average market prices of shares in the four months period after the equitization of financial 
claims. Finally, the operations on equity capital were approved by the shareholders’ meeting on 
4 March 2014. 
Then, the public hearing for approval of the composition by creditors took place on 10 July 
2014 and the outcome was largely positive: the proposal was approved with the 99.79 % of 
favourable votes for the holding SPG and the 99.51 % of favourable votes for the operating 
company SPG Italia. As a result, the Bankruptcy Court called a public hearing on 26 September 
2014 for the definitive approval of the composition and the examination of eventual oppositions 
by creditors.16 After the latter hearing, the Court ascertained the absence of oppositions by 
dissenting creditors and on 3 October 2014 it definitively approved the content of the 
                                                          
16 https://www.italiaonline.it/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/01082014_COS_ESITO_ADUNANZA_CREDITORI_ITA_def.pdf  
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composition with creditors, which became legally binding for the business and all its 
claimholders.17 
At that point, Seat put in execution the agreed complex transactions aimed at the modification 
of share capital and ownership structure: the first transaction was the realization of the merger 
by incorporation of SPG Italia into the holding SPG, which became effective on 24 October 
2014. 
At that point, the Board of Directors, considering the number of warrants and shares to be issued 
and the consequent difficulties in trading huge number of security and in price formation, 
decided, in conformance to the outcome of extraordinary shareholders’ meeting of 4 March, to 
group new and existing shares and new warrants according to the ratio of 1 security per 100 
existing or bound to be issued through conversion of impaired financial claims. After the 
definitive approval by the regulatory authority, Consob, of documentation for listing of new 
shares in Milan Stock Exchange submitted by Seat, on 22 December 2014 the following 
operations were simultaneously executed: 
- Reduction of share capital to 120.000 Euro without modification of the number of 
existing shares; 
- Increase of share capital to 19.88 million Euro through the issuance of about 6,410 
billion shares at unitary price of 0.000031 Euro, to be settled via the contribution of 
impaired financial claims belonging to Classes B and C in the composition with 
creditors. 
- Immediate grouping of ordinary shares and saving shares according to the ratio 1 to 100 
- Issuance of warrants to participants of shareholders’ meeting of 4 March 2014 and to 
withholders of saving shares. 
On the same date, SPG executed also all the promised payments to creditors of Classes B and 
C. Therefore, in that day they impaired financial creditors received the overall considerations 
resumed in Table 4.12. 
 
 Class B creditors Class C 
Cash – Preferred claim 17.8 million Euro 21.5 million Euro 
Cash – Telegate dividends 10.2 million Euro 13.1 million Euro 
Total Cash considerations 28 million Euro 34.5 million Euro 
Seat PG shares 2,898 million shares 3,512 million shares 
Telegate shares 5.1 million shares 6.58 million shares 
                                                          
17 
https://economia.ilmessaggero.it/flash_news/seat_pg_nessuna_opposizione_039_udienza_di_omologa_conco
rdato_preventivo-609578.html and https://www.italiaonline.it/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/OMOLOGAZIONE20DEL20CONCORDATO20PREVENTIVO.pdf  
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Table 4.123 – Considerations received by financial creditors in execution of the Composition  
Source: Personal elaboration from Press release on 17 December 2004 available on 
https://www.italiaonline.it/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/17122014PressReleaseCPExecution 
ITADEF.pdf and Information Memorandum for the listing of new SPG shares 
After the execution of the settlement, it was ascertained that former financial creditors, both 
bondholders and The Royal Bank of Scotland, had transferred their claims to specialized 
distressed investors, who collectively obtained a controlling stake in equity capital of the 
restructured firm. In fact, according to financial statements of year 2014, the reference 
shareholders, in their quality of managers of distressed investment funds, were the followings: 
- GoldenTree Asset Management with the 27.16 % of equity stake 
- Marc Lasry with the 23.73 % of equity stake. 
The completion of the operations on equity capital and the subsequent change of control, 
together with the cash settlement of claims belonging to the Classes A and D, closed the long 
phase of restructuring of financial liabilities, except for the financial leasing on the corporate 
headquarters, and permitted the Board of Directors, together with the new owners, to seek new 
strategic option for restarting the process of value creation. 
 
4.8.4. Litigations 
The procedure of composition with creditors, characterized by the mandatory renegotiation of 
pending contracts, guaranteed by the possibility of the distressed firm to file for the breach of 
unfavourable agreement, is very likely to cause litigations with the contractual counterparty, 
interested in keeping unchanged the contract under execution. This paragraph describes the 
contentious renegotiation of two relevant executory agreements: the contract for the printing of 
paper products, and the real estate leasing for the corporate headquarters. Furthermore, the deep 
analysis on business perspective conducted by the external professionals involved into the 
procedural aspects of the composition, together with the shift of control in the hands of financial 
creditors, led to the promotion of a litigation versus Seat directors in charge from the leveraged 
transaction to the completion of the equitization of Lighthouse bonds. 
With respect to the printing contract, in the petition for the admission to the composition 
procedure, Seat asked the bankruptcy court to declare the termination of the long-term contract 
regulating the supplying of printing services for paper directories, with the printer Rotosud – 
Ilte group. According to report of the judicial supervisor Dott. Laghi, the petition was motivated 
by the alleged technical incapability of the supplier to provide the new publishing product 
resulting from the merger of both traditional products, by the level of price higher that 
competitors and by the presence of pending lawsuits for damages. Since both companies were 
interested in the continuation of the supplying contract, Seat withdrew the petition for judicial 
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resolution and the parties signed an agreement to settle the dispute. Finally, Seat and Rotosud 
agreed to terminate the former printing contract and to substitute it with a new three-years 
agreement presenting economic conditions aligned to best offers in the market, together with 
the payment from Seat to Rotosud of a una-tantum compensation of about 10 million Euro. The 
transaction was approved by the bankruptcy court on 12 June 2014; and on 16 June 2014 the 
external expert Dott. Ranalli recognized the positive effect of the settlement on Seat equity 
value. (Page 56) 
The litigation related to the leasing agreement with Leasint refers to the acquisition of Seat 
corporate offices in Turin: the leasing was classified in Seat financial statements as financial 
leasing, with recognition of the real estate value in the asset side of the balance sheet and the 
present value of leasing instalments in the liability side. According to Dott. Ranalli, the 
anticipated termination of leasing agreements would increase the equity value of the 
restructured business because of the reduction of financial liabilities. In this case too, after a 
long negotiation, Seat withdrew the judicial petition and both parties dismissed the litigation 
reaching a transaction agreement. Through the agreement, which became binding on 31 March 
2015, Seat and Leasint terminated in advance five out seven leasing agreements, with the una-
tantum payment by Seat to the leasing company of a total sum of 3.2 million Euro as 
indemnification for the anticipated termination. 
With respect to legal suit for damages proposed in the company interest versus Seat directors 
in charge from year 2003 to year 2012, the ordinary shareholders’ meeting of 4 March 2014 
approved a resolution for the opening of the litigation. The litigation was based on an 
investigation conducted by a legal consultant, who alleged the erosion of equity value through 
non-necessary investments and financial expenses. According to the report written by the legal 
consultant in the shareholders’ meeting interest (for sake of brevity, hereinafter the “Legal 
Report”)18, former directors were responsible for damages towards Seat with respect to the 
following transactions: 
- Acquisition of the majority stake of SPG by private equity funds in year 2003 and, 
especially, distribution of the extraordinary dividend in year 2004; 
- Acquisition of the German subsidiary Wer Liefert Was in 2007 and its subsequent 
dismissal after a year, with a loss of 79.5 million Euro; 
- Restructuring of financial debt in 2010 through the issuance of Senior Secured Bonds, 
characterized by high interest rate; 
- Resignation of Mr. Luca Majocchi as CEO and the non-competition agreement; 
                                                          
18 https://www.italiaonline.it/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/Relazione__CdiA_Seat_ex_art_125_ter_TUF_def.pdf 
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- Restructuring undertaken in 2012 resulting in the equitization of Lighthouse 
subordinated bonds. 
 
The complex lawsuit was opened in Turin Court, together with the petition from Seat about the 
adoption of precautionary measures on assets and personal properties in the hand of the 
counterparties, to augment probability to obtain an actual compensation for damages eventually 
ascertained by the court. 
At the end of year 2014, Seat received a proposal for the settlement of the litigation submitted 
by a primary legal firm in the interest of former directors. In the document, the counterparties, 
together with statutory auditors and the private equity firms promoting the acquisition, 
committed to immediately pay a sum of 30 million Euro in exchange for the withdrawal of 
judicial initiatives for recognition and indemnification of damages. At the light of the uncertain 
outcome of the litigation, the long time required for the trial, the complexities in the collection 
of evidences and in liquidation of eventual indemnifications, Seat directors called the ordinary 
shareholders’ meeting on the 27 January 2015 for the examination of the settlement proposal. 
In that date, Seat shareholders, as resulting after the execution of composition with creditors, 
approved the proposal and definitively dismissed the litigation, with the obtainment of the 
agreed compensation. 
 
4.8.5. Economic performance during the composition 
Moving from technical aspects of the composition to economic performance resulting from 
annual financial statements, Table 4.13 presents relevant financial data of years 2013 and 2014, 
with 2012 and 2015 for comparison. 
 
 
2012 
(Comparable) 
2013 2014 2015 
Revenues 659,0 507.9 412.1 374.9 
YoY Growth -31.5% -22.9% -18.9% -7.91% 
Core Revenues 626.7 475.1 389.9 357.1 
EBITDA 228.9 89.5 32.6 26.3 
Marginality 34.7% 17.6% 7.91% 6.93% 
EBIT (1,756.5) (234.4) (25.5) (26.3) 
Profit/Loss (1,049.6) (347.8) 1.375,0 (19.1)  
    
Equity (968.2) (1,323.4) 174.3 160.9 
Liabilities 2,130.0 2,164.0 369.0 326.2 
Intangible Assets 416.8 130.3 121.1 111.7 
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Table 4.134 – Highlights of financials for fiscal years 2012-2015 – Values in million Euro 
Source: SPG official financial statements; 2012 values are taken from 2013 financial statement 
In details, year 2013 was characterized by the large reduction of the scope of the business, in 
conformance with the strategic aim, declared into the proposal of composition, to refocus on 
core business of Italian directories and digital services. In fact, the proposal of composition with 
creditors made explicit the initiative for dismissal of Telegate and Cipi equity stakes, separately 
classified in the financial statement as Available for Sale assets. Furthermore, the group TDL 
Infomedia, controlling the UK Directories business unit, exited from the consolidation area of 
Seat group because of its situation of insolvency. These phenomena impacted on the 
comparability of profit and loss statements between 2012 and 2013 and required the 
reclassification of 2012 financial statements. Reclassified 2012 profit and loss statements in 
conformance of the change of perimeter presented revenues level of 659 million Euro and 
EBITDA level of 228 million Euro. Considering these factors, revenues and EBITDA for year 
2013 were equal to 508 million Euro and 89 million Euro; presenting dramatic declines of 23 
% and 61 % if compared with reclassified 2012 data. The rate of marginality 
(EBITDA/Revenues) continuously declined over the years: from 40 % in 2010, it passed to 35 
% in 2012 and it was equal to only 17.62 % in 2013. 
With respect to Italian Directories business unit, revenues declined of 24.2 % and they were 
equal to 475 million Euro: the reduction interested both traditional products and web products. 
Impairment tests on intangible assets resulted in the write-off of goodwill, trademarks and 
Customer Relationships per a total amount of 197 million Euro. 
About extraordinary area, Seat estimated and expensed the cost of composition with creditors 
per an amount of about 40 million Euro. About financial area, since the proposal of composition 
was not binding yet, in the profit and loss statement financial costs related to senior loan and 
senior bonds were completely recognized per a total amount of 130 million Euro, although they 
were bound to be offset by an extraordinary proceed after the definitive approval of the 
restructuring. Consequently, profit and loss statement closed with a loss of 348 million Euro. 
2013 fiscal year, in addition to the events connected to the composition with creditors, was also 
characterized by the dismissal of Spanish operations in Directory Assistance business unit 
withheld through the subsidiary Telegate. 
Then, financial statement of year 2014 was largely impacted by the effects of the definitive 
approval of the composition with creditors, with his revolutionary modification on liability 
structure and ownership structure. With respect to the perimeter of SPG operations, the non-
core subsidiary Cipi, operating in the business of promotional gadgets, was definitively 
dismissed and, in conformance with the modified proposal of composition with creditors, Seat 
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transferred the controlling stake of Telegate to creditors, retaining only the minority share 
directly withheld, which was reclassified into consolidated financial statement among financial 
investments. Also, in June 2014, Seat acquired the whole equity capital of Glamoo, operating 
in the business of promotional couponing, which became part of Italian directories business 
unit. As the result of the divestments operated in 2013 and 2014, it followed that, apart from 
the core business unit of Italian directories, accessory businesses at the end of 2014 consisted 
in the subsidiaries Consodata and Europages, the former operating in the market of business 
information and the latter in publishing of pan-European directories for specialized B2B users. 
Total revenues were equal to 412 million Euro, experiencing a reduction of 18.86 % on the 
previous year; at the same time EBITDA level was equal to 32.6 million Euro, shrinking of 63.5 
%, with a marginality on revenues close to 8 %. With respect to financial area of profit and loss 
statement, it presented the recognition of interest expenses matured until the date of execution 
of composition with creditors, per an amount of 128 million Euro. Financial expenses were 
more than compensated by extraordinary proceeds from write-off of distressed claims in 
conformance of the composition, with a net positive impact of 1,565 million Euro, which 
determined the total cancellation of financial liabilities. The approval of the composition 
impacted on net profit, which was therefore equal to 1,375 million Euro. The positive result of 
profit and loss statement caused the reconstitution of positive shareholders’ equity in the 
balance sheet, which passed from a negative amount of 1,342 million Euro at 31 December 
2013 to a positive level of 174 million Euro at the end of year 2014. Finally, Net Financial 
Position was characterized by the first time for net cash per 71 million Euro, considering that 
the only financial debt existing at the end of 2014 was referred to the present value of real estate 
financial leasing under renegotiation. 
The core business of Italian Directories presented a total revenues level of 389 million Euro, 
whose main components were 82 million Euro arising from paper products, with decline of 32 
%, and 250 million Euro originated by web marketing services, characterized by a decline of 
14 % with respect to the previous year. 
 
 
4.9. INTEGRATION WITH ITALIAONLINE 
Soon after the entry of new reference shareholders, in May 2015, GoldenTree funds and Avenue 
funds (under the control of Marc Lasry), decided to undertake an investment agreement for the 
integration between Seat Pagine Gialle and Italiaonline (IOL). The latter company was an 
Italian enterprise operating in the segment of internet advertising and management of web 
portals, owning as main brands Libero, Virgilio and SuperEva. The rationale for the acquisition 
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under negotiation was the creation of “the Italian leader in web advertising for big clients and 
in communication services for Small and Medium Enterprises (websites, directories and local 
advertising) […] with relevant potential for growth and representing an instrument for 
development and digitalization” 19 
The investment project was articulated into three phases: Contribution of SPG shares into IOL, 
Tender Offer promoted by IOL and the final merger of both firms. 
The execution of the investment project started with the contribution of the package of SPG 
shares owned by GoldenTree and Avenue funds into IOL through a reserved increase of equity 
capital. Therefore, since 9 September 2015, Seat experienced a change in its reference 
shareholders: the 53.87 % of outstanding shares were owned by IOL. With respect to IOL 
ownership structure, its former total shareholder Libero Acquisition was diluted to an equity 
stake of 66.2 %, while Avenue and GoldenTree funds entered in its equity capital with 
respective stakes of 15.6 % and 18.2 %. 
According to the investment agreement, and in compliance with Italian security law regulating 
changes of control, after the contribution IOL promoted a tender offer on the total number of 
SPG outstanding shares held by minority shareholders. The tender offer, not aimed at the 
delisting of the security, was opened to acceptance from 5 October 2015 to 23 October 2015 at 
the price of 0.0039 Euro per share, equal to their unitary value attributed by the contracting 
parties for the settlement of the contribution to IOL. At the expiry date, the offer was accepted 
by about half of the floating securities, producing the increase of IOL ownership stake to 78.58 
% of the ordinary shares. Then, the tender offer was re-opened until 6 November 2015, and 
after its conclusion IOL was the owner of a stake equal to 80.23 % of SPG equity capital. The 
tender offer, characterized by a potential maximum cash disbursement of 114 million Euro, was 
financed by the liquidity available in IOL corporate treasury and by the eventual access to a 
short-term loan negotiated with Banca IMI. Since the availability of the credit line was planned 
to expiry after the completion of the merger, IOL obtained the right to devote liquidity and cash 
flows of Seat to the reimbursement of financial debt. According to the result of the tender offer, 
IOL used the credit line per an amount of 41 million Euro. 
The final step of the transaction was the merger of both companies and the integration of 
respective operations. The legal procedure for the merger was started right after the conclusion 
of the tender offer and it consisted in the reverse merger of the controlling company IOL into 
its subsidiary SPG, which changed its name into Italiaonline. The legal tool of the reverse 
merger allowed the firm resulting from the merger to automatically inherit the rights connected 
                                                          
19Press Release published on the corporate website (URL: https://www.italiaonline.it/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/Project-yellow-Press-release-ex-114-TUF-ITA.pdf) on 22 May 2015 - page 2 
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with the listing of Seat in Milan stock exchange enjoyed by Seat, thus avoiding the need of 
presenting a formal request to the regulatory authority and the connected documentation. The 
reverse merger was characterized by the assignation to IOL shareholders of both Seat pre-
existing withheld by IOL and new shares ad hoc issued by Seat according to the exchange ratio 
of 1,350 Seat shares each IOL share. Moreover, the extraordinary shareholders’ meeting decided 
that, rightly after the merger, new shares and existing shares would be grouped according to the 
ratio 1 share each 1,000 shares. The grouping was aimed at permitting the better marketability 
of the equity instrument in the stock exchange, since before the merger, Seat shares were 
considered as “penny stock”. In fact, the high number of outstanding shares and low market 
value determined a unitary price lower than a Eurocent, producing difficulties in price 
formation. After the completion of the merger, which became effective on 20 June 2016, the 
resulting company, Italiaonline S.p.A. presented the following ownership structure at 30 June 
2016. 
58.82 % Libero Acquisition 
13.88 % GoldenTree funds 
16.22 % Avenue funds 
11.08 % Floating equity 
Table 4.14 – IOL ownership structure at 30 June 2016 
Source: Report on relevant IOL shareholders published on Consob official website 
 
4.9.1. Distribution of extraordinary dividend 
At the time of the call of the ordinary shareholders’ meeting for the approval of 2016 financial 
statements, on 6 April 2017 reference shareholders proposed to the ordinary shareholders’ 
meeting the distribution of extraordinary dividend per a total amount of Euro 79,4 million. The 
proposal contrasted with IOL business plan, which did not predict distribution of dividends to 
strengthen the financial position and to sustain investments for growth on internal and external 
line. The avoidance of dividend distribution for year 2016 was confirmed by the Board of 
Directors in the approval of financial statement and the call of shareholders’ meeting. 
Following the receipt of the proposal by shareholders, Board of Directors released a report on 
the legal regularity and the sustainability of the request.20 The Board of Directors declared that, 
although the proposed distribution of the dividend would reduce the amount of equity reserves 
originated from the acquisition of Seat by IOL, the request was complaint with legal and 
statutory rules on equity capital. With respect to the sustainability of the extraordinary dividend, 
the Board of Directors performed a critical review of the business plan, to properly consider the 
                                                          
20 https://www.italiaonline.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CDA-IOL-10.4.2017-Valutazioni-del-CdA-
V7_CLEAN_ITA.pdf 
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impact on financial area of adverse business scenarios. After the examination of the dynamics 
of the cash flows and the effect of the extraordinary dividend, it resulted that “the Group would 
hold liquidity, net of month and seasonal swings” and the result would remain valid in case of 
unpredictable cash outs, generated by extraordinary events of 5 million Euro per year. The 
negative effect of the distribution is the lack of liquidity to finance eventual acquisition of 
businesses in compliance with the business plan, but directors and their advisors, judged that 
the arising need of financial resource would be easily satisfied through recourse to bank debt 
or increase of equity capital. 
At the light of the public interest of the proposal, the regulatory authority asked IOL the 
disclosure of further information about the impact of the extraordinary distribution. In the 
answer,21 directors highlighted that “the group would hold […] a positive Net Financial Position 
in the time horizon of the plan”, therefore the distribution would not affect economic and 
financial objectives of business plan 2017-2019. Directors specified that “business plan does 
not include estimates referred to growth by external lines”, so “management will value on 
opportunistic basis eventual options for growth by external lines”. Finally, IOL explained that 
the concession of social security benefits for laid-off workers was subordinated to the 
realization of investments for business reorganization: in these terms “the distribution does not 
affect the hypothesis at the basis of the concession of the social security benefits”, with specific 
reference to the investment plan negotiated with Ministry and trade unions. 
Moreover, the Board of Statutory Auditors stated that the request, although it present significant 
dimensions, also in consideration of the recent history, “it does not appear to threaten neither 
the going concern of the business, nor the perspectives of development, although it exposes the 
business to financial risks and it requires effort for positive growth of the business and wise 
cash flow management”. 
Despite the analogies between this transaction and the extraordinary dividend distributed in 
year 2004, on the points of the request by shareholders, the vicinity of a change of control, the 
reduction of equity reserves originated from a recent merger, the most relevant difference is that 
in 2016 IOL withheld a positive Net Financial Position, and the size of the extraordinary 
dividend was lower than liquidity available on treasury; instead, the extraordinary dividend of 
year 2004 requested the assumption of financial debts, modifying the business perspectives of 
Seat for many years. 
Finally, the ordinary shareholders’ meeting, called on 27 April 2017, definitively approved the 
distribution of the extraordinary dividend, which was paid on 10 May 2017. 
                                                          
21 https://www.italiaonline.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Comunicato-Stampa_Integrazione-info.pdf 
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4.9.2. Economic performance since acquisition by Italiaonline 
Relevant economic and financial data of SPG-IOL are resumed in Table 4.15 and commented 
in the paragraph. 
 
 
2015 
(SPG) 
2015 
(SPG+IOL) 
2016 2017 
Revenues 374.9 449.6 389.5 336.0 
YoY Growth -7.91% 9.10% -13.4% -13.7% 
Core Revenues 357.1 431.7 373.0 330.2 
EBITDA 26.3 44.1 63.9 67.7 
Marginality 6.93% 9.81% 16.2% 19.9% 
EBIT (26.3) (27.0) 0.7 27.7 
Profit/Loss (19.1) (16.4) 22.7 26.4  
    
Equity 160.9 344.9 367.3 315.6 
Liabilities 326.2 431.0 333.3 291.8 
Intangible Assets 111.7 344.1 317.3 306.9 
Table 4.155 – Highlights of financials for fiscal years 2015-2017 – Values in million Euro 
Source: SPG and IOL official financial statements 
Economic performance of SPG, as a stand-alone basis, of year 2015, showed the continuation 
of reduction in economic determinants. In fact, total consolidated revenues were equal to 375 
million Euro, lower than 2014 by 7.9 %, while EBITDA was equal to 26 million Euro, with 
reduction of 19.4 % with respect to 2014 and corresponding to a marginality rate of about 7 %. 
Because of reduction in EBITDA level, 2014 presented a negative EBIT although the effect 
from extraordinary accounts was almost null: financial statement did not present relevant 
extraordinary impairments while restructuring expenses were practically offset by proceeds 
received from former directors and private equity funds to settle the lawsuit for alleged 
damages. Financial area was characterized by a loss originated from the impairment of minority 
stake on Telegate, equal to 6.6 million Euro, partly compensated by the conclusion of 
renegotiation of real estate leasing contracts, which determined a positive impact of 5.9 million 
Euro on profit and loss statement. The bottom line of the statement presented a net loss of 19 
million Euro. With respect to cash flow generation, the settlement of controversies towards 
financial leasing companies and former directors, is the main reason determining further 
cancellation of financial debt and increase of Net Financial Position from positive levels of 71.4 
million at the beginning of the 2015 to its final value of 106.5 million Euro. 
Total revenues from the core business unit of Italian Directories were equal to 357 million Euro, 
and the contraction with respect to the former year was mainly originated by the reduction of 
Seat customer base. Main products had been reclassified into Digital and Print areas: revenues 
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from Digital products were equal to 221.5 million Euro, presenting an overall decline of 11.5 
%. Among Digital area, services related to Digital Directories and creation of Websites 
continued their contraction, while intermediation for advertising on Google and Facebook 
platforms presented a very positive performance, with revenues of 53 million and growth rate 
of 38 % with respect to 2014. Instead, traditional Print products generated a stream of revenues 
equal to 102 million Euro, experiencing a growth of 12.6 %, whose positive contribution 
depended by the launch of the innovative Smartbook with the two traditional directories books 
merged into one volume. Finally, traditional telephone Directory Assistance reduced its 
revenues by 42 %, certifying the irreversible declining phase of the service. 
With respect to the perimeter of Seat operations, year 2015 was characterized by the termination 
of the business segment of promotional couponing, by opening the liquidation of the subsidiary 
Glamoo, acquired the previous year at a cost of 4 million Euro. 
Moving to year 2016, it must be remembered that the exercise was characterized by the 
completion of the reverse merger of IOL into SPG, and the change of company name into 
Italiaonline, influencing the comparability of annual economic and financial results. Therefore, 
to ensure the comparability of year 2016 performance to 2015 results it is necessary to refer to 
pro-forma 2015 data elaborated from the hypothetical merger of both companies. Pro-forma 
profit and loss statement for 2015 presents revenues equal to 449 million Euro and EBITDA 
equal to 44 million Euro. With respect to pro-forma data, in year 2016 revenues declined by 
13.4 % reaching the level of 389 million Euro; at the same time EBITDA was equal to 64 
million Euro, growing by 45 % and highlighting the obtainment of a level of marginality on 
revenues equal to 16.4 %. EBIT was substantially close to parity, being affected by the strategic 
decision to classify the accessory subsidiary Consodata among Held for Sale assets, which 
produced the devaluation of its assets of 7.6 million to align their book value with fair value; at 
the same time financial area was characterized by the devaluation of minority equity stake of 
Telegate per an amount of 1.5 million Euro, reflecting a permanent reduction of market prices. 
Finally, profit and loss statement closed with a profit of 22.6 million Euro, mainly originated 
by the positive effect generated by the recognition of Deferred Tax Assets in the balance sheet. 
In year 2016, the business unit referred to the service of Directory Assistance at telephone 
number 12.54 was sold to a call centres company, as prescribed by Italian Authority for 
Competition after the examination of the merger of Seat and IOL. Also, the subsidiary 
Europages was definitively sold to a private equity fund with a loss lower than a million Euro. 
At the end of 2016, Net Financial Position presented a positive value of 122 million Euro, to be 
compared with a pro-forma level of 74 million Euro at the beginning of the year. The increase 
in net liquidity reflected the anticipated repayment of the credit line obtained for the acquisition 
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of SPG minority shares, and the perfection of an agreement for the transfer of real estate 
financial leasing to a third party, to be executed in 2017. 
With respect to revenues mix referred to the core business unit, Digital Italia, it generated 
revenues equal to 373 million Euro, composed by 239 million Euro generated by Digital 
segment, 102 million Euro generated by traditional Print segment, with both segments 
experiencing a rate of decline of 10 % with respect to the previous year, and 31.2 million Euro 
generated by minor products, including Directory Assistance services. The firm implemented 
actions for efficiency, reducing all type of costs: industrial costs, commercial costs, general 
costs and labour costs, which allowed the firm to achieve a relevant growth in EBITDA of the 
business unit with respect to pro-forma data for 2015. The EBIT pertaining to the business unit 
was positive and equal to 12.3 million Euro. 
Among extraordinary events of year 2016, it must be noted the expiration of equity warrants 
issued in 2014 as incentives for the approval by former shareholders of the equitization of 
financial debt in conformance to composition with creditors. Equity warrant became 
exercisable from 9 May 2016 and they definitively expired on 27 July 2016. During that time 
window, some warrants were exercised by their respective holders at the strike price of 4.50 
Euro, resulting in the emission of 13,893 IOL new shares, with cash increase of equity capital 
and share premium of 62,500 Euro. 
Finally, economic performance of year 2017 was characterized by revenues generation equal to 
336 million Euro, experiencing a decline of 13.7 % with respect to the previous year. Despite 
reduction in revenues, actions for increase of efficiency generated the reduction of industrial, 
commercial and labour costs: as a result, EBITDA of the year was equal to 67.6 million Euro, 
with a growth rate of 5.8 % and a marginality rate of 20.1 %. Extraordinary revenues and costs 
were influenced by the positive income related to the dismissal of real estate leasing contracts 
equal to 2.1 million Euro, which partly compensated costs of reorganization and redefinition of 
corporate strategy. EBIT was equal to 27.7 million Euro: since financial area and tax area was 
not relevant, profit and loss statement closed with a positive result of 26.4 million Euro. 
Final Net Financial Position was characterized by Net Cash of 73 million Euro, with a decline 
of 49 million Euro with respect to the beginning of the year, because of the payment of an 
extraordinary dividend of 80 million Euro requested by controlling shareholders. 
The most relevant extraordinary events of the year 2017 are the completion of the transfer of 
real estate financial leasing on 23 February 2017, and the strategic decision to stop the dismissal 
procedure of the subsidiary Consodata, with consequent declassification from Held for Sale 
assets. 
In detail, Digital Italia business unit generated revenues of 330 million Euro, in contraction of 
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11.5 %, of which 228 million Euro arising from Digital products (-5 % on 2016) and 101 million 
arising from Traditional products (-21 % on 2016). Digital area was characterized by the 
positive performance of Advertising services for large accounts and Small Medium Enterprises.  
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CHAPTER 5: COMMENTS ON BUSINESS DYNAMICS, MARKET 
PERFORMANCE AND RESTRUCTURING INITIATIVES 
 
 
After the presentation of economic and corporate information on SPG and IOL, as resulting 
from official financial statements and mandatory reports released for extraordinary operations 
on corporate and ownership structure, this chapter develops the critical points referred to the 
dynamics of the business and the situation of financial distress, examining the effectiveness of 
initiatives undertaken by involved stakeholders to face the difficult situation. It puts its attention 
in SPG market value of equity, as resulting from market prices prevailing in the Stock 
Exchange, and opinions released by equity analysts. Then, forecasted economic figures 
resulting from business plans are compared with actual results taken from financial statements. 
Opinions from equity analysts have been taken from the official website of Milan Stock 
Exchange, while official market prices are taken from the database Eikon owned by Thomson 
Reuters. 
Moreover, financial data from official balance sheets and profit and loss statements have been 
restated according to the methodology suggested by Koller et al. (2015), to obtain reliable 
values of EBITDA, Net Financial Position and Financial Liabilities by neutralizing the impact 
of non-monetary accounts, especially provisions for bad debts and commercial risks, which in 
official SPG-IOL financial statements are always included into EBITDA, and to disentangle 
extraordinary costs, depreciations and impairments from the computation of cash flows. Tables 
with restated SPG-IOL Profit and Loss statements, Balance Sheets, and Free Cash Flows 
prospects are reported in Appendices 2/A, 2/B and 2/C. 
 
 
 
 
5.1. DECLINE OF OPERATING AND FINANCIAL FIGURES 
As seen in Chapter 4, in the period between 2004 and 2015, main relevant economic and 
financial variable presented an overall pathway of decline, very slow until year 2007, then more 
and more pronounced. In fact, the following tables resume the most critical operating, economic 
and financial variables of SPG, taken from its official and restated financial statements. 
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Years ARPU Clients Employees Commercial Agents 
2004 N.A. 676,000 5,338 1,920 
2005 N.A. N.A. 6,105 1,838 
2006 N.A. N.A. 6,661 1,614 
2007 2,548 550,000 6,652 1,618 
2008 2,548 550,000 6,532 1,707 
2009 2,319 488,000 6,088 1,597 
2010 2,196 486,000 4,810 1,510 
2011 2,150 455,000 4,292 1,241 
2012 1,930 379,000 3,997 1,158 
2013 1,812 321,000 2,029 1,311 
2014 1,633 296,000 1,932 1,393 
2015 1,841 231,000 1,849 1,188 
Change 2008-2004 N.A. -18.6% +22.4% -11.1% 
Change 2015-2009 -20.6% -52.7% -69.6% -25.6% 
Change 2015-2004 -27.7% -65.8% -65.4% -38.1% 
Table 5.16 – Dynamics of SPG operating figures 
Source: SPG annual financial statements, section Management Discussion and Analysis, paragraphs 
Human Resources and Credit Risk; personal computation of variation rates 
 
 
Table 5.1 shows the dynamics of some key operating variables of SPG-IOL: first and second 
columns show the decomposition of revenues stream into Number of Clients and Average 
Revenue per User, taken from information disclosed in the section “Credit Risk” of official 
financial statements. While SPG declared its intention to increase both Clients and ARPU since 
the LBO transaction, as resulting from reports released by equity analysts, it is possible to infer 
that between 2004 and 2007 the firm made an accurate selection of its customer base, retaining 
the most interesting advertisers and increasing their average expenditure. From year 2009, the 
obsolescence of the core products determined churn of customers and reduction in ARPU, 
depressed also by aggressive commercial policies. For sake of completeness, Figure 5.1 shows 
the historical dynamics of ARPU and number of clients. 
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Figure 5.1 – Dynamics of SPG Average Revenues per User 
Source: Opinion on SPG share value by Lehman Brothers on 28 January 2004, page 17 
 
The other columns show the dynamics of number of SPG employees and commercial agents: 
while commercial agents continuously declined over years, number of employees reached a 
peak in 2007, then it rapidly declined, reflecting the reduction in volumes of operating activity 
and the need to reduce fixed costs to recover the marginality. It must be noted that reduction of 
employees has not stopped since 2015: considering the integration of about 400 employees 
coming from IOL operations, not included in Table 5.1, at the end of year 2017 IOL employees 
were 1,830, of which 242 were temporarily laid off. 
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Years Financial 
Debt 
NFP Book 
Equity 
EBITDA Financial 
Expenses 
Market Cap 
at 12/20 
2004 3,952.7 3,843.1 860.0 679.0 253.1 2,619.3 
2005 3,741.0 3,567.4 999.7 687.2 272.0 3,295.5 
2006 3,613.4 3,334.5 1,075.4 655.5 256.2 3,791.5 
2007 3,405.9 3,230.3 1,123.8 697.5 256.7 2,215.1 
2008 3,325.3 3,048.1 903.5 655.6 258.8 487.9 
2009 3,024.9 2,757.2 1,039.2 585.6 273.5 322.5 
2010 2,929.4 2,708.4 228.7 454.9 259.6 166.6 
2011 2,881.1 2,727.6 (555.1) 409.2 273.5 53.5 
2012 1,530.0 1,343.5 (968.2) 289.0 147.4 74.7 
2013 1,658.4 1,472.1 (1,323.4) 131.2 132.9 32.7 
2014 39.8 (60.4) 174.3 59.7 130.6 180.7 (*) 
2015 49.8 (64.8) 334.9 65.8 4.5 194.5 
Change 
2008-2004 
-15.9% -20.7% +5.06% -3.45% +2.25% -81.4% 
Change 
2012-2008 
-54.0% -56.0% -207% -56.0% -43.0% -84.7% 
Change 
2015-2012 
-96.8% -105% +135% -77.2% -97.0% +160% 
Table 5.2 –Dynamics of SPG financial figures – Values in million Euro 
Source: Financial figures taken from Appendices 2/A and 2/B, market capitalization measured at 20 December 
from Thomson Reuters - Eikon database. 
(*) 2014 market capitalization refers to 20 January 2015, one month after the equitization of Senior Financial 
Claims. 
 
Table 5.2 resumes the dynamics of financial variables in the period 2004-2015: Financial Debt 
and Net Financial Position continuously reduced from 2004 to 2009 of about 200-250 million 
Euro per year, reflecting the solid cash generation of the business which permitted also 
anticipate repayments of debt. When cash flow reduced, SPG repaid its debt though emission 
of new equity in 2009, then with substitution of expiring debt with new debt: it follows that 
NFP remained constant at the end of years 2009, 2010 and 2011. Then, financial debt was 
abruptly reduced through equitization of financial claims in 2012 and subsequently in 2014, 
producing a positive NFP since 2015 which reflected the lower and lower cash generation from 
restructured operations. The potential cash generation from ordinary activities, under the 
assumption of immediate cash regulation of operating revenues and costs, is represented by 
restated EBITDA: it reached its maximum peak in 2007, to deteriorate of 50-100 million Euro 
per year until 2011, then, in correspondence with restructuring procedures, it declined of 77 % 
in a three years-time. Financial expenses are strictly connected with debt burden and cash 
generation: they remained almost constant, in absolute values, on average levels of 250 million 
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Euro per year until 2008, then the first attempts of restructurings resulted in the increase of 
financing costs of about 20 million. It must be noted that SPG cash generation declined over 
years, as previously discussed about EBITDA, so the incidence of remuneration of financial 
debt on free cash flows became higher and higher. Values from year 2012 are not significant 
since they were recognized in the accounting books in compliance with accounting principles, 
but they were not paid because restructuring procedures were pending, and these expenses were 
finally offset by extraordinary proceeds at the final approval of restructuring measures. 
Table 5.2 shows also market capitalization of SPG, which, after the payment of extraordinary 
dividend in 2004, stabilized to market values close to 2.7 billion Euro. That value rose until 
year 2007, then it continuously declined, notwithstanding the restructuring measures adopted, 
determining the total loss of value by original shareholders, shareholders participating in the 
equity offer in 2009 and converted junior bondholders. At the same time, book value of equity 
was quite volatile, reflecting negative effects of dividends distribution in years 2006 and 2007, 
and, mainly, the consequences of progressive impairment of goodwill from 2008 to 2012, 
previously recognized at the time of the merger of SPG with the vehicles Silver and Spyglass. 
 
Years Interest Coverage 
(EBITDA/Fin Exp) 
Financial Debt/ 
EBITDA 
Net Financial Position/ 
EBITDA 
Cost of 
debt 
2004 2.68 5.82 5.66 10.97% 
2005 2.53 5.44 5.19 7.07% 
2006 2.56 5.51 5.09 6.97% 
2007 2.72 4.88 4.63 7.31% 
2008 2.53 5.07 4.65 7.69% 
2009 2.14 5.17 4.71 8.61% 
2010 1.75 6.44 5.95 8.72% 
2011 1.50 7.04 6.67 9.41% 
2012 1.96 5.29 4.65 6.68% 
2013 0.99 12.64 11.22 8.34% 
2014 0.46 0.67 (1.01) 15.38% 
2015 14.62 0.76 (0.98) 10.04% 
Change 
2008-2004 
-5.57% -12.9% -17.9% -30.0% 
Change 
2012-2008 
-22.6% +4.38% Constant -13.1% 
Change 
2015-2012 
+646% -85.7% -121% +50.3% 
Table 5.3 – Dynamics of SPG financial ratios 
Source: Personal computations from values presented in Table 5.2. Cost of debt is the ratio between financial 
expenses and the average between financial debt at the end of current year and previous year. 
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Table 5.3 shows the dynamics of main financial ratios, to support comments to figures presented 
in Table 5.2. It results that since 2009, interest coverage, rapidly declined from previously 
values higher than 2.5, reflecting the rise in interest expenses and the continual reduction of 
EBITDA from operating activities. This situation led to the default of SPG in 2011, since it 
omitted the payment of interest coupon on Lighthouse bonds, and to the need, in the first months 
of 2013, to ask the protection of composition with creditors. The incidence of debt over 
EBITDA reduced by 13 %, moving from the initial value of 5.8x to 4.88x in 2008, then the ratio 
rose to unsustainable levels because EBITDA shrank, and financial debt was impossible to be 
definitively repaid, so the unique solution was its total cancellation completed at the end of 
2014. About cost of debt, it varied between 7 % and 7.7 % until 2008, reflecting the dynamics 
of interest rates, then it jumped to values higher than 8.6 % as the result of renegotiation of 
senior loan with The Royal Bank of Scotland and the emission of Senior Secured Bonds at 
unfavourable conditions. Reduction of cost of debt of year 2012 is determined by the 
equitization of junior bonds; then, values of years 2014-2015 are not significant because SPG 
residual debt was very low and Net Financial Position was positive. 
 
5.2. BUSINESS PLAN VS ACTUAL RESULTS 
At the end of year 2003, Seat disclosed to financial community the decision to merge the 
vehicles and to distribute the special dividend, together with the new business strategy ensuring 
the sustainability of the relevant financial burden. Equity analyst unanimously agreed on the 
opinion that proposed extraordinary transactions are fair for minorities, and they put their 
attention on the amount of dividend and the assumption of debt. With respect to the industrial 
plan, the report issued by Lehman Brothers on 28 January 2004 disclosed that generation of 
revenues from advertising is based on both increasing in the number of customers, from 
attraction of new advertisers, and in the increasing of Average Revenues per customer from 
upselling and cross-selling initiatives. Moreover, SPG planned to reduce the credit risk on trade 
receivables by accurate control of recovery of expired receivables, and selection of reliable 
clients through request of automatic bank payments. Many equity analysts, for example Merrill 
Lynch in its report issued on 30 November 2004, states that the strategy to increase both ARPA 
and volume was not realistic, since there is a trade-off between the dimensions: growth of 
customer base requires discounted prices which generally reduce Average Revenues, as it 
occurred in SPG from 1996 to 2002. Furthermore, there were limited room to increase prices, 
since SPG risked the loss in quantity of advertisements. In fact, as previously commented, SPG 
commercial strategy resulted in accurate selection of advertisers’ base, aimed at the reduction 
of small and unreliable clients, together with retention of medium-high customers and upselling 
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policies. 
SPG business plan provided the forecasted financial results in a 10 years-time horizon resulting 
from the implementation of the business strategy, and the connected forecasted cash flows to 
ensure the proper satisfaction of financial obligations. From the Legal Report about the 
litigation between SPG and Directors, already described in Chapter 4, it results that on 15 
October 2003, the Board of Directors approved the following EBITDA forecasts for the period 
2004-2011, elaborated with the consultancy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers. 
 
2003 Business Plan 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
EBITDA base 663 741 800 852 888 925 960 998 
Growth rate 10.1% 11.8% 7.96% 6.5% 4.23% 4.17% 3.78% 3.96% 
EBITDA conservative 654.2 705.2 737.2 759.8 782.6 806.1 830.3 855.2 
Growth rate 8.61% 7.8% 4.54% 3.07% 3 % 3 % 3 % 3 % 
Table 5.4 – EBITDA forecasts in 2003 SPG Business Plan 
EBITDA values in million Euro – Source: Legal Report, page 2, personal computation of growth rates. 
Then, on 26 March 2004, SPG Board of Directors approved a more conservative set of financial 
forecasts, with EBITDA values resumed in Table 5.5, with the specification that in the baseline 
scenario complete satisfaction of financial debt is ensured, while “in the conservative scenario 
regular payment of principal and interest is ensured until year 2010. From 2011, the 
reimbursement of residual debt requires a refinancing of overall Euro 1,780 million” (Page 3) 
 
2004 Business Plan 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
EBITDA base 630 685.4 750.3 796.2 833.5 870.9 905.9 942.6 
Growth rate 4.59% 8.79% 9.47% 6.12% 4.68% 4.49% 4.02% 4.05% 
EBITDA conservative 605 636 665 694 721 751 778 805 
Growth rate 0.44% 5.12% 4.56% 4.36% 3.89% 4.16% 3.6% 3.47% 
Table 5.5 – EBITDA forecasts in 2004 SPG Business Plan 
EBITDA values in million Euro – Source: Legal Report, page 3, personal computation of Growth rates. 
Despite the content of these industrial plans, actual EBITDA for the period, as resulting from 
the annual financial statements, were much lower than the most conservative plan, reaching 
levels and growth rates resumed in Table 5.6. 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
EBITDA actual 614.4 626.6 611.4 648.1 602.7 527.6 416.5 370.6 
Growth rate 2.00% 1.98% -2.42% 6.00% -7.01% -12.4% -21.1% -11 % 
Actual/Conservative 101.5% 98.5% 91.9% 93.4% 83.5% 70.2% 53.5% 46% 
Table 5.6 – SPG actual EBITDA levels 
EBITDA values in million Euro – Source: official SPG financial statements, personal computation of 
rates: Conservative refers to EBITDA values in Table 5.5. 
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From the comparison of forecasts with actual EBITDA levels, it results that, also in the positive 
period (from 2004 to 2007), growth of operating margin was very limited, then in the period of 
crisis, it started to dramatically reduce with a double-digit rate of year-on-year decline. The 
deviation between actual results and conservative scenario formulated in year 2004 was very 
small for years 2004 and 2005, then it becomes wider over years, since the effect of missed 
targets cumulated over years, as showed by the ratio computed in the last row of Table 5.6, and 
as resulting in Figure 5.2. Remembering that, according to the Legal Report, the verification of 
results planned in the conservative plan would have required the renegotiation of financial debt 
in 2011, it follows that such lower results would determine earlier unsustainability of debt, as 
it occurred from the end of year 2008. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 – Comparison between forecasted and actual SPG EBITDA values 
Personal elaboration from EBITDA values presented in Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 
 
From the market point of view, the fact that operating targets were systematically not reached, 
resulted lower and lower trust on SPG budgets pointed out by equity analysts, who declared 
that the core market was more than mature, while the segment of online advertising was 
characterised by uncertain perspectives, since at that time access to Internet was still limited 
and Italian Small and Medium Enterprises were characterized by low digital alphabetization. 
In this context, they positively judged the decision by Private Equity funds to exit from the 
target firm in 2007 via strategic or financial options, as a possibility to change control and re-
boost the core business though new strategies. Moreover, in 2009, they expressed positive 
opinion about the resignation of the CEO Luca Majocchi, hoping the change in top managerial 
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line would finally produce the radical shift of business conduct. 
Concluding this section, despite low guidance on budget and forecast, discussed in the previous 
paragraph, until the first semester of 2008, cash generation was solid, and it permitted the 
distribution of dividends in 2006 and 2007, for a total amount of 100 million Euro (referred to 
the profits of fiscal years 2006 and 2007), and the growth by external lines in the segment of 
Directory Assistance. In fact, in 2007 SPG expanded its Directory Assistance operation in 
Turkey through a joint venture and it acquired from a competitor the German subsidiary Wer 
Liefert Was. Those acquisition determined a total cash outflow of 133 million Euro. Also, in 
the first semester of 2008, Telegate acquired the German firm Telegate Media, with a cash 
disbursement of 33 million Euro, as resulting from the financial statement for year 2008. While 
Telegate Media was definitively integrated into Telegate, the Turkish joint venture and Wer 
Liefert Was did not bring positive contribution to SPG consolidated figures: as explained in 
Chapter 4, the German business was sold at the end of 2008, with a financial loss of 75.5 million 
Euro. 
From an ex-post perspective, at the light of unsustainability of financial debt and low overall 
contribution from acquired firms on consolidated results, it would had been better to devote the 
cash disbursement of ordinary dividends and acquisitions, to the reimbursement of financial 
debt or to investments in core business of directories and development of digital services for 
Italian target customers. 
 
 
5.3. MARKET PERFORMANCE BETWEEN 2003 AND 2005 
Moving to the discussion of the impact on SPG equity market performance of operating and 
financial events, in year 2003 Private Equity investors interested in the acquisition disclosed 
their strategy to create value through financial leverage, in the moment the demerger between 
SPG and Telecom Italia Media was announced to the market. For that reason, when new SPG 
shares were separately listed, their performance in the Stock Exchange was very positive 
because extraordinary dividends, or equivalent distributions to minority shareholders, were 
expected, and the information was immediately incorporated in the price. In fact, since the 
execution of the spin-off on 4 August 2003, SPG shares traded at a unitary price higher than 
0.80 Euro, with a market capitalization higher than 6,500 million Euro, to be compared with 
the unitary price negotiated between Telecom Italia and PE Investors of 0.598 Euro, 
corresponding to an overall equity value of 4,852 million Euro. About the rise in market price, 
the report issued by Deutsche Bank suggested investors to do not tender shares to the vehicle 
Silver: the suggestion was followed by investors, who did not tender their shares to Silver. With 
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respect to the impact of expected Seat recapitalization, the analyst Caboto estimated a positive 
contribution of debt recapitalization on equity value equal to 0.10 Euro per share, since the asset 
value was estimated in about 0.7 Euro per share and the estimated target price at 18 August 
2003 was equal to 0.81 Euro per share. Moreover, Caboto stated that financial debt was 
sustainable until a level corresponding to 4x EBITDA for year 2003. On this point, the analyst 
Euromobiliare, in its 18 August 2003 report, stated that planned financial debt of 3.8 billion 
Euro is quite stretched, at the light of the difficulties in achieving further increases of efficiency: 
Seat “has already undergone a stringent efficiency improvement process after privatization and 
also under Telecom Italia management […] EBITDA grew from € 250 mln to over € 620 mlm 
and EBITDA margin almost doubled from 28% to 53%” (page 3) 
By the way, from the spin-off to the end of year 2003, SPG market price ranged from 0.79 to 
0.88 Euro and, excluding Merrill Lynch who suggested investors to sell SPG shares, equity 
analysts were quite optimistic on SPG shares, estimating a target price close to market value or 
even higher. The expectations were focus on the implementation of the new strategy and on the 
execution of the recapitalization of the firm. 
In year 2004, after the distribution of extraordinary dividend, the stock value presented a 
reduction higher than the amount of dividend, since SPG price per share moved from 0.83 Euro 
on 15 April 2004, to 0.34 Euro on 12 May 2004, with a reduction of 0.49 Euro while the 
dividend paid was equal to 0.43 Euro per share. In the month of May 2004, equity analysts, 
were quite cautious, estimating a target price ranging from 0.35 to 0.45 Euro, slightly higher 
than actual prices. Only Euromobiliare and Banca Akros suggested to Accumulate the stock, 
based on the alleged solidity of the underlying operating business, while Deutsche Bank, 
Lehman Brother, Ras Bank and UBS expressed a Neutral rating. These equity analysts pointed 
out the maturity of paper directories business, which determined disappointing results for the 
first semester of 2004, and the need of waiting until the second semester of 2005 to appreciate 
positive effects from new business plan. According to report released by Euromobiliare on 6 
October 2004, low results of year 2004 depended on weakness of advertising market and 
aggressive commercial policies in large cities, presenting high discount and low control of 
clients’ reliability in payment of receivables, therefore market expected the announcements the 
business plan would have been downsized at the end of 2004. The equity analysts Merrill Lynch, 
Lehman Brothers, UBS and Banca Akros reached the same conclusions. 
After the disclosure of updated business plan, on 30 November 2004 Mediobanca stated that 
reference market had radically changed, determining the need to modify approach toward 
clients and to ensure their retention. Therefore, revenues growth rates were expected to be 2% 
for 2005 and from 5% to 6% for years 2006-2007, while EBITDA was expected to be close to 
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666 million for year 2006. The analyst pointed out that second half of year 2004 was 
characterized by reduction of revenues in big cities, because of lower advertising expenses from 
big accounts, and careful selection of reliable clients, only partially offset by positive 
contribution of lower bad debt provisions; the trend was expected to continue also for year 
2005. 
With respect to market performance, in the second half of 2004 overall capitalization fluctuated 
toward average value of 2,600 million Euro, with a minimum close to 2,200 million Euro in the 
month of October, followed by upper rebound: the corresponding price per share moved from 
0.33 Euro to a minimum of 0.26 Euro. Equity analysts’ opinions for the same period were 
generally cautious, with prevalence of Hold or Neutral rating and overall target prices ranging 
from 0.29 Euro to 0.45 Euro for the most optimistic opinions. 
As expected, revenues for 2005 were quite stable, since many equity analysts labelled that year 
as another transition year and they were worried about reduction of revenues from directories 
in big cities and threat of competition on directories by Cairo Communication group, which, 
for sake of information, never launched its publishing product. Despite weaker top line than 
expected, cash generation was judged as solid, and it permitted high debt reduction and growth 
for external lines through acquisition of Cipi and foreign businesses on Directories Assistance 
segment. Equity analysts pointed out that acquired firms were very small, if compared with the 
volume of SPG core revenues, and they were not able to drive high growth rates resulting from 
business plan, but they could only ensure the stability of revenues stream. In fact, revenues from 
Italian directories were suffering reduction of advertising expenses, especially in big cities, and 
reduction of customer base resulting from the commercial policy of focusing toward bigger and 
reliable customers. Also, the acquisition of foreign businesses did not allow the achievement of 
synergies with the core business, resulting in limited scope for increasing growth or efficiency 
of operations. From the point of view of shareholders, the adoption of IAS-IFRS principles, 
with subsequent necessity to impair goodwill and intangible assets only in case of durable loss, 
permitted SPG to close the accounting profit and loss statement with a positive result and to 
eventually distribute dividends, with a cap equal to 3 % of market capitalization deriving from 
financial covenants agreed with the senior lender. 
During year 2005, market performance was characterized by growth in capitalization from 
2,639 million Euro at 20 January 2005 to 3,295 million Euro at 20 December 2005, 
corresponding to prices per share ranging from 0.31 Euro to 0.40 Euro. 
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5.4. CONSIDERATIONS ON RESTRUCTURING ATTEMPTS 
In the Legal Report, SPG consultants expressed high scepticism about the restructuring attempts 
undertaken in 2010 and in 2011-2012, pointing out that in January 2010 the investment bank 
hired by SPG manifested the need of a further equity injection of 800 million Euro, but the lack 
of interest by controlling Private Equity funds would have triggered the breach of financial 
covenants. Therefore, the investment bank suggested the issuing of Senior Secured Bonds “to 
face immediate financial needs, knowing that the bond issuance would not have solved the 
problem to face repayment of financings due on 2012” (Legal Report, page 12). Definitively, 
Senior Secured Bonds, were considered, also by financial advisor, to be a solution only in the 
short-term horizon, which would had determined a sharp rise in cost of debt, negatively 
affecting financial statements and availability of cash for investments, as already seen in the 
first part of this chapter. 
In legal consultants’ opinion, SPG was in a situation of deep crisis since year 2009, which was 
externally manifested through the sharp reduction of EBITDA for year 2009 with respect to 
2008. Moreover, the strategic decision to shift the core business from paper publishing to 
Internet advertising, would have generated the obligation for Board of Directories, in 
compliance with applicable accounting principles, to deliberate the almost total impairment of 
goodwill value, and the subsequent adoption of radical measures to face the erosion of 
shareholders’ equity from the first months of 2010. 
Instead, the Legal Report states that decision to adopt extraordinary intervention was taken on 
21 June 2011, when, with the support of an investment bank, the Board of Directors proposed 
the equitization of Lighthouse bonds, and it expressly excluded the recourse to composition 
with creditors. In legal consultants’ opinion, SPG was in a situation of insolvency since October 
2011, when directors suspended the payment of interest coupon on Lighthouse bonds, although 
the out-of-court restructuring was not approved yet. According to documentation supporting 
the Lighthouse equitization, sustainability of senior debt after the equitization of Lighthouse 
bonds assumed EBITDA levels equal to 343 million Euro in 2012 and 342 million Euro in 2013, 
while actual EBITDA resulting from profit and loss statement for year 2012 was only 296 
million Euro, including an extraordinary income of 56 million Euro deriving from the 
conclusion of a litigation involving the German subsidiary Telegate. 
The situation is quite suspicious, since the peculiar business cycle of SPG permitted a good 
level of visibility of revenues and reliable estimation on one-year time horizon. In fact, 
collection of orders for advertising products from clients started 18 or 12 months before the 
release of directory book or generation of the web advertisements, which triggered the 
recognition of revenue in SPG profit and loss statement. On this point, the Legal Report states: 
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“the examination of orders book allows to determine, with sufficient reliability, revenues in the 
subsequent 18 months. So, in July 2012, directors were able to estimate amount of revenues 
and magnitude of full 2012 EBITDA, and to value the perspectives until December 2013” (page 
17). 
It follows that, despite the predictability of revenues and EBITDA for years 2012 and 2013, 
SPG Board of Directors pursued the transformation into equity of Lighthouse junior bond, being 
involved in complex legal and procedural steps in United Kingdom, Luxembourg and Italy, 
which required six months for the completion. It must be stated that the decision was likely to 
be influenced by the sudden death of the CEO Alberto Cappellini in the month of April 2012, 
which left SPG without a strategic leadership until the end of October. Therefore, reasonably 
the Board of Directors inertially implemented the agreed out-of-court restructuring in 
conformity of approvals obtained by shareholders and debt holders, without considering 
alternative resolutions who had required another long phase of negotiation with stakeholders. 
In fact, on 4 September 2012, the Board of Directors declared that, from the comparison of 
interim financial statement at 30 June and the business plan, there were no relevant deviations 
compromising the reasonableness of the certified plan ad its capability to ensure debt 
restructuring and resolution of financial disequilibria. (Legal Report, page 18) 
Finally, it is important to observe that out-of-court restructuring was completed in September 
2012, and shareholders’ meeting appointed the new Board of Directors on 22 October 2012. 
After three months from the entry in charge of the Board, SPG entered in default, since on 31 
January 2013 it did not pay interests on senior debts and it was forced to file for composition 
with creditors. On these decisions, the Board of Directors explained that “in the preparation of 
2013 economic and financial budget, […] cash generation from operating activities, despite 
positive and high, together with actually available liquidity, would not have been sufficient to 
face financial commitments expiring in 2013, equal to about 200 million Euro of interest 
payments and principal reimbursement”. (SPG 2012 financial statement, page 9)  
 
5.4.1. Restructuring costs 
From the joint examination of financial statements from year 2011 to 2014, together with 
information taken by the above-mentioned report by legal consultants, it results that total 
extraordinary direct costs sustained by SPG for out-of-court restructuring of years 2011-2012 
were equal to 86 million Euro. Because of the ex-post insufficiency of the out-of-court 
restructuring in resolving SPG financial troubles, legal consultants proposed to qualify direct 
restructuring costs as a damage suffered by the firm and therefore to include that sum in the 
litigation for damages versus directors in charge at the time. 
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Total direct expenses for that restructuring procedure included 27 million Euro referred to 
professional fees sustained in the interest of Private Equity investors and creditors’ committees, 
and 26 million Euro paid to bond holders as consent fees to favour the reaching of the requested 
number of positive votes for the official approval of restructuring term sheet. From this 
information, professional and procedural costs directly referred to corporate and financial 
reorganization were equal to about 33 million Euro, resulting in the conversion into equity of 
financial liabilities equal to 1,235 million Euro. 
The payment of consent fees and professional fees for senior creditors had been criticized by 
Dott. Ranalli in the report aimed at certifying the feasibility of the composition with creditors, 
because they were not referred to the interests of SPG and Lighthouse, but only to the interests 
of financial creditors. Therefore, he suggests also that the total amount consent fees and 
professional fees referred to senior creditors (equal to 10.6 million Euro) were theoretical 
susceptible to clawback actions in case of bankruptcy liquidation. (Dott. Ranalli first report, 
pages 370-371) 
So, total costs of SPG-Lighthouse restructuring appear to be high if compared with total direct 
costs of the subsequent composition with creditors undertaken in years 2014-2015. 
Surprisingly, total direct costs of composition procedures may be estimated in 34.3 million 
Euro, almost corresponding to net reorganization costs in the former attempt. In fact, SPG 
financial statements for year 2013, included an estimate of these costs equal to 40 million Euro, 
of which 33 million classified among provision and 6 million in professional and judicial fees. 
Then, in 2014 financial statement, professional and judicial expenses were equal to 8.3 million 
Euro, while provisions estimated in 2013 were written-off for a total amount of 14 million Euro. 
We remember that the composition with creditors resulted in the net cancellation of financial 
and non-financial liabilities for a nominal value of 1,546.2 million Euro, including the positive 
effect related to the termination of financial leasing agreements. 
 
5.4.2. Simulation on goodwill 
According to a simulation conducted on SPG financial statement, which assumes the 
inapplicability of International Accounting Standards to SPG financial statements, and the need 
to systematically amortize assumed goodwill on a 20 years’ time horizon, it results that profit 
and loss statements, and subsequent decision about dividends distribution in 2006 and 2007, 
were heavily biased by the accounting treatment of goodwill. In fact, according to figures 
presented in the next page, under these assumptions SPG profit and loss statements for years 
between 2005 and 2009 would continuously result in a relevant loss. To increase reliability of 
the simulation, the effects of paid dividends and extraordinary impairments of goodwill have 
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been neutralized. Then, book value of shareholders’ equity has been progressively reperformed 
keeping as starting point the equity for year 2004, officially computed from Italian accounting 
principles, and considering the cumulated effect of adjusted loss. Variations in equity capital 
resulting from official balance sheets have been computed and added in the table, expressly 
excluding equity injection of year 2009. 
The result is that, first, the systematic presence of loss would had determined the impossibility 
to distribute the above-mentioned ordinary dividends. Moreover, the cumulated effect of losses 
would had rapidly eroded equity reserves existing in year 2004, which would had turned to a 
negative amount in year 2008. So, from year 2008, cumulated losses would have impacted the 
value of Share Capital. In 2009, the cumulated loss would have determined a reduction of Share 
Capital higher than 33 %, determining the need to take radical interventions for preservation of 
share capital or the liquidation of the firm, as prescribed by Italian Civil Code. 
 
 
 
Years 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
                
Official Controlling Profit (Loss) 16.406 79.930 131.905 80.136 98.399 (179.646) (38.041) 
Adjustments:               
Annual impairment of Goodwill   (180.142) (180.142) (180.142) (180.142) (180.142) (180.142) 
Neuralization of IAS/IFRS Impairments           130.793 91.297 
Adjusted Controlling Profit (Loss)   (100.212) (48.237) (100.006) (81.743) (228.995) (126.886) 
                
SYNTHETIC BALANCE SHEET 
Goodwill 3.602.834 3.422.692 3.204.737 3.033.835 2.858.434 2.786.359 2.443.941 
Investment (Disposals) in Goodwill   (37.814) 9.240 4.741 108.066 (162.276) 6.735 
Other Assets 2.224.875 1.828.009 1.742.785 1.648.487 1.418.595 1.410.755 1.260.320 
Neutralization of Dividends Paid     0 42.121 100.599 100.803 (98.389) 
TOTAL ASSETS 5.827.709 5.212.887 4.956.762 4.729.184 4.485.694 4.135.641 3.612.607 
                
Equity Reserves 2004   522.699 522.699 522.699 522.699 522.699 522.699 
Equity Reserves 2003 4.154.087             
Cumulated changes in Equity       (1.956) 37.096 39.997 (3.526) 
Other change in Equity      (1.956) 39.052 2.901 (43.523) (20.177) 
Cumulated Profit (Losses)     (100.212) (148.448) (248.454) (330.197) (559.192) 
Adjusted Profit (Loss) (32.454) (100.212) (48.237) (100.006) (81.743) (228.995) (126.886) 
                
Adjusted Equity Reserves 4.121.633 422.487 372.295 311.341 232.499 (40.019) (187.081) 
Original Share Capital 247.539 247.539 247.539 247.539 247.539 247.539 247.539 
Adjusted Controlling Equity (AER+OSC) 4.369.172 670.026 619.834 558.880 480.038 207.521 60.458 
Equity Non-controlling Interests 5.351 9.788 19.617 18.246 23.824 26.946 21.911 
Liabilities 1.453.186 4.533.073 4.317.311 4.152.058 3.981.832 3.901.174 3.530.238 
EQUITY+LIABILITIES 5.827.709 5.212.887 4.956.762 4.729.184 4.485.694 4.135.641 3.612.607 
Table 5.77 – Simulation of impact of systematic amortization of Goodwill 
Values in thousand Euro - Personal elaboration of data from SPG Balance Sheets and Profit and Loss Statements, according to the previous paragraph. 
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5.5. COMMENTS ON COMMERCIAL POLICY AND NEW STRATEGY 
Moreover, reports from Dott. Ranalli and Dott. Laghi point out that in 2010 SPG carried on 
aggressive commercial policies, by proposing agreements for bundles of paper and internet 
advertising services on a two years’ period. In this way, the business attempted to sustain the 
top-line through higher volumes of services provided and to reduce the churn rate of clients, 
but, on the other hand, the company was reducing its marginality, selling more services 
(directories and internet advertising) at lower discounted prices with respect to previous years. 
A consequence of the new focalization of SPG strategy on internet advertising and the 
prevalence of revenues from digital services with respect to paper directories was the 
modification, occurred in June 2011, of accounting policies for recognition of revenues in the 
profit and loss statement. In fact, the firm moved from the recognition of total price of the 
service in the moment the advertisement was released and published, fitting for paper 
advertising, to a pro-rata temporis criterion for progressive recognition of revenues, reflecting 
the necessity to perform continuous operating activities to keep digital advertisements available 
to final users. (2011 SPG financial statement, page 25) 
During years 2011 and 2012, in the attempt to sustain orders flow and to reduce the declining 
pathway of revenues, SPG contacted clients to push the renewal of advertising agreements 
before their natural expiration. Whether the renewal was accepted, SPG immediately 
recognized in its profit and loss statement the overall amount of revenues not provided yet in 
conformance to the former advertising agreement, clearly altering the pro-rata temporis 
principle. That policy produced an artificial shift of revenues, naturally referred to future fiscal 
years, toward the current fiscal year, naturally producing an immediate improvement of 
performance, naturally offset by lower level of revenues in the subsequent year and the need to 
adopt aggressive commercial strategies to sustain retention of customers and collection of new 
orders. These accounting policies created difficulties for external stakeholders in the 
comprehension of the actual dynamic of revenues, in the attempt of deferring the crisis 
recognition and the adoption of radical measures consistent with the severity of decline. (2012 
SPG financial statement, page 32) 
From a careful reading of financial statements from years 2010 to 2015, it is curious to observe 
that, despite the announced change of strategic focus from paper and internet directories to on-
line advertising services and creation of websites for Small and Medium Enterprises, SPG 
continued to segment its business units in Directories and Other Activities, continuing to use a 
label that reflected the historical business of SPG. Moreover, until fiscal year 2014 (included), 
in the Managements’ report (attached to official financial statement), revenues from the 
“Directories” business unit were split according to the traditional classification of Paper, 
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Internet and Voice services. In the report for fiscal year 2015, SPG changed the structure of 
segment reporting, highlighting revenues from Digital services and splitting them in the 
products lines of Directory, Web Agency and Reselling. For year 2015, inside Digital services, 
with revenues equal to 221,5 million Euro, the component from Directory products was 
predominant in its area, having generated revenues equal to 117 million Euro, corresponding to 
about the 53 % of the top line of Digital area.  
These facts may signal some inconsistencies between planned strategy and realized strategy: 
although SPG, in official presentations, labelled itself as a “Local Internet Company”, and it 
opened 74 local subsidiaries to control the commercialization and production of digital 
advertising services, called Digital Local Services companies, it continued to generate most of 
revenues from advertising on printed and digital telephone directories. Other digital services, 
such as reselling of marketing instruments on search engines and creation of website for Small 
and Medium Enterprises continued to present low incidence on total revenues until the 
integration into IOL. 
Finally, after the transformation of SPG into IOL, 2016 financial statement presented a different 
reporting structure: the core business unit changed its name into “Digital Italia”, split into three 
segments: Digital, Print and Others. Moreover, in the financial statement for year 2017, 
segments were only two, labelled as Digital and Traditional: the former segment was constituted 
by all digital advertising services, while the latter segment included revenues from print 
directories, directory assistance services and minor non-digital marketing services. These recent 
classifications of revenues and services are more consistent with IOL strategic focus on 
generation and supplying of digital marketing service for Italian businesses. 
 
5.6. MARKET PERFORMANCE DURING DECLINE AND RESTRUCTURING 
Moving to the opinions of equity analysts released to the public, they were available for the 
period between year 2008 to 2010, despite the continual reduction of number of banks covering 
the security and decline in number of reports issued. 
The first step of debt restructuring, undertaken in year 2009 and constituted by the renegotiation 
of Senior loan with The Royal Bank of Scotland and the connected increase in share capital, 
was carefully followed by some equity analysts who, generally, issued a negative opinion. 
In fact, in its report released on 5 December 2008, Citigroup declared that the equity injection 
of 200 million Euro requested by the senior creditor “appears too little, even though it accounts 
for 40 % of current market cap […] also retail investors own a big chunk of capital and are 
sitting on significant losses”. Moreover, SPG shares are risky since they are penny stocks, and 
a change in price equal to half a Eurocent produces a 6 % variation on price, which is heavily 
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affected by speculative actions. On 29 December 2008, Citigroup writes “the agreement doesn’t 
solve the real big issue. We estimate Seat doesn’t generate enough cash to reimburse its debt 
under the current schedule. So, we believe a full (and expensive) debt restructuring must take 
place”. On the same report, Citigroup pointed out that 2009 estimates of EBITDA were reduced 
to 560 million from 600 million, in any case lower than EBITDA generated in year 2002, with 
expectation to return in 2011 at level of 2008. Moreover, on 27 January 2009, Citigroup states 
“we would agree with BC Partners’ Investment strategy of not subscribing”. Finally, on 20 
February 2009, Citigroup seems to predict the future extraordinary events of Seat, highlighting 
the decline of print products and the low attractiveness of internet products for the customer 
basis, and stating: “we think Seat will eventually be forced to swap debt into equity, with the 
junior bonds being the obvious candidate”. 
Also, the analyst report by Kepler released on 7 January 2009 points out that the capital increase 
simply delays SPG financial problems: “neither the renegotiation of covenants nor the share 
capital increase, in our view, are sufficient to support the turnaround of Seat PG”, suggesting 
reducing the position on SPG stocks. On 9 March 2009, Citigroup, in confirming the suggestion 
to sell the shares, highlights BC Partners funds were the main shareholder of SPG, and its 
decision to not taking part to the equity injection is quite worrying. 
On the opposite site, Deutsche Bank, in its reports issued from 5 November 2008 to 9 February 
2005, rates SPG shares as Buy, proposing a target price equal to 0.15 Euro per share; after the 
completion of equity injection, it moved to a neutral rating “Hold” with a target price of 0.23 
Euro, kept constant until the end of year 2009. 
After the execution of equity injection, on 26 June 2009 Kepler issued a dramatic report on SPG 
shares, reducing the target price to 0.01 Euro (from current price of 0.17 Euro), stating that 
decline in print advertising was faster than expected and growth in the online side was very 
slow. Kepler judged the increase in capital as a simple option to delay debt restructuring in 
2011, and the definitive solutions for SPG financial imbalances were an increase of capital in 
minimum 1 billion Euro or the equitization of senior debt. Moreover, in the opinion released on 
5 August 2009, Citigroup stated: “We still see senior debt repayments as very challenging, and 
we fear that Seat might eventually be forced to swap debt into equity”. Finally, on 19 November 
2009, Kepler determined a null value per share: print directories were dramatically declining, 
and the connected low generation of EBITDA would inevitably produce the breach of covenants 
and the entry in a situation of default. 
With respect to SPG market capitalization, during year 2008 it reduced from the initial value of 
1,885 million Euro at 18 January 2008, to 487.9 million Euro at 19 December 2008, presenting 
a reduction in value of about 75 %. Then, in year 2009, SPG market capitalization continued to 
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reduce until 164.78 million Euro at 20 March, then after the conclusion of equity injection, its 
market value reached a maximum of 505.9 million at 18 September 2009, the it gradually 
reduced to 322 million Euro in December. 
In year 2010, following the sharp reduction in market capitalization for SPG, interest of equity 
analysts in the security declined and reports from investment banks became rare. In fact, in that 
year, only 10 reports were issued, of which 6 had been produced by the same analyst: Deutsche 
Bank. That analyst continued to suggest a neutral approach toward the stock, estimating a target 
prices equal to 0.18 Euro in the first half of 2010, then cut to the level of 0.15 Euro in the second 
half. Goldman Sachs, which released its reports on 16 March 2010 and 10 November 2010, 
although it set respective target prices of 0.17 and 0.14 Euro, very close to current market prices, 
rated the security as Sell, negatively considering the weakness of core business operations, 
reflected in the continual decline of revenues and EBITDA. Finally, the report issued by Kepler 
on 25 November 2010, while confirming the null equity value estimated in November 2009, 
denounced that SPG was returned a penny stock – as it had already occurred in the end of 2008 
– and the burden of 2.7 billion Euro of debt was clearly unsustainable. Kepler suggested the 
adoption of extraordinary measures composed by both cash equity injection and conversion of 
financial debt, predicting that a debt level of 1.3 billion Euro would be sustainable under the 
condition of EBITDA ranging between 450 and 480 million Euro. 
Market value in year 2010 presented such a reduction that SPG value returned to the situation 
preceding the equity injection, causing the loss of the overall sum contributed by investors. In 
fact, at 20 December 2010, SPG capitalization was equal to 167 million Euro. 
Then, in the period between 2011 and 2016, no report from equity analysts were issued, because 
of low capitalization of the title and situation of trouble and uncertainty which drove away 
investors’ interest; coverage by analysts restarted only in 2017, after the transformation of SPG 
into IOL and return to positive economic performance. 
The unique equity analysis released between years 2011 and 2016 was issued by Kepler on 14 
March 2012, when involved stakeholders consented on the equitization of junior debt. The 
analyst pointed out that the reduction of EBITDA to levels close to 350 million Euro, and 
expected to further shrink, threatened the sustainability of residual 1.5 billion Euro of debt, 
which would have needed a renegotiation in 2016: “if the group is not able to stabilise its 
EBITDA, in a couple of years it may fall again in a pre-default situation”. According to Kepler, 
who however expressed a negative rating for the security reflecting the dilution of original 
shareholders, equity value after conversion was finally estimated by the analyst in about 1 
billion Euro, keeping a negative rating for current shareholders’ point of view. 
In details, during years 2011 and 2012, SPG equity value continued to dramatically decline, 
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reaching a minimum level of 47.1 million Euro at 20 January 2012, finally ranging from 55 to 
65 million Euro right before the equitization of Lighthouse bonds. At that time, Lighthouse 
bonds traded in the bond market at a price corresponding to the 12 % of nominal value from 
May 2012 to August 2012, so the junior bond loan market price was close to 156 million Euro. 
The execution of the equitization increased SPG market value of shares to 153 million Euro at 
20 September 2012, but the persisting of the situation of distress rapidly driven its value to a 
range between 70 and 90 million Euro until January 2012. 
The petition for composition with creditors caused another huge decline in market 
capitalization, which ranged between 25 and 35 million Euro during the whole judicial 
procedure. Finally, according to the content of composition with creditors, pre-existing 
shareholders bore the almost total loss of share value, since after the equitization of senior 
financial debt, SPG market capitalization reached an amount of about 190 million Euro, slightly 
lower than value estimated by SPG financial advisors. Form the point of view of market value, 
after the execution of composition with creditors, SPG shares were characterized by a positive 
performance: in year 2015 rumours for acquisition by IOL shifted market capitalization to 296 
million Euro on 20 May, then value stabilized to 250 million Euro at the time of IOL tender 
offer. 
In the time window between the conclusion of IOL tender offer on SPG shares (November 
2015) and the subsequent merger of both firms (June 2016), SPG market capitalization declined 
to values ranging from 155 to 195 million, then the merger boosted IOL value to about 260 
million Euro, which remained almost constant for the second half of year 2016. Finally, in 2017, 
following positive economic and financial performance, together with the requested distribution 
of extraordinary dividends, produced positive effects on IOL market capitalization, which 
shifted from 257.66 million Euro at 20 January 2017 to 363 million Euro at 20 April 2017, then 
it persisted on values above the threshold of 300 million Euro for the remaining part of the year, 
even reaching a maximum capitalization of 394 million Euro on 20 September 2017. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In modern economies characterized by openness of real and capital markets at worldwide level, 
together with disruptive innovation in technology and exposure to global competition, many 
industries are nowadays exposed to risk of obsolescence and decline of their products and 
services. It follows that, during their overall lifecycle, firms shall continuously adopt strategic 
measures aimed at the conservation of competitive advantage, they shall invest in innovation, 
then redeploy distinctive resources and competences in the offer of valuable products and 
services to target customers. These measures permit a business to hold over time the control of 
its key resources (tangible or, more frequently, intangible and human) and to defer the entry in 
situations of decline and crisis. 
When a situation of decline and crisis occurs, the survival of business activities is jeopardized 
by lack of financial resources and by sudden deterioration of relationships with key 
stakeholders. It follows that, as explained in Chapter 1, top management shall put high effort in 
the recognition of the causes of crisis and to start as soon as possible the turnaround process, 
characterized by the removal of identified inefficiencies and by the restart of value creation 
through operating activities. The critical point is about the implementation of required 
extraordinary measures: the action plan shall be shared and approved by stakeholders who 
inevitably bear a sacrifice in their personal interest to advantage the business’ sustainability. 
Therefore, relationships between distressed business and its stakeholders are negatively 
affected by opportunistic behaviours such as the holdout problem, informational asymmetry 
and lack of reciprocal trust, which are likely to defer the adoption of extraordinary measures, 
thus limiting their effectiveness. To ensure higher success of negotiations and turnaround plans, 
avoiding further deterioration in value and improper cessation of still valuable businesses, 
advanced economies provide legal and institutional frameworks, known as bankruptcy law, 
which favour the timely adoption of efficient measures to recover residual positive value of 
distressed businesses and to ensure the best exploitation of key resources. 
Moving to Seat Pagine Gialle case, the firm was acquired in 2003 by a consortium of Private 
Equity investors through a Leveraged Buy-Out, on the (wrong) assumption that the underlying 
core business of directory publishing would have remained stable for a long-time horizon, and 
whose growth was likely to be boosted with incremental innovation on products and limited 
Capital Expenditure for growth. The general stability of revenues stream and marginality 
between year 2004 to 2007, followed by a rapid decline and obsolescence of the core products 
from 2008, rapidly determined the unsustainability of financial debt and the need to undertake 
a long restructuring process. 
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As suggested by Gilson et al. (1990), attempts to restructure assets and liabilities, whether 
conducted out-of-court, are intensively affected by holdout problems which are likely to 
negatively affect the negotiations, resulting in limited interventions, which are insufficient to 
solve structural problems of the business. In these cases, distressed firms shall start new 
negotiations with stakeholders to define more incisive measures, hoping to finally obtain their 
consent and to effectively exit from the situation of decline and crisis. This situation occurred 
in Seat Pagine Gialle: the distressed firm was involved into four restructuring attempts from 
2009 to 2015, characterized by progressive higher intensity of interventions, which finally 
resulted in the total write-off of exposure towards financial lenders. The overall restructuring 
ensured the business continuity and its valorisation through business combinations. In fact, 
residual resources were integrated into Italiaonline, to finally create a point of reference in the 
business of Internet advertising for Small and Medium Enterprises, achieving the strategic goal 
that SPG stand-alone did not reach because of lack of internal competencies and scarcity of 
financial resources for relevant investment in new web-based products and services. 
In first and second restructuring attempts, SPG focused on renegotiation of outstanding 
financial liabilities, by undertaking private negotiations with its main senior lender, who 
released his consent on initiatives which protected its position: these attempts resulted in rise 
of interest rate for residual debt and anticipated reimbursement of about 800 million Euro, 
raised through a small stake in new equity capital (issued through a very-high dilution ratio for 
pre-existing shareholders since the market did not show interest in the offer) and a new bond 
loan with high interest rate, expiring in seven years. 
Despite the partial rescheduling of financial debt, SPG was still in trouble, so it undertook a 
long and complex negotiation with shareholders and overall financial claimants, resulting in the 
conversion of SPG junior debt into equity, which determined the shift of control in the hands 
of junior bond holders. Since the assumptions on sustainability of residual debt were not 
realistic, at the light of irreversible decline of the directory business and overall weakness of 
advertising market, four months after the completion of that restructuring, new SPG Board of 
Directors was forced to file a petition for composition with creditors in the bankruptcy court: 
only the latter procedure allowed the total cancellation of financial debt and the availability of 
residual assets to be valorised through M&A transactions. 
To value the opportunity of managerial choices and pathway followed for SPG reorganization, 
it is not sufficient to look at the facts, but it is necessary to pay attention on reasonableness of 
the choices at the light of information available at the time of the decision, on an ex-ante 
perspective. From the examination of critical points developed in Chapter 5, it is possible to 
conclude that the original LBO transaction was motivated by solid cash generation, and it 
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obtained a large consensus by equity analysts, who generally agreed on stability of revenues 
and EBITDA over years. On the other hand, the presence of high financial debt, reduced the 
amount of cash available for operating investments in launch of complementary products and 
acquisitions. 
The insufficiency of financial resources had become evident since the end of 2008, when SPG 
faced a general decline of advertising expenditure and of paper directories by declaring the shift 
of its core business to the supplying of digital advertising services for Small and Medium 
Enterprises. The success of new strategy would had required relevant investments in software 
and human resources for creation and commercialization of valuable digital products able to 
satisfy the needs of target customers, while SPG was focused on creation of standard websites 
and reselling of marketing services from Google. Therefore, from 2009 to 2015, despite the 
announced change in core business, the firm was still focused on the declining segment of 
directories advertising, and it tried to boost revenues through aggressive commercial policies. 
With respect to the restructuring attempts undertaken from 2009 to 2012, with special reference 
to Lighthouse equitization, their low effectiveness was probably determined by strong 
contractual position of senior creditors, who had pushed the determination of a SPG Enterprise 
Value higher than their claims’ nominal value through unrealistic assumptions, resulting from 
the holdout problem. This situation was consistent with the empirical analysis conducted by 
Gilson (1997), who found that out-of-court restructurings, although they constitute the first 
attempt of managers to sort out situations of financial crisis, on average, they result in limited 
reduction of outstanding debt: it follows that residual debt burden remains unsustainable and it 
determines the need of further restructurings. Moreover, SPG financial structure, composed by 
junior bonds, three tranches of senior bonds, a senior loan, and financial leasing, did not fit for 
out-of-out restructurings, because of high incidence of holdout problem and low external 
pressure for approval. In fact, in SPG case, the deadlock situation was manifested through long 
negotiations for discussion of the solution and the need of payment of relevant consent fees to 
favour the obtainment of the minimum share of approvals. 
Moreover, in out-of-court restructuring, senior creditors obtained higher collateralization of 
claims, higher interest rate without cancellation of principal, as counterparties for postponement 
of maturity date of the senior loan. The agreement was also constituted by complex, and almost 
useless from an operating point of view, transactions on corporate structure, such as the 
contribution of the whole firm to SPG Italia at the expenses of the overall business, in the only 
interest of junior and senior creditors. At the light of this result and the complexity of 2011-
2012 restructuring, it is possible to state that immediate recourse to a judicial instrument for 
crisis resolution would have been likely to facilitate big reduction of debt (including senior 
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debt) to facilitate the recovery of the distressed firm. This solution had probably reduced the 
extra procedural costs determined by low level of commitment and consent on needed 
measures. The threats of cram-down and business liquidation in case a sufficient consent lacked, 
would have been likely to favour the cooperation of involved creditors in reaching an 
advantageous agreement for all involved parties with lower cost and higher timeliness. 
In fact, applying the approach suggested by Moyer (2012) to the outcome of SPG 
reorganization, it is reasonably possible to conclude that, since 2011, SPG residual Enterprise 
Value was sufficient to only ensure a partial recovery of senior financial claims, so the “fulcrum 
security” was in the hand of senior creditors, while junior bond holders had irreversibly lost 
their investment. At the light of aggressive commercial policies, decline of market and reduction 
in EBITDA, it seems not reasonable that the huge loss of Enterprise Value, formally recognized 
in 2012 financial statement, had not manifested earlier. So, at that time, it was critical to take 
radical interventions, including total impairment of junior claimants, in conformance to their 
contractual position, and to rapidly shift the controlling stake of equity to senior creditors. 
Whether new shareholders had taken timely and consistent implementation of a new strategy, 
through new investments or M&A transaction, SPG operations would had restarted the value 
creation from a more favourable position. In addition, the presence of external supervision of 
neutral experts and mandatory rules in the judicial procedure, would have helped higher 
disclosure of information among involved stakeholders, facilitating the acknowledgement of 
the real situation of crisis by all involved parties. It must be remembered that additional positive 
effects, from SPG point of view, of composition with creditors in years 2013-2014 were the 
renegotiation of financial leasing and printing agreements. 
On the other hand, the recourse to composition with creditors had inevitably caused negative 
return for SPG external image and reduction of business activities. As explained by Gilson 
(2012), judicial procedures reduce trust by external stakeholders on the firms’ capability to 
honour its agreements, especially by clients who expect the service they have paid for is 
performed on a continual basis, and this effect is more pronounced when the business is based 
on intangible resources, since these firms and their key resources suffer direct losses from bad 
news. It follows that, potentially, the reduction in SPG customer base experienced in years 2013 
and 2014 was influenced by the negative image determined by the entry into composition with 
creditors, but it must be remembered that directories business was in irreversible decline and it 
had been damaged by aggressive commercial policies which reduced the product value. So, 
reasonably, the earlier entry of SPG into composition with creditors would not had determined 
further negative effects on revenues.  
In conclusion, as exemplified by the case study, the choice between judicial and non-judicial 
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procedures for resolution of financial distress is not straightforward, and it is not true that out-
of-court restructurings are always better than judicial procedures since the latter are long, costly 
and they damage the corporate image, as the common sense suggests. By contrary, after a deep 
and sincere recognition of reasons behind the situation of decline and crisis, incumbent 
shareholders and management are asked to select the instrument that best fits for the actual 
situation. It means that the ideal pathway of restructuring should minimize incidence of 
opportunistic behaviours and unnecessary costs, while it should ensure the return of financial 
burden to sustainable levels, together with a timely recovery of valuable resources inside the 
business. Models presented in Chapter 2 may help the proper selection of pathway for 
negotiation with stakeholders and subsequent reorganization, according to specific features of 
the business, environmental factors and the position of involved external stakeholders. 
The case study shows also the potentiality of reformed composition with creditors regulated by 
Italian law, in conformance to the U. S. experience of Chapter 11: over years, the Italian tool 
has been changing its nature from a framework for liquidation of distressed business and 
satisfaction of creditors, to an institute aimed at helping the reorganization of businesses 
possessing residual value in continuity and at restarting the process of sustainable value 
creation. Composition with creditors is also aimed at reduction of opportunistic behaviours by 
stakeholders, who are, by contrary, incentivized to actively participate in the reorganization and 
to directly enjoy the result of their choices. The hope is that, as suggested by Giacosa and 
Mazzoleni (2012), financial creditors and involved stakeholders, rather than stopping 
relationships with businesses who enter in composition with creditors, causing the need for 
forced liquidation of still valuable businesses, recognize the positive potentialities of these 
innovations: in this way they would permit the safeguard of good parts of distressed business 
and the creation of new value which benefits the overall economic system. 
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APPENDIX 1/A: DATA FROM OFFICIAL SPG-IOL PROFIT AND LOSS STATEMENTS 
 YEARS 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
         
TOTAL REVENUES 1,451,631 1,410,100 1,430,580 1,468,779 1,449,588 1,374,971 1,214,475 1,039,214 
         
Cost of raw materials 
(552,882) 
(73,057) (68,211) (64,862) (61,417) (56,308) (45,408) (37,423) 
Cost of services (445,039) (450,785) (508,417) (442,724) (415,331) (360,758) (343,660) 
Cost of labour (223,545) (209,216) (219,128) (231,921) (242,615) (236,663) (218,176) (199,490) 
Loss on receivables (41,652) (37,965) (40,771) (37,441) (38,741) (44,509) (48,745) (35,722) 
Provisions (31,216) (26,688) (19,888) (9,739) (11,211) (13,972) (9,257) (2,666) 
Other operating costs 0 (3,753) (5,237) (4,975) (4,756) (5,493) (4,530) (3,757) 
EBITDA 602,336 614,382 626,560 611,424 648,124 602,695 527,601 416,496 
         
Depreciations and impairments (272,151) (199,044) (194,458) (195,336) (203,884) (343,020) (252,160) (750,637) 
Extraordinary income/expenses (42,987) (31,321) (11,144) (12,932) (9,017) (17,587) (15,740) (9,187) 
Restructuring expenses  (4,645) (764) (1,038) (7,519) (13,741) (13,973) (31,517) 
OPERATING RESULT 287,198 379,372 420,194 402,118 427,704 228,347 245,728 (374,845) 
         
Financial income 12,384 8,978 24,185 11,374 18,727 33,612 26,423 16,568 
Interest expenses (139,118) (259,937) (284,753) (257,583) (258,505) (281,819) (241,306) (270,527) 
Gains/losses from Securities 1,593 6,576 4,243 (5) (3,314) (5) 36 35 
Gains from Composition  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EARNINGS BEFORE TAXES AND AFS 162,057 134,989 163,869 155,904 184,612 (19,865) 30,881 (628,769) 
         
Taxes on income (117,256) (48,930) (25,383) (74,116) (79,482) (69,190) (54,173) (87,938) 
Income from AfS assets (27,202) 0 175 0 1,108 (84,625) (12,337) (240) 
         
NET INCOME 17,599 86,059 138,661 81,788 106,238 (173,680) (35,629) (716,947) 
 
 
YEARS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
        
TOTAL REVENUES 961,792 659,008 507,931 412,133 449,554 393,507 340,490 
        
Cost of raw materials (29,634) 
(275,671) 
(22,419) (15,670) 
(271,934) 
(13,939) (2,321) 
Cost of services (336,946) (244,745) (238,050) (192,130) (180,222) 
Cost of labour (181,607) (91,789) (105,922) (95,292) (109,748) (99,782) (77,599) 
Loss on receivables (25,768) (51,113) (41,501) (25,093) (19,699) (14,894) (7,570) 
Provisions (12,751) (8,974) (231) (1,933) (1,931) (5,422) (2,434) 
Other operating costs (4,449) (2,579) (3,622) (3,467) (2,117) (3,393) (2,683) 
EBITDA 370,637 228,882 89,491 32,628 44,125 63,947 67,661 
        
Depreciations and impairments (761,253) (1,884,582) (277,896) (49,921) (54,164) (54,104) (35,909) 
Extraordinary income/expenses (29,809) 
(100,834) 
(43,078) (7,242) 
(16,933) 
(9,356) (1,930) 
Restructuring expenses (12,594) (2,973) (1,001) 252 (2,061) 
OPERATING RESULT (433,019) (1,756,534) (234,456) (25,536) (26,972) 739 27,761 
        
Financial income 16,041 675,155 2,659 2,221 1,860 2,555 1,320 
Interest expenses (284,428) (147,353) (132,910) (130,573) (4,459) (2,486) (639) 
Gains/losses from Securities (378) 0 0 (2,648) (6,618) (1,499) 0 
Gains from Composition 0 0 0 1,565,052 5,887 0 0 
EARNINGS BEFORE TAXES AND AFS (701,784) (1,228,732) (364,707) 1,408,516 (30,302) (691) 28442 
        
Taxes on income (87,184) 174,884 13,174 (15,069) 13,660 23,341 (2,025) 
Income from AfS assets 0 4,294 3,733 (18,428) 222 0 0 
        
NET INCOME (788,968) (1,049,554) (347,800) 1,375,019 (16,420) 22,650 26,417 
  
 
 
APPENDIX 1/B: DATA FROM OFFICIAL SPG-IOL BALANCE SHEETS 
YEARS 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
         
FIXED ASSETS 4,714,126 4,460,937 4,353,158 4,165,916 4,113,640 3,735,650 3,570,086 2,895,441 
Indefinite-lived Intangible Assets 3,602,834 3,565,020 3,574,260 3,579,001 3,687,067 3,393,998 3,309,436 2,637,197 
Definite-lived intangible assets 954,658 777,654 624,703 485,871 347,873 219,752 119,169 91,240 
Tangible Assets 42,579 35,697 49,648 50,013 55,709 43,716 37,207 32,217 
Financial leasing 0 0 0 0 489 62,886 60,173 56,445 
Equity investments 8,327 209 254 288 5,707 2,372 343 378 
Financial Assets - loans to employees 3,720 4,917 1,330 1,592 2,126 2,140 2,203 2,284 
Deferred tax assets 100,340 76,027 101,837 48,346 14,343 10,442 40,562 74,934 
Other non-current assets 1,668 1,413 1,126 805 326 344 993 746 
         
CURRENT ASSETS 1,113,583 932,092 963,887 1,061,572 992,022 1,068,189 999,341 946,283 
Inventory 12,890 10,313 12,444 11,891 15,703 15,211 10,482 10,399 
Trade Receivables 754,713 684,297 669,740 668,681 671,101 671,014 621,601 613,088 
Tax credits 69,242 16,306 6,267 5,239 21,054 7,016 8,376 4,300 
Other Credits 96,154 81,352 70,891 66,243 66,532 68,414 64,973 75,270 
Financial current assets 14,653 1,947 2,387 1,323 13,083 1,932 1,918 1,498 
Liquidity 165,931 137,877 202,158 308,195 204,549 304,602 291,991 241,728 
         
Assets available for sale 0 0 0 0 0 914 329 0 
         
TOTAL ASSETS 5,827,709 5,393,029 5,317,045 5,227,488 5,105,662 4,804,753 4,569,756 3,841,724 
  
 
 
YEARS 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
         
GROUP EQUITY 4,369,172 850,168 980,117 1,057,184 1,100,006 876,595 1,017,352 213,590 
Share capital 247,539 247,539 248,012 249,879 250,352 250,352 450,266 450,266 
Share premium reserve 4,154,087 541,845 441,893 460,428 465,103 465,103 466,843 466,843 
Legal reserve         
Other reserves 0 (19,146) 158,307 266,741 286,152 340,786 138,284 14,628 
Result for the period (32,454) 79,930 131,905 80,136 98,399 (179,646) (38,041) (718,147) 
MINORITIES EQUITY 5,351 9,788 19,617 18,246 23,824 26,946 21,911 15,064 
Share capital and reserves 4,462 3,659 12,861 16,594 15,985 20,980 18,478 13,517 
Result for the period 889 6,129 6,756 1,652 7,839 5,966 3,433 1,547 
SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY 4,374,523 859,956 999,734 1,075,430 1,123,830 903,541 1,039,263 228,654 
         
NON-CURRENT LIABILITIES 159,186 3,835,455 3,604,317 3,462,771 3,265,331 3,111,017 2,482,763 2,685,937 
Financial liabilities 105,170 2,513,070 2,273,792 2,125,640 1,926,171 1,766,442 1,125,960 1,327,196 
Subordinated liabilities 0 1,247,431 1,252,897 1,258,549 1,264,201 1,269,470 1,270,052 1,276,023 
Severance payments fund 32,427 52,916 52,781 56,768 47,183 34,767 42,896 38,641 
Deferred tax liabilities 1,497 10 2,059 0 5,089 14,168 14,028 7,498 
Other liabilities 20,092 22,028 22,788 21,814 22,687 26,170 29,827 36,579 
CURRENT LIABILITIES 1,294,000 697,618 712,994 689,287 716,501 790,157 1,047,475 926,883 
Financial liabilities 555,602 172,927 196,926 211,835 198,133 272,036 611,474 308,789 
Subordinated liabilities 0 19,306 17,375 17,375 17,375 17,375 17,375 17,375 
Trade payables 273,333 274,257 292,754 292,919 276,814 256,993 228,947 207,593 
Provisions 74,027 60,890 50,366 39,259 44,165 52,460 49,928 45,637 
Tax liabilities 243,730 43,057 40,958 23,533 54,413 72,764 39,258 50,653 
Deposits and deferred income 147,308 127,181 114,615 104,366 125,601 118,529 100,493 296,836 
Liabilities connected to AfS   0 0 0 0 38 255 250 
TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 5,827,709 5,393,029 5,317,045 5,227,488 5,105,662 4,804,753 4,569,756 3,841,724 
 
 
  YEARS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
        
FIXED ASSETS 2,129,400 508,610 177,958 173,172 375,487 355,271 345,912 
Indefinite-lived Intangible Assets 1,940,373 91,068 0 0 250,720 250,720 250,720 
Definite-lived intangible assets 78,591 325,707 130,338 121,115 93,360 66,605 56,193 
Tangible Assets 31,725 29,641 12,744 9,978 11,752 8,654 9,430 
Financial leasing 52,821 38,124 27,303 24,777 6,628 0 0 
Equity investments 0 0 0 10,254 3,646 2,111 2,699 
Financial Assets - loans to employees 2,414 2,037 1,015 869 2,358 3,469 2,901 
Deferred tax assets 22,800 16,503 696 462 191 152 117 
Other non-current assets 676 5,530 5,862 5,717 6,832 23,560 23,852 
        
CURRENT ASSETS 796,741 653,298 493,580 370,112 397,906 333,564 261,522 
Inventory 10,409 9,862 4,458 3,927 3,789 2,210 1,279 
Trade Receivables 520,797 360,528 229,815 182,830 197,070 161,786 137,794 
Tax credits 27,237 23,758 21,786 27,567 26,598 7,215 10,194 
Other Credits 62,080 57,104 39,056 44,615 46,098 40,177 37,113 
Financial current assets 3,486 2,387 2,039 2,718 785 610 666 
Liquidity 172,732 199,659 196,426 108,455 123,566 121,566 74,476 
        
Assets available for sale 602 0 169,015 0 2,525 11,801 0 
        
TOTAL ASSETS 2,926,743 1,161,908 840,553 543,284 775,918 700,636 607,434 
 
 
YEARS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
        
GROUP EQUITY (568,759) (996,460) (1,342,907) 174,429 295,472 367,337 315,593 
Share capital 450,266 450,266 450,266 20,000 7,558 20,000 20,000 
Share premium reserve 466,847 466,847 466,847 117,155 207,628 117,217 117,217 
Legal reserve    4,000 884 4,000 4,000 
Other reserves (696,122) (870,852) (1,912,417) (1,345,893) 75,350 203,470 147,959 
Result for the period (789,750) (1,042,721) (347,603) 1,379,167 4,052 22,650 26,417 
MINORITIES EQUITY 13,681 28,309 19,479 (92) 49,453 0 0 
Share capital and reserves 12,899 25,532 19,676 4,056 50,860 0 0 
Result for the period 782 2,777 (197) (4,148) (1,407) 0 0 
SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY (555,078) (968,151) (1,323,428) 174,337 344,925 367,337 315,593 
        
NON-CURRENT LIABILITIES 809,191 1,453,852 90,989 95,514 93,484 59,822 50,436 
Financial liabilities 750,661 1,328,338 35,216 32,344 7,798 0 0 
Subordinated liabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Severance payments fund 27,832 32,511 15,210 15,651 18,393 19,015 18,270 
Deferred tax liabilities 5,977 60,598 10,545 20,740 33,762 9,267 12,661 
Other liabilities 24,721 32,405 30,018 26,779 33,531 31,540 19,505 
CURRENT LIABILITIES 2,671,723 675,957 2,022,639 273,183 337,304 259,551 241,405 
Financial liabilities 760,981 201,653 1,623,178 7,428 41,996 59 2,195 
Subordinated liabilities 1,369,500 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Trade payables 192,608 177,938 149,796 94,216 137,713 111,027 101,113 
Provisions 51,113 55,392 71,705 26,865 36,048 33,798 35,966 
Tax liabilities 17,995 28,670 26,062 14,318 4,926 4,260 5,798 
Deposits and deferred income 279,526 212,304 151,898 130,356 116,621 110,407 96,333 
Liabilities connected to AfS 907 250 50,353 250 205 13,926 0 
TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 2,926,743 1,161,908 840,553 523,284 775,918 700,636 607,434 
 
 
APPENDIX 2/A: DATA FROM RESTATED SPG-IOL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
  
YEARS 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
         
TOTAL REVENUES 1.451.631 1.410.100 1.430.580 1.465.690 1.449.049 1.369.431 1.214.475 1.039.214 
Cost of raw materials and services (552.882) (518.096) (518.996) (573.279) (504.141) (471.639) (406.166) (381.083) 
Cost of labour (223.545) (209.216) (219.128) (231.921) (242.615) (236.663) (218.176) (199.490) 
Other operating costs 0 (3.753) (5.237) (4.975) (4.756) (5.493) (4.530) (3.757) 
EBITDA 675.204 679.035 687.219 655.515 697.537 655.636 585.603 454.884 
Provisions (72.868) (64.653) (60.659) (47.180) (49.952) (58.481) (58.002) (38.388) 
Depreciations (16.754) (14.579) (13.718) (13.234) (14.783) (14.782) (15.951) (14.575) 
Amortization of Operating Intangibles (17.994) (15.711) (18.673) (20.035) (27.034) (33.031) (47.245) (50.483) 
EBITA 567.588 584.092 594.169 575.066 605.768 549.342 464.405 351.438 
Impairments of goodwill (90.102) 0 0 0 0 (130.793) (91.297) (673.816) 
Amortization of MKTG related Intangibles (147.301) (168.754) (162.067) (162.067) (162.067) (164.414) (97.667) (11.763) 
EBIT 330.185 415.338 432.102 412.999 443.701 254.135 275.441 (334.141) 
Restructuring expenses (39.818) (4.645) (764) (6.432) (10.299) (25.611) (23.575) (38.349) 
Extraordinary Income (Costs) (3.169) (28.316) (3.237) 319 (4.201) 395 (5.911) (2.295) 
Cost of Stock options 0 (3.005) (7.907) (4.768) (1.497) (572) (227) (60) 
OPERATING RESULT 287.198 379.372 420.194 402.118 427.704 228.347 245.728 (374.845) 
         
Income (losses) from AfS (27.202) 0 175 0 1.108 (84.625) (12.337) (240) 
Result from equity investments 1.593 6.576 4.243 (5) (3.314) (5) 36 35 
Financial income 12.384 4.798 7.722 10.129 16.098 15.671 7.155 5.431 
Financial expenses (138.553) (253.055) (272.008) (256.202) (256.651) (258.805) (225.263) (259.597) 
Foreign Currency effects (565) (2.702) 3.718 (136) 775 (5.073) 3.225 207 
Income from debt restructuring         
Taxes (117.256) (48.930) (25.383) (74.116) (79.482) (69.190) (54.173) (87.938) 
NET INCOME (LOSS) 17.599 86.059 138.661 81.788 106.238 (173.680) (35.629) (716.947) 
 
 
YEARS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
        
TOTAL REVENUES 961.792 659.008 507.931 412.133 449.554 393.507 340.490 
Cost of raw materials and services (366.580) (275.671) (267.164) (253.720) (271.934) (206.069) (182.543) 
Cost of labour (181.607) (91.789) (105.922) (95.292) (109.748) (99.782) (77.599) 
Other operating costs (4.449) (2.579) (3.622) (3.467) (2.117) (3.393) (2.683) 
EBITDA 409.156 288.969 131.223 59.654 65.755 84.263 77.665 
Provisions (38.519) (60.087) (41.732) (27.026) (21.630) (20.316) (10.004) 
Depreciations (13.808) (9.070) (22.730) (7.667) (6.643) (5.905) (3.781) 
Amortization of Operating Intangibles (48.587) (38.773) (36.798) (32.682) (42.886) (42.189) (26.900) 
EBITA 308.242 181.039 29.963 (7.721) (5.404) 15.853 36.980 
Impairments of goodwill (696.284) (1.327.625) (88.947) (4.619) 0 0 0 
Amortization of MKTG related Intangibles (2.574) (509.114) (129.421) (4.953) (4.635) (6.010) (5.228) 
EBIT (390.616) (1.655.700) (188.405) (17.293) (10.039) 9.843 31.752 
Restructuring expenses (42.007) (89.932) (42.058) (11.737) (42.353) (8.044) (5.110) 
Extraordinary Income (Costs) (396) (10.902) (3.993) 3.494 25.420 (1.060) 1.119 
Cost of Stock options 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OPERATING RESULT (433.019) (1.756.534) (234.456) (25.536) (26.972) 739 27.761 
        
Income (losses) from AfS 0 4.294 3.733 (18.428) 222 0 0 
Result from equity investments (378) 0 0 (2.648) (6.618) (1.499) 0 
Financial income 3.776 5.465 2.659 2.221 1.860 2.555 1.320 
Financial expenses (273.472) (147.353) (132.858) (130.565) (4.459) (2.442) (623) 
Foreign Currency effects 1.309 0 (52) (8) 0 (44) (16) 
Income from debt restructuring  669.690  1.565.052 5.887   
Taxes (87.184) 174.884 13.174 (15.069) 13.660 23.341 (2.025) 
NET INCOME (LOSS) (788.968) (1.049.554) (347.800) 1.375.019 (16.420) 22.650 26.417 
  
 
 
APPENDIX 2/B: DATA FROM RESTATED SPG-IOL BALANCE SHEETS 
  YEARS 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Trade receivables 754.713 684.297 669.740 668.681 671.101 671.014 621.601 613.088 
Inventory 12.890 10.313 12.444 11.891 15.703 15.211 10.482 10.399 
Trade payables (273.333) (274.257) (292.754) (292.919) (276.814) (256.993) (228.947) (207.593) 
Working cash 29.033 28.202 28.612 29.314 28.981 27.389 24.290 20.784 
Net deferred income and prepaid expenses (51.154) (45.829) (43.724) (38.123) (50.080) (50.115) (35.520) (221.566) 
TRADE WORKING CAPITAL 472.149 402.726 374.318 378.844 388.891 406.506 391.906 215.112 
Net tax credits (liabilities) (174.488) (26.751) (34.691) (18.294) (33.359) (65.748) (30.882) (46.353) 
Current Provisions (74.027) (60.890) (50.366) (39.259) (44.165) (52.460) (49.928) (45.637) 
NET WORKING CAPITAL 223.634 315.085 289.261 321.291 311.367 288.298 311.096 123.122 
Tangible assets 42.579 35.697 49.648 50.013 56.198 106.602 97.380 88.662 
Operating intangible assets 44.465 34.849 43.965 67.200 91.269 96.264 93.348 77.182 
OPERATING FIXED CAPITAL 87.044 70.546 93.613 117.213 147.467 202.866 190.728 165.844 
Other non-current assets 0 1.413 1.126 805 326 344 993 746 
Non-current Provisions 0 (4.167) (3.323) (576) (1.343) (4.012) (6.641) (13.604) 
DTA/DTL on operating items 98.843 70.239 57.574 50.706 54.008 47.745 49.555 88.824 
Non-current Tax credits 1.668 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NON-CURRENT ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 100.511 67.485 55.377 50.935 52.991 44.077 43.907 75.966 
OPERATING INVESTED CAPITAL 411.189 453.116 438.251 489.439 511.825 535.241 545.731 364.932 
Goodwill and marketing related intangibles 4.513.027 4.307.825 4.154.998 3.997.672 3.943.671 3.517.486 3.335.257 2.651.255 
Deferred tax assets/liabilities on goodwill 0 (68.733) (73.839) (114.358) (50.019) (53.564) (28.649) (29.054) 
OPERATING INVESTED CAPITAL + GOODWILL 4.924.216 4.692.208 4.519.410 4.372.753 4.405.477 3.999.163 3.852.339 2.987.133 
Non-operating assets 26.700 7.073 3.971 3.203 11.927 6.444 4.464 4.160 
Held for sale assets/liabilities 0 0 0 0 0 876 74 (250) 
DTA/DTL on losses and non-operating assets 0 74.511 116.043 111.998 5.265 2.093 5.628 7.666 
NON-OPERATING ASSETS 26.700 81.584 120.014 115.201 17.192 9.413 10.166 11.576 
TOTAL INVESTED CAPITAL 4.950.916 4.773.792 4.639.424 4.487.954 4.422.669 4.008.576 3.862.505 2.998.709 
 
 
  
YEARS 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
         
Excess cash (136.898) (109.675) (173.546) (278.881) (175.568) (277.213) (267.702) (220.944) 
RBS bank loan 528.328 2.684.194 2.444.841 2.059.552 1.834.431 1.671.976 1.390.320 649.974 
Lighthouse International loan 0 1.266.737 1.270.272 1.275.924 1.281.576 1.286.845 1.287.427 1.293.398 
Senior Secured Bonds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 728.220 
Financial leasing 0 0 0 0 0 56.458 54.911 52.202 
Securitization of receivables 0 0 0 254.653 258.768 258.865 256.930 190.000 
Other current financial liabilities 27.274 1.705 25.814 23.144 30.839 51.086 29.878 15.589 
Other non-current financial liabilities 105.170 98 63 126 266 93 5.395 0 
         
NET FINANCIAL POSITION 523.874 3.843.059 3.567.444 3.334.518 3.230.312 3.048.110 2.757.160 2.708.439 
         
Severance payments funds 52.519 70.777 72.246 78.006 68.527 56.925 66.082 61.616 
         
NFP+DEBT EQUIVALENT 576.393 3.913.836 3.639.690 3.412.524 3.298.839 3.105.035 2.823.242 2.770.055 
         
GROUP EQUITY 4.369.172 850.168 980.117 1.057.184 1.100.006 876.595 1.017.352 213.590 
MINORITY INTERESTS 5.351 9.788 19.617 18.246 23.824 26.946 21.911 15.064 
         
TOTAL SOURCE OF FINANCING 4.950.916 4.773.792 4.639.424 4.487.954 4.422.669 4.008.576 3.862.505 2.998.709 
 
 
YEARS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Trade receivables 520.797 360.528 229.815 182.830 197.070 161.786 137.794 
Inventory 10.409 9.862 4.458 3.927 3.789 2.210 1.279 
Trade payables (192.608) (177.938) (149.796) (94.216) (137.713) (111.027) (101.113) 
Working cash 19.236 13.180 10.159 8.243 8.991 7.870 6.810 
Net deferred income and prepaid expenses (217.446) (155.200) (112.842) (92.022) (73.274) (76.263) (68.519) 
TRADE WORKING CAPITAL 140.388 50.432 (18.206) 8.762 (1.137) (15.424) (23.749) 
Net tax credits (liabilities) 9.242 (4.912) (4.276) 19.530 24.423 8.988 13.695 
Current Provisions (51.113) (55.392) (71.705) (26.865) (36.048) (33.798) (35.966) 
NET WORKING CAPITAL 98.517 (9.872) (94.187) 1.427 (12.762) (40.234) (46.020) 
Tangible assets 84.546 67.765 40.047 34.755 18.380 8.654 9.430 
Operating intangible assets 67.107 164.570 101.275 95.803 60.367 39.622 34.437 
OPERATING FIXED CAPITAL 151.653 232.335 141.322 130.558 78.747 48.276 43.867 
Other non-current assets 676 5.530 5.862 1.199 2.314 499 434 
Non-current Provisions (4.152) (7.834) (7.182) (2.296) (14.760) (12.257) (503) 
DTA/DTL on operating items 48.638 51.956 12.956 424 12.517 22.456 20.920 
Non-current Tax credits 0 0 0 4.518 4.518 23.061 23.418 
NON-CURRENT ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 45.162 49.652 11.636 3.845 4.589 33.759 44.269 
OPERATING INVESTED CAPITAL 295.332 272.115 58.771 135.830 70.574 41.801 42.116 
Goodwill and marketing related intangibles 1.951.857 252.205 29.063 25.312 283.713 277.703 272.476 
Deferred tax assets/liabilities on goodwill (40.682) (108.350) (22.829) (21.390) (56.025) (54.646) (52.280) 
OPERATING INVESTED CAPITAL + GOODWILL 2.206.507 415.970 65.005 139.752 298.262 264.858 262.312 
Non-operating assets 5.900 4.424 3.054 13.841 6.789 6.190 6.266 
Held for sale assets/liabilities (305) (250) 118.662 (250) 2.320 (2.125) 0 
DTA/DTL on losses and non-operating assets 8.867 12.299 24 688 9.937 23.075 18.816 
NON-OPERATING ASSETS 14.462 16.473 121.740 14.279 19.046 27.140 25.082 
TOTAL INVESTED CAPITAL 2.220.969 432.443 186.745 154.031 317.308 291.998 287.394 
  
 
 
YEARS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
        
Excess cash (153.496) (186.479) (186.267) (100.212) (114.575) (113.696) (67.666) 
RBS bank loan 740.250 663.873 703.435 0 0 0 0 
Lighthouse International loan 1.369.500 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Senior Secured Bonds 722.242 824.616 915.493 0 0 0 0 
Financial leasing 49.336 41.502 39.466 37.320 8.916 0 0 
Securitization of receivables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other current financial liabilities (186) 0 0 2.452 40.878 59 2.195 
Other non-current financial liabilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
NET FINANCIAL POSITION 2.727.646 1.343.512 1.472.127 (60.440) (64.781) (113.637) (65.471) 
        
Severance payments funds 48.401 57.082 38.046 40.134 37.164 38.298 37.272 
        
NFP+DEBT EQUIVALENT 2.776.047 1.400.594 1.510.173 (20.306) (27.617) (75.339) (28.199) 
        
GROUP EQUITY (568.759) (996.460) (1.342.907) 174.429 295.472 367.337 315.593 
MINORITY INTERESTS 13.681 28.309 19.479 (92) 49.453 0 0 
        
TOTAL SOURCE OF FINANCING 2.220.969 432.443 186.745 154.031 317.308 291.998 287.394 
 
  
 
 
APPENDIX 2/C: COMPUTATION OF SPG-IOL FREE CASH FLOWS 
YEARS 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
EBITA 567.588 584.092 594.169 575.066 605.768 549.342 464.405 351.438 
Adjusted operating taxes (243.535) (208.005) (176.111) (219.788) (224.525) (223.743) (157.137) (174.327) 
NOPLAT 324.053 376.087 418.058 355.278 381.243 325.599 307.268 177.111 
Provisions (72.868) (64.653) (60.659) (47.180) (49.952) (58.481) (58.002) (38.388) 
Depreciations 16.754 14.579 13.718 13.234 14.783 14.782 15.951 14.575 
Amortization of Operating Intangibles 17.994 15.711 18.673 20.035 27.034 33.031 47.245 50.483 
GROSS CASH FLOW 431.669 471.030 511.108 435.727 473.012 431.893 428.466 280.557 
Change in operating working capital  (156.104) (34.835) (79.210) (40.028) (35.412) (80.800) 149.585 
Net capital expenditure  (13.792) (55.458) (56.869) (72.071) (103.212) (51.058) (40.174) 
Change in other operating items  33.026 12.108 4.442 (2.056) 8.914 170 (32.059) 
GROSS INVESTMENT   (136.870) (78.185) (131.637) (114.155) (129.710) (131.688) 77.352 
FCF BEFORE INVESTMENT IN GOODWILL   334.160 432.923 304.090 358.857 302.184 296.778 357.909 
Investment in goodwill (+DTL effect)  105.181 (4.134) 35.778 (172.405) 134.523 (31.650) (1.172) 
FCF AFTER GOODWILL   439.341 428.789 339.868 186.452 436.707 265.128 356.737 
Investment in extra operating items  (54.884) (38.430) 4.813 98.009 7.779 (753) (1.410) 
Extraordinary income and expenses  (35.966) (11.908) (10.881) (15.997) (25.788) (29.713) (40.704) 
Gains and losses on equity investments  6.576 4.243 (5) (3.314) (5) 36 35 
Gains and losses from foreign currencies  (2.702) 3.718 (136) 775 (5.073) 3.225 207 
Gains and losses from available for sale  0 175 0 1.108 (84.625) (12.337) (240) 
Non-operating taxes  159.075 150.728 145.672 145.043 154.553 102.964 86.389 
NON-OPERATING CASH FLOW   72.099 108.526 139.463 225.624 46.841 63.422 44.277 
CASH FLOW AVAILABLE TO INVESTORS  511.440 537.315 479.331 412.076 483.547 328.550 401.014 
Proceeds from debt restructuring  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Net financial expenses  (248.257) (264.286) (246.073) (240.553) (243.134) (218.108) (254.166) 
Change in severance pay funds  18.258 1.469 5.760 (9.479) (11.602) 9.157 (4.466) 
Change in shareholders' equity  (3.598.934) (1.956) (3.069) (55.577) (43.765) 178.798 (85.615) 
Change in minority interest  (1.692) 3.073 (3.023) (2.261) (2.844) (7.447) (8.047) 
CHANGE IN NFP   (3.319.185) 275.615 232.926 104.206 182.202 290.950 48.720 
  
 
 
 
YEARS 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
EBITA 308.242 181.039 29.963 (7.721) (5.404) 15.853 36.980 
Adjusted operating taxes (175.113) (54.311) (76.571) (60.296) 6.243 19.136 (4.284) 
NOPLAT 133.129 126.728 (46.608) (68.017) 839 34.989 32.696 
Provisions (38.519) (60.087) (41.732) (27.026) (21.630) (20.316) (10.004) 
Depreciations 13.808 9.070 22.730 7.667 6.643 5.905 3.781 
Amortization of Operating Intangibles 48.587 38.773 36.798 32.682 42.886 42.189 26.900 
GROSS CASH FLOW 234.043 234.658 54.652 (642) 71.998 103.399 73.381 
Change in operating working capital (13.914) 48.302 42.584 (122.640) (7.441) 7.156 (4.218) 
Net capital expenditure (48.204) (128.525) 31.485 (29.585) 2.282 (17.623) (26.272) 
Change in other operating items 30.804 (4.490) 38.016 7.791 (744) (29.170) (10.510) 
GROSS INVESTMENT (31.314) (84.713) 112.085 (144.434) (5.903) (39.637) (41.000) 
FCF BEFORE INVESTMENT IN GOODWILL 202.729 149.945 166.736 (145.076) 66.094 63.762 32.381 
Investment in goodwill (+DTL effect) 12.168 (69.419) (80.747) (7.260) (228.401) (1.379) (2.367) 
FCF AFTER GOODWILL 214.897 80.526 85.989 (152.336) (162.307) 62.383 30.014 
Investment in extra operating items (2.886) (2.011) (105.267) 107.461 (4.767) (8.094) 2.058 
Extraordinary income and expenses (42.403) (100.834) (46.051) (8.243) (16.933) (9.104) (3.991) 
Gains and losses on equity investments (378) 0 0 (2.648) (6.618) (1.499) 0 
Gains and losses from foreign currencies 1.309 0 (52) (8) 0 (44) (16) 
Gains and losses from available for sale 0 4.294 3.733 (18.428) 222 0 0 
Non-operating taxes 87.929 229.195 89.745 45.227 7.417 4.205 2.259 
NON-OPERATING CASH FLOW 43.571 130.644 (57.892) 123.361 (20.679) (14.536) 310 
CASH FLOW AVAILABLE TO INVESTORS 258.468 211.170 28.098 (28.975) (182.985) 47.847 30.324 
Proceeds from debt restructuring 0 669.690 0 1.565.052 5.887 0 0 
Net financial expenses (269.696) (141.888) (130.199) (128.344) (2.599) 113 697 
Change in severance pay funds (13.215) 8.681 (19.036) 2.088 (2.970) 1.134 (1.026) 
Change in shareholders' equity 7.401 630.841 1.156 138.169 133.684 49.215 (78.161) 
Change in minority interest (2.165) 5.640 (8.633) (15.423) 53.324 (49.453) 0 
CHANGE IN NFP (19.207) 1.384.134 (128.614) 1.532.567 4.341 48.856 (48.166) 
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